US President Donald Trump said Monday that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un had responded to his recent overtures, raising the prospect of renewed engagement between Washington and Pyongyang as tensions over military exercises on the Korean Peninsula come under renewed scrutiny.

Trump, speaking to reporters in the Oval Office, suggested that communication with Kim was progressing positively, although he did not provide details about when the North Korean leader responded, what was discussed or whether a direct meeting between the two leaders was being considered.

Asked why Kim had not responded to his requests for a conversation since Trump returned to the White House, Trump challenged the premise of the question.

“How do you know he hasn’t responded?” he said.

Asked about the current stage of his communication with Kim, Trump replied that it was “very positive” without elaborating.

Trump subsequently renewed his praise for the North Korean leader, portraying his personal relationship with Kim as an important factor in reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

“You see, I’m actually making it much safer. Kim Jong Un has always treated me with great respect,” Trump said. “I understand him. He understands me.”

The remarks came one day after Trump announced that the United States would scale back military exercises with South Korea, describing the drills as “inappropriate and hostile.” The decision immediately generated concern in Washington and Seoul over the future of joint military preparedness against North Korea.

Trump also linked the decision to South Korea’s refusal to assist the United States and Israel in their war against Iran. His comments reflected a broader argument that US allies should assume greater responsibility for their own defence and provide more support when Washington becomes involved in military operations overseas.

Trump has repeatedly complained that the United States bears a disproportionate share of the security burden for its allies. His latest criticism of Seoul focused particularly on the presence of tens of thousands of US troops in South Korea.

“Wait a minute. We have 39,000 soldiers over there, guarding you from Kim Jong Un, your next-door neighbour, and you’re not going to help us on a very easy military operation in Iran. That’s strange,” Trump said.

The United States maintains a large military presence on the Korean Peninsula as part of its longstanding commitment to deter North Korean aggression and defend South Korea. The actual number of US troops stationed in South Korea is generally around 28,500, although Trump’s comments referred to a higher figure.

Trump also questioned whether Washington should continue providing security guarantees to countries that do not support US military operations.

“We can’t go around and protect all of these countries, especially when they’re not there to help us,” he said.

His comments extended beyond South Korea. Trump also raised questions about the US security commitment to NATO members that have declined to contribute to the conflict involving Iran.

The remarks have added another layer of uncertainty to an already complicated security environment in East Asia. For decades, US military forces and regular joint exercises with South Korea have been central components of deterrence against Pyongyang.

Any reduction in the scale or frequency of those exercises could therefore have implications extending well beyond the immediate training schedule.

Despite Trump’s announcement, South Korean officials said the joint exercises had begun as planned.

The 11-day Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises are designed to improve the readiness of US and South Korean forces for a potential conflict with North Korea. The exercises combine computer-based command-post training with field activities intended to test the two allies’ ability to respond to a wide range of military contingencies.

South Korea’s presidential office said it remained in close coordination with Washington regarding the exercises.

On Tuesday, the presidential office stressed that the drills were defensive in nature and were not intended to provoke North Korea.

The exercises did not reflect “any intention to attack North Korea or escalate tensions on the Korean peninsula,” the office said.

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung reiterated that the fundamental purpose of the military exercises was to protect the country’s population rather than identify a particular state as an enemy.

“The fundamental purpose of the exercises is not to treat a specific entity as an adversary, but to safeguard the safe and peaceful daily lives of the people,” Lee’s office said.

The statement appeared aimed at reassuring both the South Korean public and Pyongyang that the exercises were intended primarily to maintain defensive readiness.

North Korea, however, has historically viewed the annual US-South Korean military drills as preparations for an invasion.

Pyongyang has repeatedly condemned the exercises and warned that military demonstrations by Washington and Seoul could provoke a response.

The North has also continued to develop and test ballistic missile systems capable of threatening South Korea, Japan and potentially US forces in the region.

It recently test-fired a ballistic missile over the Sea of Japan and warned Friday that it could respond to the joint exercises with what it described as a “new level of deterrent.”

That warning underscores the delicate balance surrounding the exercises. Washington and Seoul consider them necessary to maintain military readiness, while Pyongyang regards them as evidence of hostile intent.

Although Trump said Kim had responded to his overtures, North Korea has not publicly confirmed the communication.

The lack of details makes it difficult to determine whether Trump’s comments refer to a direct diplomatic exchange, an indirect message transmitted through intermediaries or another form of communication.

Trump’s latest remarks nevertheless indicate that he continues to see his personal relationship with Kim as an important diplomatic asset.

During his first presidency, Trump held three unprecedented meetings with Kim. The encounters represented a dramatic departure from decades of hostility between Washington and Pyongyang.

Trump and Kim first met in Singapore in June 2018. The summit was followed by a second meeting in Hanoi in 2019 and an informal encounter at the Korean Demilitarized Zone later that year.

The diplomacy ultimately failed to produce a comprehensive agreement on North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme.

Nevertheless, Trump has frequently pointed to his personal relationship with Kim as evidence that direct engagement can reduce the risk of war.

During his first term, Trump also announced that Washington would suspend what he described as “provocative” military exercises with South Korea following his first summit with Kim.

The issue of military exercises has remained one of Pyongyang’s central demands. North Korea has consistently argued that US-South Korean drills are incompatible with efforts to reduce tensions and establish a lasting peace on the peninsula.

The United States and South Korea, however, have maintained that the exercises are necessary because the Korean War ended in 1953 with an armistice rather than a formal peace treaty.

Trump’s decision to scale back the exercises has already triggered criticism from senior US lawmakers.

Senator Jack Reed, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, criticized the president’s decision and warned that Washington’s allies and strategic competitors were closely watching his approach to alliance commitments.

“This is another inane, haphazard decision by President Trump and his chaotic administration,” Reed said.

He argued that China and Russia were “watching how easily this president abandons America’s allies.”

The criticism reflects a broader debate over the role of US alliances under Trump’s second administration.

Trump has repeatedly argued that American allies should spend more on defence and contribute more directly to collective security. His administration has also pressed allies to take greater responsibility for military capabilities that Washington has traditionally helped provide.

For South Korea, however, the alliance with the United States is considered fundamental to national security because of the continuing threat from North Korea.

The presence of US troops on the peninsula is intended to strengthen deterrence and ensure that any North Korean attack would immediately involve American forces.

A reduction in military exercises could therefore raise questions about readiness even if the number of US troops stationed in South Korea remains unchanged.

## North Korea’s Growing Military Cooperation With Russia

The military environment facing South Korea has also changed significantly in recent years.

North Korea has strengthened its relationship with Russia, including through military cooperation connected to Moscow’s war in Ukraine.

US and South Korean officials have closely monitored reports that North Korean troops have been deployed to Russia to support its war effort.

Colonel Ryan Donald, spokesman for the US and South Korean Combined Forces Command, said the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises would simulate combat against North Korean forces that had gained battlefield experience through their deployment alongside Russian forces in Ukraine.

That development has added a new dimension to the military threat posed by Pyongyang.

North Korea’s participation in Russia’s war has provided the country with an opportunity to gain experience from an active conflict while strengthening its strategic relationship with Moscow.

In return, Western governments have raised concerns about military and technological cooperation between Russia and North Korea.

The growing Russia-North Korea relationship has also complicated efforts by Washington and Seoul to engage Pyongyang diplomatically.

The announcement concerning the South Korea exercises also came as the US military is managing competing demands across different regions.

The only US aircraft carrier operating in the Pacific region, the USS George Washington, is being redeployed to the Middle East to relieve the USS Abraham Lincoln, which has remained deployed for an extended period.

