The November 19 Tokyo 2+2 dialogue signals a significant shift in bilateral defence relations, with India opening military training infrastructure to Japanese forces and the two countries moving towards deeper industrial and operational integration across the Indo-Pacific.
India and Japan are moving towards a more consequential phase of strategic cooperation, with expanded military access, joint defence manufacturing, naval logistics and closer coordination on Indo-Pacific security emerging as the central pillars of their partnership.
The outcome of the fourth India-Japan Foreign and Defence Ministerial Dialogue, commonly known as the 2+2 meeting, held in Tokyo on November 19, indicates that the two countries are increasingly prepared to translate their strategic partnership into practical military capabilities. The joint statement issued after the meeting outlined a series of initiatives that could significantly deepen defence cooperation between the two Asian powers.
The meeting brought together Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar with their Japanese counterparts, Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu and Defence Minister Koizumi Shinjiro. Their discussions covered military exercises, defence technology, industrial collaboration, maritime security and regional geopolitical developments.
Although the joint statement received relatively limited international attention, several of its commitments represent important developments in the evolution of India-Japan relations. Most notably, the two countries have agreed to move towards allowing Japan’s Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) to conduct live-fire training at designated firing ranges in India, including exercises involving surface-to-ship missiles.
The development marks a significant departure from the traditional framework of bilateral military engagement, which has largely centred on joint exercises, naval visits and high-level defence exchanges.
One of the most consequential outcomes of the Tokyo meeting was the signing of a Letter of Intent (LoI) concerning the use of Indian firing ranges by Japan’s Self-Defence Forces.
The sixth paragraph of the joint statement welcomed the agreement, under which Japanese forces would, for the first time, be able to conduct live-fire training in India, including activities involving surface-to-ship missiles.
Japan’s Defence Minister Koizumi described the development as a major strategic step, reflecting the growing confidence between the two countries.
The agreement is particularly significant because Japan faces geographical and operational limitations in conducting certain types of military training. As a densely populated island nation, Japan has relatively limited space for extensive long-range missile exercises and other live-fire activities. Conducting such training requires careful management of surrounding airspace and maritime areas, including populated regions and important fishing grounds.
India, by comparison, possesses extensive military training and testing infrastructure, including facilities in Rajasthan and strategically important locations along its coastline. The country’s Integrated Test Range off the coast of Odisha also provides specialised capabilities for missile testing and tracking.
Access to such facilities could give Japanese forces additional opportunities to conduct realistic training under different operational conditions.
The agreement also reflects a growing level of strategic confidence. Allowing a foreign military to use sensitive training infrastructure, particularly for missile-related exercises, goes beyond conventional military exchanges and indicates a willingness to deepen operational cooperation.
The development builds on an expanding programme of bilateral military exercises. During Exercise Veer Guardian 26, conducted from September 9 to 26, Japan deployed its Mitsubishi F-2A fighter aircraft and personnel to India’s Air Force Station Jodhpur for the first time. Japan’s Air Chief, Takehiro Morita, also visited India during the exercise.
The two countries have gradually expanded cooperation through the Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX), the air exercise Veer Guardian, the army exercise Dharma Guardian and the multilateral Malabar naval exercises.
JIMEX, most recently conducted on November 13-14 south of Japan’s Honshu Island, has provided opportunities for both navies to improve interoperability and coordination.
However, the latest agreement takes military cooperation beyond conventional exercises by introducing the possibility of more advanced live-fire training on Indian territory.
The Tokyo meeting also produced important developments in maritime logistics and operational coordination.
Building on the Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services (RPSS) agreement, the two governments agreed to advance negotiations towards a reciprocal framework for naval ship repairs.
Such an arrangement could strengthen the logistical relationship between the two navies by connecting Indian shipyards with Japanese naval support networks.
The framework would potentially allow Indian naval vessels operating in the Western Pacific to access Japanese repair and maintenance facilities, while Japanese vessels deployed in the Indian Ocean could benefit from India’s expanding shipbuilding and maintenance infrastructure.
This cooperation could become increasingly important as both countries seek to maintain a sustained naval presence across the Indo-Pacific. Access to repair facilities, fuel, supplies and other logistical support can significantly improve operational flexibility, particularly during prolonged deployments or regional crises.
The ministers also recognised the growing importance of unmanned technologies in contemporary military operations. Both sides committed to incorporating unmanned aerial and maritime systems into joint exercises and strengthening their ability to operate together at short notice.
Another important initiative involves tabletop exercises focused on Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), which are designed to improve coordination during emergencies requiring the evacuation of civilians from conflict zones or unstable regions.
These arrangements indicate that the partnership is expanding beyond traditional deterrence towards practical crisis-management capabilities.
As regional tensions increase and maritime security challenges become more complex, the ability to coordinate unmanned surveillance, maritime operations and emergency responses could provide both countries with significant operational advantages.
