{"id":59277,"date":"2025-07-22T16:48:00","date_gmt":"2025-07-22T16:48:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/gulftimes.ae\/u-s-influence-wanes-as-russia-designs-foreign-aid-blueprint-to-woo-global-south-with-development-projects\/"},"modified":"2025-07-22T16:48:00","modified_gmt":"2025-07-22T16:48:00","slug":"u-s-influence-wanes-as-russia-designs-foreign-aid-blueprint-to-woo-global-south-with-development-projects","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/gulftimes.ae\/?p=59277","title":{"rendered":"U.S. Influence Wanes as Russia Designs Foreign Aid Blueprint to Woo Global South with Development Projects"},"content":{"rendered":"


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As the United States pulls back from its decades-long leadership in foreign development assistance, a strategic vacuum is emerging\u2014one that Russia is maneuvering to fill. With the recent shutdown of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), a cornerstone of American soft power for over six decades, the Kremlin sees a timely opportunity to expand its geopolitical and geoeconomic footprint, particularly across the Global South.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The end of USAID, a $22 billion-a-year institution, marks a historic pivot in American foreign policy. Once present in over 146 countries and instrumental in post-disaster recovery, democratic institution-building, public health, and infrastructure development, USAID\u2019s dissolution has caused ripple effects globally\u2014leaving numerous governments, NGOs, and communities uncertain about the future of critical projects.<\/p>\n

Into that void, Moscow is stepping forward.<\/p>\n

Russia, historically a modest player in global development, is signaling an ambitious new direction. In a rare, in-depth interview this month, Yevgeny Primakov, head of Rossotrudnichestvo\u2014a cultural and humanitarian arm of the Russian Foreign Ministry\u2014unveiled plans to create a centralized foreign aid institution akin to the now-defunct USAID.<\/p>\n

Primakov, a former journalist and grandson of a former prime minister, said Moscow is exploring \u201cthe next iteration of Russian foreign aid,\u201d with the goal of building \u201ca format analogous to USAID.\u201d Though details remain vague, the proposed structure would streamline Russia\u2019s fragmented aid efforts currently dispersed across more than a dozen ministries and agencies. A centralized body would likely combine humanitarian aid, educational exchange, disaster relief, infrastructure development, and possibly paramilitary assistance under one umbrella.<\/p>\n

If successful, this would mark the first time since the Soviet era that Russia would have a comprehensive, strategic foreign aid policy designed to win hearts and minds far beyond its borders.<\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s motivations are both practical and ideological. On one level, Moscow sees an opportunity to expand its sphere of influence at the expense of Western rivals. By stepping into regions where U.S. support is diminishing\u2014particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and parts of the Middle East\u2014Russia hopes to reshape geopolitical loyalties and economic alliances.<\/p>\n

\u201cThis isn\u2019t about altruism,\u201d said Maria Snegovaya, a Russian foreign policy analyst at the Center for Strategic International Studies in Washington. \u201cIt\u2019s about influence, prestige, and access to resources. Moscow sees development aid not as charity, but as diplomacy by other means.\u201d<\/p>\n

For years, Russia\u2019s foreign assistance has been narrow in scope and largely concentrated in the post-Soviet space\u2014targeting countries like Armenia, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan. In 2021, analysts estimated Russia\u2019s total annual foreign aid budget to be just over $1 billion, a fraction of what Western countries spend. However, since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow has found itself increasingly isolated from Europe and the United States. It has since turned its focus sharply southward, hoping to court allies among developing nations through trade, military support, information campaigns, and now, development assistance.<\/p>\n

\u201cThere\u2019s been a notable uptick in Russian engagement in countries like Mali, Sudan, Nicaragua, and Myanmar,\u201d said Daria Isaeva, a senior researcher with the Russian International Affairs Council. \u201cThis is about building alternative networks to the West.\u201d<\/p>\n

At the center of this new push is Rossotrudnichestvo. Originally created to promote cultural diplomacy and humanitarian outreach, the agency has expanded its activities since 2020 to include development-style work. Its global network of \u201cRussia Houses\u201d now numbers over 60 cultural centers abroad, often co-located with embassies. These outposts promote the Russian language, host exhibitions, distribute textbooks, and organize student exchanges. Recently, they\u2019ve also begun implementing small infrastructure and education projects\u2014particularly in Africa and Central Asia.<\/p>\n

Rossotrudnichestvo\u2019s transformation into something more akin to USAID is a bold leap. But it fits with the Kremlin\u2019s larger strategy: wielding soft power where hard power is constrained.<\/p>\n

\u201cDevelopment aid is the new frontier in Russia\u2019s asymmetric foreign policy,\u201d said Tatiana Stanovaya, a political analyst with the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. \u201cWhere Moscow can\u2019t compete militarily or economically, it uses culture, education, and now aid to make its presence felt.\u201d<\/p>\n

Primakov noted that the Kremlin intends to double down on educational outreach, increasing scholarships for foreign students, building Russian-language institutions abroad, and expanding aid tied to ideological affinity. \u201cIt\u2019s not just about money\u2014it\u2019s about worldview,\u201d he said in the interview. \u201cWe want to help those who are ready to listen to us.\u201d<\/p>\n

Still, Russia faces steep hurdles in trying to emulate USAID.<\/p>\n

For one, its budgetary capacity remains limited. While USAID once operated on a $22 billion annual budget, Russia\u2019s entire aid apparatus barely crosses $1 billion\u2014and that was before war-related costs, sanctions, and domestic austerity programs began to bite. Russia\u2019s economy, though resilient in some respects, is under immense strain from Western sanctions, reduced access to global markets, and the costly war in Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Additionally, Russia lacks the institutional infrastructure that made USAID effective: a large cadre of technical experts, partnerships with NGOs, accountability mechanisms, and decades of credibility in the development sector.<\/p>\n

\u201cThrowing money at the Global South without capacity or strategy won\u2019t be enough,\u201d said Paul Stronski, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment. \u201cDevelopment assistance is about long-term relationships, not just flashy announcements.\u201d<\/p>\n

Moreover, there is skepticism about Russia\u2019s motives. In Africa, for instance, the Wagner Group\u2014Moscow\u2019s paramilitary contractor\u2014has left behind a complex legacy of both support and violence. While some governments welcome Russian assistance, civil society actors remain wary of aid that comes with strings attached or veils a deeper geopolitical agenda.<\/p>\n

In Latin America and Southeast Asia, where U.S. withdrawal has created gaps, Russia still faces competition from China, which operates the vast Belt and Road Initiative and commands hundreds of billions in global development finance.<\/p>\n

Despite these limitations, Russia appears to be focusing its attention on several key zones:<\/p>\n