The movement highlights the increasing pressure on US military resources as Washington manages security commitments across the Indo-Pacific and Middle East simultaneously.

The USS Abraham Lincoln has been at the centre of concerns over the strain placed on its crew during a prolonged deployment, including issues involving mental health and supplies.

The redeployment of the George Washington therefore illustrates the strategic trade-offs facing the Pentagon.

For South Korea, the concern is not simply the size of a particular military exercise but whether changes to US force posture could signal a broader shift in American priorities.

South Korean officials have sought to avoid an open confrontation with Washington over Trump’s announcement.

Seoul’s presidential office said it remained in close coordination with the United States and expressed hope that Trump’s relationship with Kim could eventually contribute to renewed dialogue.

The South Korean government faces a difficult balancing act.

It must preserve the military alliance with Washington while also supporting efforts to reduce tensions with North Korea. At the same time, Seoul must respond to Trump’s demands for greater burden-sharing without weakening its own defence posture.

President Lee has emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula while pursuing diplomatic opportunities.

The possibility of renewed US-North Korea talks could therefore be welcomed in Seoul if diplomacy helps reduce the threat posed by Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programmes.

However, South Korean officials are likely to remain concerned if reductions in military exercises occur without corresponding progress in North Korea’s military behaviour.

For Seoul, diplomacy and deterrence have traditionally been viewed as complementary rather than mutually exclusive.

Trump’s latest comments could signal an attempt to reopen the diplomatic channel with North Korea after years of stalled engagement.

The fact that Trump says Kim has responded to his overtures is significant because Pyongyang has largely avoided direct engagement with Washington in recent years.

But there is still little evidence of a concrete diplomatic process.

North Korea has not publicly confirmed Kim’s alleged response, and Trump did not explain whether the two sides are discussing a summit, working-level negotiations or broader nuclear diplomacy.

The strategic environment has also changed considerably since Trump’s first meetings with Kim.

North Korea has continued to expand its nuclear and missile capabilities, while its relationship with Russia has become substantially closer. Pyongyang’s military cooperation with Moscow has given North Korea new strategic options and potentially reduced its dependence on China and engagement with the United States.

At the same time, Washington’s relationship with Seoul remains essential to US strategy in the Indo-Pacific.

The United States maintains thousands of troops in South Korea, while the two countries conduct regular military exercises and coordinate closely on missile defence, intelligence and deterrence.

Trump’s latest decision therefore presents a complicated strategic calculation.

On one side, reducing military exercises could create diplomatic space for engagement with Kim and potentially lower tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

On the other, a significant reduction in training could raise concerns about military readiness and reinforce perceptions among US allies that Washington’s security commitments are becoming conditional.

For now, Trump’s claim that communication with Kim is “very positive” has revived speculation about another chapter in US-North Korea diplomacy.

Whether that communication develops into substantive negotiations will depend on issues far more difficult than personal chemistry, including North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, missile development, military cooperation with Russia and the future of the US-South Korea alliance.

The Indo-US Trade Agreement concluded earlier this month has done more than strengthen economic ties—it has injected fresh momentum into a strategic partnership that had shown signs of slowing amid global turbulence. Beyond tariffs and market access, the agreement appears to have revived the broader security and technological cooperation between New Delhi and Washington, particularly in the increasingly contested domain of space.

The renewed energy in bilateral ties was visible in India’s decision to acquire six additional Boeing P-8I Poseidon long-range maritime patrol aircraft. The purchase reinforces India’s surveillance capabilities across the Indian Ocean Region at a time when maritime security concerns remain high. The P-8I fleet has already proven critical for anti-submarine warfare and long-range reconnaissance, especially amid heightened Chinese naval activity in the Indo-Pacific.

Further underscoring the warming strategic atmosphere was the visit of Admiral Samuel J. Paparo, Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, to New Delhi on February 15. In a notable departure from past diplomatic restraint, Paparo publicly “applauded the tactical execution” of the Indian military during Operation Sindoor against Pakistan. His remarks, coupled with his assertion that the United States would “learn” from the conflict, signaled an unusually candid endorsement of India’s operational conduct. He described the US-India defense relationship as being on a “steeply upward trajectory.”

Amid these defense developments, the U.S. Consulate General in Chennai, with support from the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership Forum, hosted the U.S.-India Space Business Forum in Bengaluru on February 10–11. The forum marked the flagship event of the first U.S. Trade Mission to India focused exclusively on commercial space.

Bringing together 23 executives from 14 leading American space companies and more than 200 government and industry stakeholders from both countries, the mission was only the second space-focused trade delegation ever organized by the U.S. Department of Commerce—and the first of its kind to India. The initiative reinforced American leadership in commercial space innovation while highlighting the accelerating momentum of bilateral cooperation in the global space economy.

While the forum emphasized developmental goals and “cocreation” of space technologies, American participants also stressed a critical reality: space underpins national security. Any meaningful cooperation in space, whether bilateral or multilateral, inevitably carries strategic implications due to the dual-use nature of most space technologies.

Over the past two decades, outer space has evolved from a primarily scientific and socio-economic arena into what defense experts now describe as the “fifth domain of warfare,” alongside land, sea, air, and cyber. Increasingly, analysts portray space not merely as a physical expanse but as an “eighth continent” to be controlled, safeguarded, and leveraged for power projection.

Spacepower today forms the backbone of modern warfare. Satellites enable weather forecasting, precision navigation, missile launch detection, and multi-domain Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). Without them, contemporary military operations would be severely constrained.

Dedicated military satellites provide 24/7 monitoring of borders and maritime zones, secure encrypted communications, and high-resolution imagery capable of tracking troop movements and identifying targets even through cloud cover. Equipped with electro-optic sensors, thermal imaging, and synthetic aperture radars, these platforms deliver unprecedented situational awareness. In effect, space-based assets serve as the “eyes and ears” of modern armed forces and act as powerful force multipliers.

However, the increasing centrality of space has led to rapid militarization. More satellites have been launched in the past five years than in the previous six decades combined. Over 100 nations and multilateral organizations now operate at least one satellite, compared to just 14 at the turn of the century. Today, more than 10,000 active satellites orbit Earth, alongside over 40,000 tracked objects, including debris.

Major powers are simultaneously developing counterspace capabilities, including anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles. While the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit, it does not ban conventional ASAT weapons. Instances of high-altitude jamming, GPS spoofing, and cyberattacks on satellite ground stations are increasingly reported, highlighting non-kinetic threats designed to “blind” adversaries without creating debris.

The risks have prompted concern from international policy circles. On February 13, the Euro-Atlantic Security Leadership Group warned that without practical measures to prevent conflict in space, the danger of nuclear catastrophe—whether deliberate or accidental—could grow significantly. The group urged major spacefaring nations, including India and China, to initiate dialogue to prevent a destabilizing arms race.

Even as some advocate cooperative governance, another school of thought argues that democratic nations must unite to counter what they see as authoritarian ambitions in space. Proponents call for closer collaboration among democratic governments and private sectors, including joint ventures in lunar exploration, asteroid resource extraction, and even “freedom of navigation operations” in space.

It is against this global backdrop that Indo-US space cooperation has acquired sharper strategic contours.

India’s Defence Space Agency has been collaborating with the United States Space Command on monitoring space assets and tracking potential threats. India participated as a full participant in the 2025 Global Sentinel exercise, transitioning from its earlier observer status.

Human spaceflight cooperation has also expanded. Indian astronauts have undergone training at NASA, and Group Captain Shubhanshu Shukla participated in Axiom Space’s Ax-4 mission to the International Space Station last year.

