Evaluating Alternative Security Approaches to Counter China

Last week, NATO heads of state gathered in Washington to commemorate the alliance’s 75th anniversary. While the summit’s outcomes were largely predictable, the discussions revealed an unexpected emphasis on China. The Asian superpower emerged as a central topic of concern, reflecting NATO’s evolving strategic considerations.

China’s influence was a top agenda item for NATO, criticized for several reasons: the People’s Liberation Army’s aggressive actions in the East and South China Seas, its strategic alliance with Russia, and its efforts to undermine the international order. The summit’s joint communique emphasized, “The People’s Republic of China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies continue to challenge our interests, security, and values.”

NATO’s invitation to the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4)—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—for a third consecutive year underscored the alliance’s intent to enhance coordination with Asian powers concerning China. Although U.S. and NATO leaders did not explicitly frame the summit as an anti-China gathering, the underlying message was clear.

Recent years have seen a growing consensus among experts and officials that Europe and East Asia cannot be viewed in isolation. A crisis in the South China Sea could harm Europe’s economic well-being, just as a conflict in Europe might enable China to advance its regional ambitions unchecked. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken highlighted this interconnectedness, stating on July 1, “There’s strong recognition that the two theaters … are linked.”

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has been a vocal advocate of this linkage theory, suggesting that “Ukraine today may be the East Asia of tomorrow.” This perspective gains credibility considering Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to North Korea and the new comprehensive strategic partnership between Putin and Kim Jong Un. This partnership, aiming to bolster bilateral relations, trade, and mutual assistance in case of aggression, could exacerbate security challenges in both Europe and East Asia.

North Korea’s provision of munitions to Russia and Russia’s potential assistance to North Korea in satellite technology present significant security concerns. These developments pose a threat not only to Ukraine but also to countries like Germany, Poland, Japan, and South Korea. The United States and its allies have responded by pooling resources and strengthening communication on shared concerns. Cooperation primarily occurs through bilateral and mini-lateral arrangements.

For instance, the United Kingdom and Japan finalized a Reciprocal Access Agreement in 2023, facilitating military collaboration and joint exercises. Germany and France have also deployed naval and air forces to the Indo-Pacific, both as a show of resolve to China and to protect freedom of navigation. In 2023, Berlin sent its first warship to the South China Sea in nearly two decades.

The U.S. is enhancing trilateral naval drills with Japan and South Korea, and with Japan and the Philippines, to boost interoperability among their forces.

NATO has increasingly addressed China in its communications. In 2019, the alliance acknowledged that “China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges.” By 2022, NATO’s Strategic Concept adopted a more critical tone, citing China’s confrontational rhetoric, “malicious hybrid and cyber operations,” and exploitation of economic leverage over smaller states.

There is a growing sense that NATO, originally designed during the Cold War to defend Western Europe from the Soviet Union, should adapt to counter China. Some, like former Supreme Allied Commander Europe James Stavridis, have even proposed including Japan, South Korea, and Australia in the alliance.

Despite the strategic rationale, expanding NATO’s focus to Asia faces significant challenges:

• Internal Divisions Within NATO
  There is no consensus within NATO on expanding its remit to Asia, particularly with the goal of containing China. Various NATO members have different reasons for opposing this shift. French President Emmanuel Macron fears that incorporating Asian security issues could dilute NATO’s primary focus on European deterrence. France also seeks to maintain its relationship with China and avoid direct military confrontation. Germany is more concerned about preserving its substantial trade relationship with China, which has been its largest trading partner for eight years. Hungary, strengthening ties with China, is likely to oppose any expansion of NATO’s scope for self-interested reasons.
• Limitations in Military Capability
  Beyond the U.S. and possibly the U.K., NATO members may lack the necessary military power and capacity to significantly increase deterrence in Asia. Europe’s defense industry is already stretched thin, primarily supporting the ongoing land war in Ukraine. France’s Pacific obligations are far from the critical areas of potential conflict, and Germany’s contributions would likely be limited to symbolic freedom-of-navigation exercises.
• Potential Reactions from China, Russia, and North Korea
  China, Russia, and North Korea are unlikely to remain passive if NATO becomes more involved in Asia. China, already suspicious of NATO’s intentions, might strengthen its “no limits” partnership with Russia. This could lead to larger and more frequent joint military exercises and a diminished chance of driving a wedge between the two powers. China might also reconsider its opposition to a formal trilateral alliance with Russia and North Korea, signaling that NATO’s actions have significant consequences.
• Strategic Alternatives for NATO
  Rather than elevating Asia on the NATO agenda, the U.S., Canada, and European allies might find it more effective to keep NATO focused on its traditional North Atlantic area of responsibility. The primary goals—maintaining a balance of power with China and avoiding a costly war—can be achieved through bilateral relationships with East Asian countries such as Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam, and Indonesia. These nations are modernizing their militaries to defend against China without the need for a foreign military bloc.

Strengthening bilateral and regional cooperation with East Asian countries could provide a more flexible and less provocative approach. This strategy allows the U.S. and its allies to support these countries’ defense capabilities without extending NATO’s mandate.

• Japan and the UK: The Reciprocal Access Agreement facilitates military collaboration, enhancing both countries’ readiness.
• France and Germany: Deployments to the Indo-Pacific demonstrate commitment to regional security without overextending NATO.
• U.S. Trilateral Drills: Regular naval exercises with Japan and South Korea, and with Japan and the Philippines, improve military coordination and readiness.

In addition to military cooperation, NATO members can focus on economic and cybersecurity partnerships to counter China’s influence. Strengthening economic ties with East Asian countries and collaborating on cybersecurity measures can provide a multi-faceted approach to addressing security concerns.

• Economic Partnerships: Enhancing trade relationships with East Asian countries can reduce their dependence on China and provide economic stability.
• Cybersecurity Collaboration: Joint efforts to combat cyber threats can protect critical infrastructure and reduce vulnerabilities.

NATO’s 75th anniversary summit in Washington highlighted the alliance’s evolving focus on China, reflecting broader geopolitical shifts. While there are compelling reasons to consider a more prominent role for NATO in Asia, significant challenges remain. Internal divisions within NATO, limitations in military capability, and potential reactions from China, Russia, and North Korea complicate the issue.

A more prudent approach may involve strengthening bilateral and regional cooperation with East Asian countries, focusing on economic and cybersecurity partnerships. This strategy allows the U.S. and its allies to support regional security without overextending NATO’s traditional mandate, maintaining a balance of power in Asia, and avoiding unnecessary military confrontation.