Arab News | Trump’s ‘economic D-Day’ about more than sanctions

by gulftimes



There are many ways of looking at US President Donald Trump’s “economic D-Day” against Iran. Conventional wisdom says that economic sanctions on the economy simply do not work, but maybe they were never meant to. This is part of a many-sided mind game involving both domestic and international audiences. It is like a gunman in a cowboy movie aiming at several targets at the same time. There is the opponent, the opponent’s public, the international audience of allies and rivals, and, most importantly, your own domestic public.

Sanctions are sometimes the default option to show that something is being done. This can be for internal political reasons, to avoid other choices or as a digression to gain time. These curbs have little effect on the regimes being sanctioned and instead it is the civilian population that bears the brunt via the economic collapse of their day-to-day lives. The targeted regime can use the restrictions to grow stronger by directing the anger at the US rather than at itself. We have seen this in many cases, from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to Bashar Assad’s Syria to Tehran itself. In 1991, former US President George H.W. Bush called on Iraqis to rise up against Saddam, which they did, thinking they had US support. But Bush got cold feet and, instead of liberating the Iraqi people, punished them with sanctions and allowed Saddam to crush the revolt.

So, when Trump announces an “economic D-Day” — unleashing maximum pressure and threatening secondary sanctions on anyone doing business with Iran — the anti-Trump mainstream media’s reaction is entirely predictable. It is framed as a desperate measure from an administration whose policy has failed, with the Iranian regime still standing, the Strait of Hormuz a flashpoint and the US losing the battle. Here, domestic politics becomes the main battleground. At the same time, Trump must show his base and the public that he is acting tough and winning; he cannot afford to project any degree of weakness.

If Washington shows any sign of fragility, the Iran regime will seize on it to declare victory to its own people

Nadim Shehadi

Tehran is playing a similar game. The Iranian regime has its own internal constituency and hard-liners to satisfy. If Washington shows any sign of fragility, the regime will seize on it to declare victory to its own people. Any concessions can backfire. When former President Joe Biden suspended the enforcement of certain sanctions as an incentive for diplomatic progress, the approach failed — the Iranians viewed it as a weakness to be exploited.

This time, the regime may have met its match, with both sides playing tough and Trump not falling for any of the previous traps set by Tehran. One was using the nuclear issue as a diversion while building up its proxies in the region. Another was using these proxies to keep the battle away from its own territory.

For more than 30 years, many of the region’s dictators have used nuclear negotiations and weapons of mass destruction as a diversion. Saddam welcomed international inspectors and kept the world busy while he was massacring his own people. Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi used them as a rehabilitation tool. Assad, with Russian help, brought in inspectors as a distraction and avoided the retaliation that former US President Barack Obama promised — his famous “red line” — if Syria used chemical weapons against its own people. As a result, Assad was given a green light to destroy his country.

The 2015 nuclear deal allowed Iran to develop its regional power, which we saw in action after Oct. 7, 2023. The main condition during these negotiations was that the US should concentrate only on the technicalities of the nuclear issue and was forbidden to bring to the table any “geopolitical” matters involving Iran’s role in the region. Hence, Iran intervened in Syria to prop up the Assad regime and continued to build up its proxies in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Trump, however, refuses to isolate the nuclear file and insists on addressing the entire package, including ballistic missiles and regional proxies.

In response, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is trying to exert counterpressure by targeting Gulf states and holding global trade hostage in the Strait of Hormuz. But this kind of economic blackmail is a double-edged sword. Tehran is not gaining any friends in the region by acting like a global nuisance, nor is it winning favor with its own key allies. Closing international waterways hurts major energy importers such as China far more than it hurts the energy independent US.

Maximum pressure is a card in Trump’s hand for his broader strategic posture, particularly regarding China

Nadim Shehadi

At the same time, the war is now happening on Iranian soil. For 47 years, the IRGC has managed to avoid this by keeping the confrontation with the US away from its own territory. As such, it is far more costly than when the battles were in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon or Gaza. This is far less sustainable and is affecting the economy, infrastructure and destroying most of the regime’s arsenal and military equipment.

This brings us to the broader geopolitical chessboard. Maximum pressure on Iran is not just about Tehran — it is also a card in Trump’s hand for his broader strategic posture, particularly regarding his upcoming meeting with China’s Xi Jinping. By squeezing Iran’s oil trade, Trump creates leverage that can be traded or leveraged in high-level talks with Beijing.

None of this changes the tragic human reality. Under extreme sanctions, it is never the regime elites who starve or go without medicine; it is ordinary civilians who bear the brunt of a collapsing economy and skyrocketing inflation. We saw this devastating pattern in Iraq and we are seeing it again in Iran.

Nobody can predict the final outcome of this confrontation or how internal shifts on either side will influence events. Trump may have to back down due to purely internal pressures if the outcome of the upcoming midterm elections is unfavorable. In Iran, we may also see popular revolts intensifying. Both sides may be let down by their allies because of economic pressures resulting from the war.

But viewing Trump’s “economic D-Day” purely as a sanctions failure ignores the brutal realities of political survival. This is not just economic policy; it is a battle of wits and political posturing played out on a global stage, with both sides fighting as much for their domestic survival as they are for regional dominance.

Nadim Shehadi is an economist and political adviser. He has held positions in academia and think tanks in Europe and the US. He ran a program on the regional dimension of the Middle East Peace Process at Chatham House.





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