On the technological front, the India-US Defense Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS-X) has supported startups working on satellite reconnaissance and secure communications. Agreements such as BECA (2020), COMCASA (2018), and the 2022 Space Situational Awareness pact have facilitated real-time intelligence sharing and access to high-end geospatial data, significantly enhancing India’s military navigation and targeting precision.

The joint NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR) mission further exemplifies dual-use cooperation, offering advanced Earth observation capabilities for both civilian and security applications.

India’s 2023 decision to join the Artemis Accords marked another milestone, aligning New Delhi more closely with Washington’s lunar governance framework. The same year saw the launch of the U.S.-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), later rebranded during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2025 Washington visit as the U.S.-India TRUST initiative—Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology. TRUST emphasizes artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and critical minerals, with space cooperation as a core pillar.

Yet, despite operational alignment, differences remain. India, though granted Strategic Trade Authorisation-1 status in 2018, continues to navigate restrictions under U.S. export control regimes such as ITAR and EAR.

Moreover, India has abstained from certain U.S.-backed United Nations resolutions, including the 2022 proposal to ban debris-generating ASAT tests and the 2024 resolution on responsible space behavior. Indian policymakers cite concerns over exclusionary norm-making processes, reflecting New Delhi’s long-standing doctrine of “strategic autonomy.”

As Dimitrios Stroikos of the London School of Economics has observed, India’s space diplomacy reflects selective engagement—operationally aligned with the United States, yet cautious and ambivalent in global governance debates.

The Indo-US Trade Agreement may have catalyzed renewed momentum, but the deeper transformation lies in space cooperation. As outer space becomes more congested, contested, and critical to national security, the trajectory of Indo-US relations will increasingly be shaped above the atmosphere.

Whether this partnership ultimately fosters stability or intensifies competition will depend not only on technological collaboration but also on the willingness of both democracies to shape inclusive, credible norms for the final frontier.

The latest diplomatic drama surrounding  U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin has once again underscored the delicate — and deeply strategic — nature of their relationship. The announcement of a planned meeting between Trump and Putin in Hungary, followed by its abrupt cancellation, revealed not only the volatile dynamic between the two men but also the calculated way Moscow leverages personal politics to influence Washington’s stance on Ukraine.

For a few fleeting days, the world anticipated what could have been a high-stakes summit between two of the most unpredictable leaders in global politics. The Trump administration said preparations were underway for a meeting between the American and Russian presidents, with teams from both sides coordinating details in Budapest. Yet within days, the Kremlin abruptly denied any agreement, calling reports of the summit “premature.” Trump, characteristically, countered by implying that Moscow had backed out.

Soon after, Trump dismissed the idea altogether, saying any meeting without a “peace agreement in hand” would be a “waste of time.”

While the episode might appear to be a diplomatic misunderstanding, it in fact exposes a deeper pattern: Putin’s methodical management of Trump’s ego and emotions — a tactic that ultimately undermines Ukraine’s interests and reshapes the Western alliance.

Since returning to the White House in early 2025, Trump has revived his distinctly personal brand of diplomacy — one that often sidelines traditional institutions in favor of leader-to-leader dealings. Putin, a master manipulator of such dynamics, has proven adept at exploiting this.

The Russian president sees the United States as the indispensable actor in determining the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine. But for Putin, the real objective is not peace — it is legitimacy. By engaging directly with Trump, Putin seeks to elevate Russia’s status as a co-equal superpower and to gain recognition of its sphere of influence over Ukraine and Eastern Europe.

Putin has long recognized that Trump admires strength and personal loyalty. After their August meeting in Alaska — the first face-to-face encounter since Trump’s return to office — Trump publicly praised Putin for “agreeing” with his criticisms of mail-in ballots during U.S. elections. The anecdote, trivial as it may seem, revealed the depth of Putin’s psychological insight: he feeds Trump’s ego to earn his trust.

In October, shortly after being snubbed by the Nobel Committee, Putin publicly lauded Trump’s supposed “peacemaking instincts.” The message was not for the global audience but for Trump himself. By showering the American leader with praise and flattery, Putin keeps open a personal channel of influence that consistently yields strategic dividends for Moscow.

The results of this influence have been visible. After private calls or meetings with Putin, Trump has repeatedly echoed Kremlin talking points about the Ukraine war. He has described the conflict as “a tragic misunderstanding” and argued that Ukraine must “compromise to survive.”

These statements, which mirror Moscow’s narrative that blames NATO expansion and Western interference for the war, have become recurring themes in Trump’s public remarks. Most recently, on October 17, 2025, Trump reportedly clashed with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during their meeting in Washington, telling him that “Ukraine will be destroyed by Russia” unless Kyiv accepted Putin’s demands.

Such rhetoric not only undermines U.S. policy but also strains Washington’s credibility with European allies. The pattern reflects how Putin manipulates Trump’s personal diplomacy to sow discord within the Western alliance — a key goal of Moscow since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Putin’s handling of Trump serves three overlapping objectives.

First, it disrupts the U.S.-Ukraine relationship. Each engagement between Trump and Putin — even informal ones — tends to precede moments of tension between Washington and Kyiv. The infamous Oval Office meeting in February 2025, attended by Trump, Zelenskyy, and Vice President JD Vance, occurred shortly after Trump spoke with Putin. That meeting reportedly ended with Trump lecturing Zelenskyy about corruption and NATO’s “burden sharing,” leaving Kyiv alarmed.

Second, Putin’s manipulation of these personal ties directly affects military aid and arms negotiations. The most recent Hungarian summit announcement coincided with an impending U.S.-Ukraine discussion about Kyiv’s request to purchase Tomahawk cruise missiles — a move that would have extended Ukraine’s long-range strike capability deep into Russian-held territory. Following the cancellation of the Trump-Putin summit, those talks evaporated. Without the prospect of new missile systems, Ukraine’s negotiating leverage diminished — precisely what Moscow desired.

Third, Putin seeks to weaken transatlantic unity. Since the 2022 invasion, the United States and Europe have largely presented a united front in support of Ukraine. But Trump’s recurring criticism of NATO spending, coupled with his visible camaraderie with Putin, has rattled European capitals. Each proposed or rumored Trump-Putin meeting reignites fears of a “grand bargain” that would sacrifice Ukrainian sovereignty for geopolitical expediency.

The mere announcement of the Hungarian summit sent alarm bells ringing across Europe. Diplomats from Germany, Poland, and France reportedly sought urgent clarification from Washington, fearing that Trump might unilaterally endorse a ceasefire favorable to Moscow.

Yet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has also learned to adapt. Recognizing Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy, Zelenskyy has adopted his own version of personal diplomacy.

In April, Zelenskyy met privately with Trump during Pope Francis’s funeral in Rome — an encounter that reportedly helped reset relations after February’s tense Oval Office confrontation. In August, Zelenskyy made a deliberate effort to project statesmanship during another meeting with Trump, donning a suit instead of his trademark military attire — a subtle nod to Trump’s earlier criticism of his “casual” appearance.

Zelenskyy has also sought to engage Trump’s business instincts. Ukraine signed agreements to supply rare minerals to U.S. companies and expanded purchases of American-made weapons with partial NATO funding — moves designed to appeal to Trump’s preference for deals that benefit U.S. industry.

While these gestures have yet to yield major policy shifts, they have helped Ukraine maintain a fragile line of communication with a White House whose priorities are often unpredictable.

Following the collapse of the Hungarian summit plan, the Trump administration appeared to pivot toward a tougher stance. The U.S. imposed fresh sanctions on Russian oil exporters and entities circumventing the price cap mechanism — signaling Washington’s continued commitment to economic pressure despite diplomatic confusion.