Another major outcome of the meeting concerns defence industrial cooperation, particularly the proposed manufacturing and integration of Japan’s Unified Complex Radio Antenna (UNICORN) system in India.
The seventh paragraph of the joint statement emphasised the early implementation of arrangements for the UNICORN mast, with India’s Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) expected by February 2027.
The technology, fitted aboard Japan’s Mogami-class stealth frigates, integrates multiple communications, radar and electronic warfare functions into a single mast structure.
By consolidating different antenna systems, UNICORN reduces the number of exposed structures on a warship, helping lower its radar signature while improving its ability to detect, communicate and respond to potential threats.
Under the proposed arrangement, Japan’s NEC Corporation will provide the design and technology, while India’s Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) will undertake integration and manufacturing activities.
The project is significant because it represents a move away from conventional defence procurement towards technology collaboration and domestic production.
For India, it could provide access to advanced Japanese naval electronics and manufacturing expertise. For Japan, cooperation with India’s defence industry offers opportunities to expand production capabilities and establish a stronger industrial presence in one of the world’s largest defence markets.
At the Tokyo meeting, Singh described the emerging approach through the principle of “Design with Japan, Make in India.”
The formula reflects the complementary strengths of the two countries. Japan possesses advanced capabilities in precision engineering, electronics, materials science and high-end manufacturing, while India offers a large engineering workforce, industrial capacity and an expanding domestic defence manufacturing ecosystem.
The ministers also agreed to explore similar cooperation in mine countermeasures, underwater domain awareness, missile technologies and naval shipbuilding.
These sectors are becoming increasingly important as modern maritime competition expands beyond conventional surface warfare to include underwater surveillance, autonomous systems, electronic warfare and precision-guided weapons.
If implemented effectively, the UNICORN project could become a model for broader defence industrial collaboration between the two countries.
Beyond military and industrial cooperation, the joint statement carries a clear geopolitical message about the future security architecture of the Indo-Pacific.
India and Japan reaffirmed their commitment to sovereignty, territorial integrity, freedom of navigation and a rules-based maritime order. They also expressed opposition to unilateral attempts to change the status quo through force or coercion.
Although China was not explicitly identified in these commitments, Beijing’s expanding military and maritime influence remains an important strategic consideration for both governments.
Japan faces persistent tensions with China around the Senkaku Islands, which Beijing calls the Diaoyu Islands, alongside growing concerns about Chinese military activities in the East China Sea and the wider Western Pacific.
India, meanwhile, continues to manage an unresolved territorial dispute with China, including military tensions along the Line of Actual Control. Beijing’s expanding strategic and defence relationship with Pakistan also remains a major concern for New Delhi.
China’s rapid naval modernisation and growing presence in the Indian Ocean have further strengthened the strategic convergence between India and Japan.
However, neither country appears to be pursuing a formal military alliance directed exclusively against Beijing. Instead, their approach emphasises regional resilience, maritime cooperation and strengthening the capabilities of partner countries across Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific.
The joint statement underscored the importance of providing regional partners with greater strategic depth, helping them resist coercion, preserve freedom of navigation and maintain an open maritime order.
In this context, cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries remains a central element of their regional strategy.
The 14th paragraph of the statement welcomed the inaugural India-Japan-Philippines Trilateral 1.5 Dialogue held in October and the first trilateral naval Passage Exercise (PASSEX) with Indonesia in February 2026.
These initiatives demonstrate how the India-Japan partnership is increasingly extending into a wider network of regional security relationships.
The two countries also committed to aligning India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and MAHASAGAR vision with Japan’s updated Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) framework.
Such coordination could provide a broader foundation for cooperation in maritime security, infrastructure development, capacity-building and regional connectivity.
The timing of the latest agreements is particularly important as Japan undertakes a review of its National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy and Defense Buildup Program under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi.
Tokyo is seeking to strengthen its defence capabilities and adopt a more proactive security posture amid growing regional uncertainty. In this evolving strategic environment, India is increasingly emerging as an important partner for Japan in maintaining stability across the Indo-Pacific.
For New Delhi, closer defence cooperation with Tokyo offers access to advanced technologies, industrial partnerships and additional opportunities to strengthen its maritime capabilities without relying exclusively on traditional defence suppliers.
The partnership also reflects the growing importance of economic and technological security in modern strategic relationships. Cooperation in defence manufacturing, electronics, missile technologies and naval infrastructure can create long-term industrial interdependence while strengthening military preparedness.
As the two countries prepare to mark 75 years of diplomatic relations in 2027, the fourth 2+2 dialogue represents an important milestone in their bilateral relationship.
The joint statement suggests that the India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership is moving beyond diplomatic commitments and routine military exchanges. Access to firing ranges, reciprocal naval repair arrangements, unmanned warfare cooperation and joint defence technology development indicate a more practical and operational phase of engagement.
The extent of its impact will ultimately depend on implementation, particularly the conclusion of technical arrangements, regulatory approvals and industrial agreements.
