The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas visited Damascus this week, where she said that Brussels wanted to “upgrade” its partnership with Syria and help boost the country’s recovery, but she also called for further domestic reform.
Following the fall of the Bashar Assad regime, the EU launched a new chapter with Syria. EU chief Ursula von der Leyen told Syria’s new President Ahmad Al-Sharaa that Europe would “do everything it can” to support Syria’s recovery. Within this context, the EU gradually lifted its economic sanctions on Syria and in May, the first high-level political dialogue between the EU and Syria was held in Brussels.
Earlier this month, EU Ambassador Michael Ohnmacht presented his credentials to Al-Sharaa, marking the first time the bloc has been represented at the ambassadorial level in Syria since 2012. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani announced that Syria and the EU also plan to replace their 1977 cooperation accord with a modern partnership agreement.
During the Syrian crisis, the country was a critical issue for both Turkiye and the EU, with joint concerns focusing on terrorism and the refugee problem. These two issues required close Turkish-European coordination, despite ups and downs in their relations and approaches to the crisis.
In 2016, the EU signed a migration agreement with Turkiye, an EU candidate country that hosted the largest number of Syrian refugees throughout the crisis. The agreement aimed to stop refugees trying to reach Europe by the Aegean route. Under the agreement, Turkiye agreed to prevent irregular migration to the EU, and in return the EU committed funding to support refugees in Turkiye and also improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria, particularly near the Turkish border.
From the EU perspective, Syria was approached through both security and humanitarian contexts, and Turkiye was seen as a crucial partner on its southeastern flank. This role even led many to describe Turkiye as “Europe’s gatekeeper.” As a result, Syria became a key point of convergence in Turkish-EU relations where migration, security, and foreign policy interests intersected.
Over the years, the prolonging of the Syrian crisis, however, caused shifts in the EU’s approach, as European countries began to review their relations with Assad in the belief that there would be no alternative to his “secular” regime, and its absence would only bring instability and extremism to the region. In July 2024, Italy became the first EU state to restore ties with Assad after a 12-year hiatus, appointing an ambassador to Damascus. This attempt aimed to push the other EU states to follow the same path and reevaluate their approach toward Assad.
There is a significant opportunity for a Turkiye-EU-Syria triangular cooperation that could support Syria’s political reform and recovery, as well as its economic development, trade, and regional connectivity. This requires a division of labor between Turkiye and EU countries.
Dr. Sinem Cengiz
However, the fall of the Assad regime led the EU to once again recalibrate its policy. Delegations from Western countries soon visited Damascus to cultivate ties between Syria and the EU and, in a way, to support the new leadership’s integration into the international community.
Turkiye has been one of the key countries that has supported the Syrian government’s integration into the international community. Given its proximity to Syria, long-standing support for the opposition throughout the crisis, and its role in hosting millions of Syrian refugees, Turkiye has a special relationship with Syria’s new leadership. Ankara developed close relations with the post-Assad authorities and has provided political, diplomatic, security, and institutional support. The EU recognizes that Turkiye has acquired significant leverage in post-Assad Syria, and that it does not possess the same degree of leverage as Ankara.
However, Turkiye’s interests and the EU’s interests in Syria’s future overlap considerably. Turkiye could once again become a key partner for the EU in shaping Syria’s future, particularly through the establishment of a Syria return-and-reconstruction compact. The EU continues to fund refugee-related programs in Turkiye, while increasingly supporting recovery inside Syria.
More than 600,000 Syrians had returned from Turkiye to Syria by early April 2026, according to the EU delegation in Turkiye. Turkiye is among the leading contributors to the UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan for Syria, which remains critically underfunded, with $3.19 billion required to meet priority humanitarian needs. Turkiye provides the largest share of funding, 22 percent, followed by the European Commission with 18.3 percent.
Ankara could also play an important role in strengthening Syria as a security partner for Europe and supporting connectivity projects that link Syria more closely with the continent. Ankara wants to integrate a stable Syria into regional connectivity projects so that it could serve as a transit point between the Gulf and European markets.
For Syria to stabilize and recover, it needs a secure environment free from attacks that threaten its sovereignty. Al-Shaibani urged the EU to translate its concerns into concrete pressure on Israel to halt its continued attacks on Syria, as Damascus pushes for international action to protect its sovereignty. Al-Shaibani also called for the issue to be explicitly placed on the agenda of the EU’s Political and Security Committee. Israeli attacks in Syria are an issue of concern for regional countries, including Turkiye, that accelerated efforts to support the country’s future.
Syria is no longer the same place it was a decade ago. As a result, Turkish-European cooperation can no longer be limited to humanitarian assistance and security. There is a significant opportunity for a Turkiye-EU-Syria triangular cooperation that could support Syria’s political reform and recovery, as well as its economic development, trade, and regional connectivity. This requires a division of labor between Turkiye and EU countries.