Trump himself told reporters he was “done wasting time” unless Putin showed “real seriousness about peace.” Yet the statement carried an air of resignation. Putin, after all, has not meaningfully altered his demands since launching the invasion in February 2022.

For the Kremlin, these oscillations between engagement and cancellation serve a purpose. By dangling the prospect of talks, Putin fosters division among Western policymakers — between those advocating negotiation and those pushing for unconditional Ukrainian victory. Each aborted meeting, like the one in Hungary, reinforces Moscow’s image as an indispensable interlocutor while keeping the West off balance.

Despite hopes that personal diplomacy could pave the way for peace, the underlying reality remains bleak. Putin’s interactions with Trump are less about conflict resolution and more about influence projection.

Trump, who has repeatedly boasted that he could “end the war in 24 hours,” has shown a willingness to entertain Russian narratives. This creates space for Putin to insert himself into U.S. domestic debates, shaping perceptions of the war among Trump’s supporters and eroding bipartisan consensus on Ukraine.

For now, the aborted Hungarian meeting stands as a microcosm of this manipulative diplomacy — a theatre of gestures, praise, and cancellations that achieves nothing tangible for peace but plenty for Russia’s strategic aims.

Even if another Trump-Putin summit materializes in the months ahead, the outcome is unlikely to be a breakthrough. The meeting would serve as yet another episode in Putin’s long game: cultivating influence within Washington while buying time on the battlefield.

As Ukraine continues to fight for survival, both Putin and Zelenskyy will keep courting Trump — one to legitimize aggression, the other to preserve support. But only one of them benefits from delay.

When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi traveled to Washington in June 2023, the reception could hardly have been more grand. The White House rolled out the red carpet, staging a state dinner and a congressional address that underlined India’s rising stature in American foreign policy. Then-President Joe Biden embraced Modi with warmth, describing India as a “defining partner of the 21st century.”

Barely a year later, the landscape looks unrecognizable. As of August 27, 2025, most Indian goods entering the United States face a punitive 50% tariff — one of the steepest barriers in the global trading system. The penalties were imposed by President Donald Trump following a collapse in trade negotiations and an escalation of tensions over India’s continued purchases of discounted Russian oil.

The turnabout has jolted policymakers in both Washington and New Delhi. For U.S. officials who long championed India as a counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific, the tariffs represent a stunning reversal. For India, whose economy relies heavily on exports to the American market, the shock threatens growth, jobs, and Modi’s political standing at home.

This is the story of how two democracies that once styled themselves as “natural allies” have stumbled into one of their sharpest trade conflicts in decades — and what it could mean for the balance of power in Asia.

Trump’s decision to slap tariffs on India is part of a broader strategy he has resurrected from his first presidency: wielding trade penalties as leverage to extract concessions. In April 2025, the White House unveiled sweeping duties on a host of trading partners, insisting that “America will no longer be taken advantage of.”

India initially hoped to secure an exemption through bilateral negotiations. But talks collapsed after Washington insisted New Delhi curtail its imports of Russian crude, which India has been buying in record quantities since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. The oil purchases, though vital for India’s energy security, clashed with U.S. sanctions policy.

By summer, frustration in the White House had boiled over. Trump imposed an additional 25% penalty on Indian goods — on top of the April tariffs — citing India’s defiance. The result: a combined 50% barrier that has effectively priced Indian exports out of the American market.

“The administration saw India as both a trade problem and a geopolitical challenge,” said Rick Rossow, Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). “Trump was right that India is protectionist in many sectors. But the tools he’s chosen are blunt and deeply damaging.”

The U.S. is India’s single largest trading partner. In 2024, India exported $87 billion worth of goods to the American market — everything from textiles and jewelry to machinery and pharmaceuticals. That number is now expected to plunge.

The Global Trade Research Initiative, a New Delhi think-tank, forecasts that Indian exports to the U.S. will shrink by 40% within two years, potentially falling to $50 billion by 2026. Sectors like textiles, garments, and gemstone processing — which together employ hundreds of thousands — are bracing for collapse.

“Factories are already slowing production,” said a textile exporter from Tiruppur, Tamil Nadu. “Orders have dried up. If this continues, we’ll see mass layoffs.”

The U.S., by contrast, exported about $42 billion worth of goods to India in 2024 — less than half the flow in the other direction. That imbalance means India stands to lose far more in the tariff war.

Sushant Singh, a lecturer at Yale University, was blunt: “Under Trump, India has no leverage. The losses are mainly India’s.”

For Modi, the trade conflict has landed at a delicate moment. His Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had campaigned heavily on economic growth and the success of his “Make in India” program to boost manufacturing. The tariffs strike at the heart of that agenda.

“Manufacturing is only about 14% of India’s GDP,” Rossow noted, “so the macro-level impact may be limited. But politically, this is a problem. Modi promised jobs in factories, and now his biggest export market is closing its doors.”

The prime minister also faces criticism for mismanaging relations with Trump. Opposition leaders argue that Modi, once hailed for his personal rapport with foreign leaders, has failed to safeguard India’s interests.

The optics are particularly tricky because Modi had only recently celebrated his strong ties with Trump, calling the U.S. a “trusted partner.” The contrast between the pageantry of 2023 and the penalties of 2025 has fueled charges that his diplomacy is all spectacle and little substance.

While trade disputes were central, the real spark may have been geopolitical. Trump has repeatedly demanded that India cut off purchases of Russian oil, framing it as a test of loyalty. Modi resisted, arguing that India needs cheap energy to fuel development.

The tensions deepened further after the India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025. Trump claimed credit for brokering a ceasefire, while Modi told domestic audiences that Pakistan had “sued for peace” after India’s military response.

“That clash of narratives really angered Trump,” said Singh. “He wanted to showcase his deal-making skills. Modi wanted to showcase his toughness. The tariffs became a way for Trump to reassert control.”

The economic hit is severe, but experts warn the greater risk lies in geopolitics. For nearly two decades, successive U.S. administrations have courted India as a partner to balance China’s rise. Military exercises, intelligence sharing, and arms sales have all expanded under the banner of the “Indo-Pacific strategy.”

Now that partnership is in jeopardy.

“Trump is approaching China, India, and the Indo-Pacific very differently,” Singh observed. “If India concludes the U.S. cannot be trusted, it could tilt closer to China or Russia. That would be geopolitically disastrous for Washington.”

Gary Hufbauer of the Peterson Institute for International Economics added that U.S. companies may rethink plans to shift supply chains from China to India. “For a while India looked like the alternative manufacturing hub,” he said. “But with tariffs this high, it’s back to square one.”

Even the American education sector may feel the blow. Indian students constitute one of the largest groups of international enrollees at U.S. universities, contributing billions to the economy. Analysts expect a sharp decline in applications as goodwill erodes.

Curiously, prominent Indian-American leaders in Silicon Valley have been muted. Despite layoffs and tighter immigration rules under Trump, executives of companies like Google, Microsoft, and Adobe — all led by Indian-born CEOs — have avoided criticizing the White House.

“They’re scared,” Singh explained. “No one wants to antagonize Trump. They’re calculating that silence is safer than confrontation.”

This silence has frustrated some in India, who hoped diaspora voices would lobby against the tariffs. But the political climate in the U.S. has left little room for dissent.

In India, the tariffs hit hardest in regions where export industries dominate local economies. Towns in Gujarat that polish diamonds, garment hubs in Tamil Nadu, and jewelry clusters in Rajasthan all face uncertainty. Unions warn of mass unemployment.

“The jewelry industry could see a collapse,” said Ajay Sahai, director general of the Federation of Indian Export Organisations. “It’s not just about export numbers — it’s about livelihoods in entire communities.”

The government has floated relief measures, including subsidies and tax breaks, but economists doubt these will offset the U.S. tariffs. The World Bank projects India’s GDP growth could slow by nearly a full percentage point in 2026 if the standoff persists.

Politically, Modi is still dominant, but opposition parties sense vulnerability. Rahul Gandhi of the Congress Party accused Modi of “failing to protect India’s national interest” and “bending before foreign powers.”

Despite the harsh rhetoric, many believe a trade deal remains possible. Trump thrives on dramatic brinkmanship, often escalating before pivoting to declare victory. India, desperate to restore market access, may be willing to make concessions — such as modestly reducing tariffs on U.S. agricultural imports or pledging to buy more American energy.

“They want to give Trump a win,” Singh said. “This could happen any week, any month. That’s how the Trump administration works.”

Rossow agrees: “Both sides know the stakes. India is on the verge of becoming the world’s third-largest economy. The U.S. needs India for regional security. A strong partnership is still in both countries’ interests.”

The U.S.–India rift comes at a moment when global alignments are already shifting. China is pressing its influence across Asia, from the South China Sea to the Himalayas. Russia is courting partners to blunt Western sanctions. The European Union is grappling with its own economic troubles.

If Washington and New Delhi cannot repair ties, the consequences could reverberate far beyond trade statistics.

“Imagine an Asia where China is the undisputed leader, India plays a secondary role, and the U.S. is sidelined,” Singh warned. “That’s the geopolitical risk we’re talking about.”

For now, businesses and workers on both sides of the Pacific can only wait to see whether Trump and Modi will clash further — or strike a deal that salvages what remains of a partnership once hailed as historic.

The arc from pageantry in 2023 to punishment in 2025 underscores the volatility of international politics in the Trump era. What began as a celebrated alliance between the world’s two largest democracies now teeters on the edge of a trade war.

For Modi, the tariffs threaten jobs, growth, and his political brand. For Trump, they are a gamble that could yield concessions — or backfire geopolitically by driving India toward China.

RIYADH: Tesla’s arrival in Saudi Arabia signals a turning point in the Kingdom’s ambitious electric mobility strategy, with close to half of its citizens now open to purchasing an electric vehicle.

With a target of 30 percent EV adoption by 2030 under Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia has gained a powerful ally in Tesla — one that could accelerate progress through competitive pricing, charging infrastructure investments, and potential local manufacturing deals.

This move not only brings one of the world’s most recognizable EV brands to Saudi consumers but also supports the nation’s broader push toward sustainable mobility.

This is also set to be boosted with the launch of the Kingdom’s first homegrown EV brand, Ceer, with production set to begin in 2026.

In an interview with Arab News, Alessandro Tricamo, partner at Oliver Wyman’s transportation and services practice, noted that while EVs currently make up just over 1 percent of vehicle sales, consumer interest is rising. “Nearly half of Saudi citizens say they are considering an EV purchase in the coming years,” he said.

A win-win proposition 

Tesla’s arrival comes at a critical time for the company and the Kingdom alike. The American automaker, facing increasing competition from Chinese rivals like BYD and declining sales in traditional markets, sees Saudi Arabia as a promising new frontier. 

Tricamo explained: “Tesla’s entry into the Saudi market is potentially a significant win-win situation. With its leadership position increasingly challenged by BYD and other manufacturers — and with sales declining in the US and Europe — Tesla is looking to open up new markets.”

He added: “Saudi Arabia, while investing heavily in public transport and mass transit, remains a car-centric country where Tesla’s brand is resonant. This makes the Kingdom a promising growth opportunity for the OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer).”

Tesla’s Riyadh showroom and service center, along with pop-up stores in Jeddah and Dammam, introduce Saudi drivers to the Model 3, Model Y, and Cybertruck — a clear signal of the company’s long-term commitment to the region.

Fixing infrastructure gap

One of the biggest roadblocks to mass EV adoption is Saudi Arabia’s underdeveloped charging network. With just 101 public charging stations in 2024 — behind the UAE’s 261 — range anxiety remains a major deterrent for potential buyers.

Oliver Wyman’s Tricamo underscored the urgency of infrastructure expansion, saying: “Expanding the Kingdom’s charging infrastructure is arguably the single most critical factor in accelerating EV adoption. As of 2024, Saudi Arabia has around 100 public charging stations, primarily concentrated in Riyadh.”

He added: “For comparison, the UAE has nearly three times as many, despite having only a third of Saudi Arabia’s population.”

To address this, Saudi authorities are rolling out high-speed charging stations along key routes, including the 900 km Riyadh-Makkah corridor, which currently lacks any charging points. Tesla’s planned Supercharger network — open to other brands — could be a game changer if deployed swiftly.

However, rapid infrastructure expansion brings its own risks. Taline Vahanian, placement leader at Marsh UAE, an insurance broker and risk adviser, warned that high-speed charging stations, by their nature, handle significant electrical loads and integrate advanced digital control systems.

“This exposure brings a range of liability risks — from electrical malfunctions that might result in fires or physical injuries to property damage caused by system failures or cyberattacks,” she told Arab News, adding: “Additionally, integrating an array of new charging stations into an evolving power grid presents operational challenges such as voltage fluctuations, grid stability issues, and the necessity for specialized, regular maintenance.” 

A new EV manufacturing hub?

While Tesla makes its retail debut, Lucid Motors — backed by Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund — is already establishing local production, with a Jeddah factory set to manufacture thousands of EVs annually. This positions the Kingdom as a potential regional EV production hub, reducing reliance on imports. 

Vahanian highlighted the challenges of local production, saying: “On the supply chain front, vulnerabilities arise as the industry remains heavily dependent on imported components and critical raw materials. These dependencies are susceptible to international trade disruptions or logistical bottlenecks.”

She added: “Harmonizing standards and streamlining certification processes on the regulatory front will be crucial; any delays or misalignments with international standards could disrupt production schedules and cause cascading delays.”

Can EVs survive Saudi summers? 

Extreme temperatures pose another major challenge for EV adoption. Lithium-ion batteries degrade faster in heat, raising concerns about long-term durability. 

Tesla and Lucid are countering this with advanced liquid cooling systems and heat-resistant materials, while Saudi researchers are exploring solid-state batteries for better performance.

Vahanian emphasized the risks, saying: “In Saudi Arabia’s harsh desert climate, battery safety is a paramount concern. EV batteries rely on sophisticated thermal management systems, yet extreme ambient temperatures can accelerate degradation and — even in rare cases — trigger thermal runaway or fire incidents.”

She added that compounding this risk is the “nascent state” of the charging infrastructure, which must contend with sand, dust, and persistent heat stress — all of which elevates the possibility of technical failures and unexpected downtime.

Tricamo offered a more optimistic view: “I believe the impact of extreme heat on EV performance is often overstated. While high temperatures can pose challenges for batteries, such conditions are limited to certain periods, and battery technology is improving rapidly to support performance across a wide temperature range.”

He added: “EVs have been operating in the region for several years with virtually no performance issues. A more relevant environmental concern may be sand and dust, which can affect charging stations and equipment. But even here, mitigation measures are relatively straightforward and already well understood.”

Insurance and cost

Another hurdle is the higher cost of insuring EVs compared to traditional vehicles.

Vahanian explained that unlike traditional cars powered by internal combustion engines, EVs rely on sophisticated battery systems, state-of-the-art electronics, and specialized components that require expert handling.

“When collisions or mishaps occur, repairing these systems can be significantly pricier than conventional repairs. Limited availability of repair facilities and trained technicians — particularly in emerging markets like KSA — exacerbates these costs,” she said.

The Marsh UAE official added that insurers are adapting but warns of potential premium hikes: “Insurance companies, which traditionally set premiums based on anticipated claim payouts and repair costs, are therefore likely to face higher liabilities. In anticipation, we can expect a recalibration of premiums, reflecting a more accurate risk profile and the amplified repair costs associated with EVs.”

Vahanian went on to say: “Higher repair costs inevitably feed into the economics of risk assessment for insurers. As claims tend to rise with the complexity and expense of EV repairs, premium rates may correspondingly increase to maintain the insurers’ financial stability.”

She noted that higher EV insurance premiums could have a dual effect — while buyers are attracted by lower fuel costs and environmental benefits, steep insurance rates might weaken their appeal, particularly given the already high upfront costs.

The road to 2030

Despite these challenges, Saudi Arabia’s EV revolution is undeniably gaining momentum. Tricamo stressed that government intervention will be crucial. “To accelerate the transition, targeted government intervention will be essential — both to level the playing field and to fast-track the decarbonization of mobility,” he said.

Tricamo added that petrol vehicles remain significantly cheaper to operate in the region due to low fuel prices and a lack of EV incentives, while limited charging infrastructure further hinders widespread adoption.

Vahanian echoed this sentiment, calling for collaboration between policymakers and insurers, saying: “By collaborating with insurance providers, policymakers can create schemes that provide favorable premium rates or bundled services, thereby alleviating consumer concerns and accelerating market penetration.”

Full speed ahead 

With Tesla’s market entry, Lucid’s local production, and government-backed infrastructure investments, Saudi Arabia is fast-tracking its EV transition. Yet hurdles like charging deserts, affordability, battery resilience, and insurance costs must be overcome to reach the 30 percent adoption goal.

Europe’s armored defense capabilities and further elevate South Korea’s role as a major global arms exporter, South Korean defense manufacturer Hyundai Rotem has finalized a landmark agreement with the Polish government for a second batch of K2 Black Panther main battle tanks. The deal, officially signed on July 2, 2025, builds upon a previous acquisition and represents one of the most ambitious bilateral defense industrial partnerships between a European Union country and an Asian power to date.

The contract—estimated at $6 billion—includes the delivery of approximately 180 additional K2 tanks, with 117 units produced in South Korea and the rest to be assembled locally in Poland by Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ), the state-owned Polish Armaments Group. This dual-production model, incorporating extensive technology transfer, localized upgrades, and domestic supply chain development, places Poland at the forefront of NATO’s armored modernization drive, while cementing South Korea’s status as an indispensable partner in European defense.

The K2 Black Panther, first inducted into service with the Republic of Korea Army in 2014, is widely regarded as one of the most advanced main battle tanks (MBTs) in the world. Designed by Hyundai Rotem, a subsidiary of the Hyundai Motor Group, the tank was developed over more than a decade to replace aging K1 MBTs and respond to emerging threats on the Korean Peninsula.

Featuring a 120mm smoothbore gun with an autoloader, modular composite armor, and an integrated active protection system (APS), the K2 offers unparalleled firepower, protection, and survivability. Its hydropneumatic suspension system grants it exceptional maneuverability on varied terrain, while also allowing the tank to “kneel” or “tilt” for better gun elevation or depression—an advantage in both mountainous and urban environments.

Critically for Europe, the K2 is capable of forging water bodies up to 4.1 meters deep, thanks to a snorkel system, making it ideal for Central and Eastern European terrain, where rivers and marshlands pose significant mobility challenges for traditional armor.

With these capabilities, the K2 Black Panther offers performance on par with or exceeding that of its closest NATO counterparts—Germany’s Leopard 2A7, the US M1A2 Abrams, and France’s Leclerc—at a competitive cost and with greater modularity and upgrade potential.

Poland’s pursuit of the K2 reflects a broader transformation of its defense posture in response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Since that watershed moment, Warsaw has emerged as NATO’s frontline state, channeling record defense budgets into tank acquisitions, artillery, air defenses, and drone capabilities.

In 2022, Poland signed its first major arms deal with South Korea—a $13.7 billion package that included 180 K2 tanks, 212 K9 self-propelled howitzers, and 48 FA-50 light fighter jets. The speed and scale of that agreement made Warsaw Seoul’s largest defense customer.

The new second tranche of K2s, signed in 2025, not only doubles Poland’s tank order but also deepens the industrial partnership. The local assembly and modification of the tanks by PGZ allows for Polish-specific upgrades, including additional armor packages, custom communication systems, and integration with NATO-standard C4ISR networks. This aligns with the EU’s ReArm Europe Plan, which promotes regional defense manufacturing, autonomy, and resilience against supply chain disruptions.

According to Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak, the agreement “ensures long-term strategic autonomy, technological advancement, and robust interoperability within NATO. It represents a fundamental pillar of Poland’s ambition to become Europe’s leading land warfare power.”

For South Korea, this deal marks the largest single defense export in its history and underscores President Yoon Suk Yeol’s policy of transforming the country’s arms sector into a strategic economic and diplomatic tool. Seoul aims to become the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter by 2027, and the K2 has become a flagship product in that campaign.

Following a record $17.3 billion in defense exports in 2022, South Korea experienced a dip to $9.5 billion in 2024. This new $6 billion agreement with Poland signals a strong rebound and highlights how Seoul is leveraging quality, speed, and customization to outcompete traditional Western suppliers in high-stakes defense markets.

Key to this success is Hyundai Rotem’s willingness to share technology and support local assembly, features that many European defense ministries find increasingly attractive. Unlike American and German manufacturers, which often impose restrictions on intellectual property and local production, South Korean firms have demonstrated a flexible and cooperative approach.

“The K2 is more than a tank—it’s a platform for strategic partnership,” said Kim Yong-hyun, CEO of Hyundai Rotem. “Through this contract, we are building the foundation for long-term industrial collaboration, joint innovation, and regional security.”

The K2’s success in Poland could serve as a launchpad for further exports across Europe and the Middle East. Countries such as Romania, Slovakia, Norway, and the Baltic states have expressed interest in acquiring modern MBTs amid mounting concerns over Russia’s military resurgence.

Meanwhile, in the Middle East, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates are reportedly in advanced talks with South Korean defense officials regarding possible purchases of the K2 or K2-derived platforms. These discussions have gained traction amid skepticism toward Western suppliers following delivery delays and political conditionality.

Hyundai Rotem has also hinted at the development of further K2 variants, including a K2PL model optimized for Poland, as well as potential unmanned turret configurations and hybrid-electric drive systems—innovations that could open up new segments of the armored vehicle market.

The inclusion of the K2 within NATO’s arsenal represents a significant technological and doctrinal evolution. Unlike legacy tanks developed during the Cold War, the K2 is born from a post-Cold War design philosophy—emphasizing asymmetric threat response, network-centric warfare, and modularity.

The tank’s digital battlefield management system, sensor fusion, and active protection integration allow it to operate seamlessly in networked formations, sharing targeting data with drones, infantry, and artillery. This is critical for NATO’s multi-domain operations strategy, particularly in Eastern Europe where combined arms coordination is essential for deterring a potential Russian advance.

Moreover, local production in Poland ensures a secure supply line for spares, ammunition, and maintenance, a key lesson from the logistical chaos of early aid efforts to Ukraine in 2022–23.

The K2 contract also brings significant economic benefits to both countries. In Poland, the local assembly of the tanks at PGZ will generate thousands of jobs, revive legacy facilities, and lead to technology diffusion across the broader defense-industrial ecosystem. The government has also earmarked funding for R&D partnerships with South Korean firms, universities, and private suppliers.

In South Korea, Hyundai Rotem and subcontractors such as Hanwha Aerospace and LIG Nex1 benefit from long-term production pipelines, facilitating continued investment in next-generation systems.

According to defense economist Lee Sang-wook at the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade, “This is more than a contract—it’s a springboard for building a trans-Eurasian defense axis that complements, rather than competes with, existing U.S.-led frameworks.”

At the geopolitical level, the K2 agreement represents a subtle but strategic realignment. While Poland remains firmly embedded in NATO and the EU, it is diversifying its defense partnerships beyond traditional Western suppliers. This increases strategic redundancy and signals Europe’s recognition of Asia’s growing defense manufacturing prowess.

For South Korea, this is part of a broader “Global Pivotal State” strategy articulated by President Yoon, which sees arms exports as a way to build influence, forge alliances, and project soft power across the Global North and South.

As tensions persist in Eastern Europe, the Taiwan Strait, and the Middle East, the K2’s success illustrates how defense technology is increasingly at the intersection of geoeconomics, security policy, and national branding.

With the K2 Black Panther now entrenched in Poland’s arsenal and new orders on the horizon, both Seoul and Warsaw are preparing for the next phase of their defense partnership. Talks are already underway for joint development of future armored systems, possibly including autonomous vehicles, drone-tank coordination, and AI-assisted battlefield decision-making.

As both nations navigate the complexities of 21st-century warfare, the July 2nd agreement is more than just a tank sale. It is a strategic convergence—between a rising Asian power with world-class manufacturing and a frontline European nation rearming for an era of renewed conflict.

India and the United States are strategic partners, closely aligned in their economic, political, and defense policies. They conduct regular joint military exercises, share intelligence, and cooperate on global challenges from counterterrorism to climate change. Yet, less than four decades ago, the two countries were on the brink of a simulated war — with the U.S. preparing to strike deep into Indian territory.

In 1991, as the Cold War collapsed and the Soviet Union disintegrated, a shadowy crisis emerged in South Asia. Tensions between nuclear-armed neighbors India and Pakistan were boiling over, especially over Kashmir, and American defense strategists were preparing for the worst. For the United States, which had emerged as the world’s sole superpower, a nuclear war in South Asia was not just a regional concern—it was a global catastrophe in the making.

What followed was a military simulation so aggressive that it bordered on an act of war. Conducted by U.S. defense giant General Dynamics, the simulation envisioned a full-blown American attack on Indian military infrastructure to stop a possible Indian pre-emptive strike on Pakistan.

The wargame, meant to pitch the next generation of American cruise missiles to the Pentagon, outlined a hypothetical scenario set in the year 2000. The Kashmir crisis had escalated to its peak. Intelligence reports suggested India was planning a surgical nuclear strike against Pakistan’s launch facilities. In response, the U.S. war machine mobilized to crush India’s offensive capability before a single missile could be launched.

According to the simulation, India had declared a 600-nautical-mile maritime exclusion zone around its coast and warned foreign powers to stay out. Undeterred, the U.S. dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups and two nuclear-powered submarines into the Indian Ocean. The U.S. violated India’s declared zone southwest of Bombay, provoking a fierce response.

Indian Navy aircraft performed mock attacks on the U.S. fleet. The Americans responded by placing their B-52 bombers in Diego Garcia on full alert. The strategic bombers were assigned clear targets inside India — the Agni and Prithvi missile launch sites, the Virabhu nuclear submarine base, Venduruthy naval air station, ammunition depots, aircraft hangars, power plants, and key logistical centers.

In total, 190 cruise missiles were fired by American submarines, destroyers, and bombers in the simulation. The strikes were surgical but devastating. India’s command-and-control systems were assumed to be disabled. Its Navy was under continuous fire. Its aircraft could not take off. A total of 117 additional missiles were held in reserve — to “ensure no retaliation.”

The goal, according to the declassified simulation documents and reporting by a veteran journalist who first broke the story in The Telegraph on March 14, 1991, was clear: paralyze India’s military infrastructure before it could initiate or retaliate with nuclear force. The simulation grouped India with rogue states like Iran and Libya, sparking outrage in New Delhi.

The early 1990s were a time of uncertainty. The world had just emerged from the Cold War’s binary structure. With the USSR gone, the global balance of power shifted drastically. New power centers, like a rising India, were viewed with suspicion by American strategists.

On September 27, 1990, U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. G.L. Butler gave a testimony before Congress identifying three major threats to future peace: persistent rivalries between historical enemies (India-Pakistan), systemic failures in developing countries, and the rise of new centers of power. India checked all three boxes in Washington’s eyes.

India had conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 and maintained an ambiguous nuclear posture. Its strategic cooperation with the USSR, combined with moves like leasing the Soviet-made nuclear-powered submarine INS Chakra and expanding its naval ambitions in the Indian Ocean, further alienated the United States.

Each missile test by India, whether Agni or Prithvi, was met with a stern American rebuke. To the U.S., India was not just a regional power—it was a potentially destabilizing force in an already volatile region.

The war game was more than just a hypothetical exercise. It was a sales pitch.

General Dynamics, the company behind the simulation, had developed the Tomahawk cruise missile with McDonnell Douglas. Now, it was pushing for funding and adoption of a new generation of cruise missiles with triple the range. The simulation’s goal was to convince Congress and the Pentagon that the United States needed more surgical, long-range, high-impact strike options in a changing world.

By showcasing how its new missile systems could disable a large, ambitious regional power like India in a matter of hours, General Dynamics was making a hard sell. Ironically, the company that once simulated annihilating India is today a supplier of defense equipment to New Delhi.

The relationship began to shift meaningfully only two decades later.

In 2012, President Barack Obama unveiled a Strategic Guidance document that marked a historic pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region. The document emphasized the importance of strengthening alliances and partnerships in Asia to counterbalance China’s rise. India was described as a “linchpin” of this strategy.

This pivot changed the tone of bilateral ties. India was no longer seen as a potential antagonist. It was now a counterweight to China, a fellow democracy, and a partner in maintaining maritime freedom and order in the Indo-Pacific.

India responded by diversifying its defense partnerships. It had long depended on Russian weapons, but now sought American systems for diversification and modernization. Joint exercises like “Malabar” became regular features. Intelligence sharing, interoperability drills, and co-development of systems gained momentum.

In a twist of history, General Dynamics—the same firm that simulated the destruction of Indian military assets—is now working closely with the Indian Army.

In April 2025, India is set to finalize a deal to purchase Stryker armored combat vehicles from General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada. The 8×8 wheeled infantry carriers are designed for rapid mobility in high-altitude terrain, perfect for deployments along the Line of Actual Control with China in Eastern Ladakh and Sikkim.

Powered by a 350-horsepower Caterpillar C7 engine, with a top speed of 100 km/h and a range of 483 kilometers, the Stryker vehicles also come with modular ceramic armor for enhanced protection. Their compatibility with the IAF’s Chinook helicopters allows rapid insertion into rugged terrain.

The deal follows a three-phase plan by India’s Ministry of Defense. The first phase involves a limited purchase through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route. The second phase shifts to co-production in India, with technology transfer. The final phase will involve joint development of future armored platforms suited to Indian needs.

This is not just a defense transaction. It marks a culmination of decades of evolving ties, from suspicion and simulated conflict to strategic partnership and joint production.

The India-U.S. defense transformation is more than a change in posture. It reflects how geopolitical compulsions rewrite old assumptions.

India is now part of the Quad, alongside the U.S., Japan, and Australia, focusing on Indo-Pacific security. American companies are establishing joint ventures with Indian firms under the “Make in India” initiative. U.S. defense officials routinely refer to India as a “net security provider” in the region.

And perhaps most significantly, Washington no longer sees New Delhi through the lens of Pakistan or the Cold War. It sees India as an independent power, whose ambitions—regional and global—can complement American interests rather than threaten them.

This shift is pragmatic, not romantic. Both nations still have differences—on trade, on human rights, on Russia. But there is an understanding that strategic alignment, especially against a rising and assertive China, overrides these frictions.

There’s a strange symmetry in how history plays out. The same Indian Navy that once threatened to turn mock attacks into real strikes against the U.S. Navy in 1991 now conducts joint carrier operations with American forces in the Bay of Bengal. The same U.S. generals who once feared India’s Agni missiles now welcome India’s role in missile defense cooperation and space security.

The evolution of India-U.S. ties is not just a story of diplomacy—it’s a case study in global realignment. It shows how threats are often defined by context, and how alliances are forged not by sentiment, but by strategy.

As General Dynamics delivers the first batch of Strykers to India later this year, the symbolism is unmistakable. A nation once seen as a threat is now a buyer, partner, and perhaps, an indispensable ally.

And somewhere in the archives of Washington’s defense contractors lies a dusty file — a simulation that imagined a different future, one where war with India was not only possible but necessary. History, fortunately, chose another path.

RIYADH: Saudi Arabia is rapidly transforming into a regional technology hub, drawing comparisons to Silicon Valley, thanks to a wave of strategic investments and high-profile initiatives, experts have told Arab News.  

At the heart of this transformation is Project Transcendence, a groundbreaking $100 billion initiative launched in 2024.   

Spearheaded by the Kingdom’s Public Investment Fund in partnership with Google, the project aims to build a comprehensive artificial intelligence ecosystem within Saudi Arabia.  

The initiative is set to bolster the growth of local tech startups, generate employment opportunities, and foster collaborations with global technology firms — positioning the Kingdom at the forefront of regional innovation.  

Complementing these efforts is the annual LEAP technology conference, which continues to gain international attention. The 2025 edition of the event attracted over 170,000 visitors and secured investments exceeding $14.9 billion, underscoring Saudi Arabia’s growing appeal as a technology and innovation destination.  

These developments are central to the Kingdom’s broader economic reform strategy under Vision 2030, which aims to diversify the economy and reduce its longstanding reliance on oil revenues.  

With strategic initiatives and strong global partnerships, Saudi Arabia is cementing its place as a key player in the global tech landscape.  

Speaking to Arab News, Noor Al-Nahhas, co-founder and CEO of UAE-based software company nybl, said: “Saudi Arabia is rapidly transforming into a global technology hub, driven by Vision 2030’s ambitious agenda. The Kingdom is creating a robust ecosystem for tech startups to thrive while accelerating investments in AI and deep tech — technologies that are critical to furthering the progress of the sector.”   

He added: “With the emerging developments we are seeing in the Kingdom, obstacles are few — this is the Silicon Valley of the Middle East and a rising force in the global tech landscape.”   

Mamdouh Al-Doubayan, managing director of Globant for the Middle East and North Africa region, also echoed similar views. He said that Saudi Arabia’s investments in the digital infrastructure should be supported with key partnerships to achieve the desired results.  

“The Kingdom is making substantial investments in digital infrastructure while fostering an ecosystem that nurtures innovation and entrepreneurship. Key partnerships are pivotal to driving this vision forward,” said Al-Doubayan.   

The crucial SME factor  

Vikas Panchal, general manager, Middle East, for Indian multinational technology company Tally Solutions, told Arab News that small and medium enterprises in Saudi Arabia have a huge role to play as the Kingdom continues its technological evolution journey.   

“Saudi Arabia is rapidly advancing in its digital transformation journey, with SMEs playing a pivotal role in this evolution. The Kingdom’s Vision 2030 has placed technology and digitalization at the forefront of economic diversification, fostering a pro-business environment where SMEs are seen to continuously succeed in,” said Panchal.   

He added that government-backed programs like Monsha’at’s SME support initiatives as well as investments in AI, fintech and e-commerce are equipping businesses with scalable digital tools, thus allowing them to compete on a global scale.   

“With streamlined business regulations and a growing interest in pursuing tech-driven efficiencies, Saudi Arabia is on track to becoming a global tech hub,” Panchal added.  

Homegrown innovation   

Amid these advancements, experts also highlighted potential challenges that Saudi Arabia may encounter as it strives to establish itself as a global tech destination.  

Al-Doubayan noted that while the Kingdom is making significant progress in digital transformation, addressing certain challenges will be crucial to ensuring sustainable growth.  

He pointed out that one of the key obstacles Saudi Arabia may face is building a robust talent pipeline to support the burgeoning tech sector.  

“While the Kingdom invests in education and training, attracting and retaining skilled professionals in a competitive global landscape remains critical,” said Al-Doubayan, adding: “Additionally, navigating regulatory frameworks and ensuring a supportive environment for innovation can be complex, especially as the country seeks to balance rapid technological advancement with traditional practices.”  

Panchal said that some of the challenges faced by the Kingdom include costs for digital transformation, especially among SMEs in the Kingdom.  

 “While large corporations are quickly embracing AI and automation, many SMEs still face challenges in transitioning from traditional to digital operations. The lack of expertise in adopting cloud-based financial management, tax automation, and real-time accounting can slow down their competitiveness,” said Panchal.   

He added: “For some SMEs, the initial cost of transitioning to fully digital operations can be a challenging feat. By empowering SMEs with affordable, easy-to-use technology solutions, Saudi Arabia can overcome these hurdles and accelerate toward its goal of achieving a truly tech-driven economy.”   

Al-Doubayan also expressed similar views and said that some companies are facing the risk of infrastructural limitations, as developing the necessary digital and physical infrastructure to support ambitious projects can be both time-consuming and costly.  

Al-Nahhas said that Saudi Arabia should strengthen its AI capabilities to truly achieve its tech ambitions in the future.   

“One critical factor to consider is the speed at which the global AI race is evolving. This will be a vital aspect to remain cognizant of as Saudi Arabia pushes forward in pursuit of meeting its Vision 2030 goals,” said the nybl CEO.  

He added that Saudi Arabia should try to develop its local ecosystem for technological innovation rather than importing it from other nations.   

“A striking example is DeepSeek, which in a short span has developed an AI model capable of rivalling those from Silicon Valley and disrupts the sector in unprecedented ways,” said Al-Nahhas.   

DeepSeek, a chatbot developed by China, uses advanced large language models and was first launched on Jan. 10.   

Upon its release, it quickly outpaced ChatGPT, becoming the most downloaded freeware app on the iOS App Store in the US.   

The impressive performance of DeepSeek, coupled with its relatively low cost, has made waves globally, challenging the dominance of US-based AI models.   

Thanks to its Natural Language Processing technologies, DeepSeek is able to understand, interpret, and generate human language more effectively, resulting in a 60 percent reduction in irrelevant search results compared to traditional search engines.  

Al-Nahhas added: “This highlights the sheer speed of innovation in the tech sector, but also raises a fundamental question: ‘Why should we import tech when we have the resources and vision to create it in the Kingdom?’ To truly lead, Saudi Arabia must double down on homegrown innovation — over-reliance on external solutions risks dependency and could slow progress.”  

During the recent LEAP conference, held in Riyadh from Feb. 9 to Feb. 12, Saudi Minister of Communications and Information Technology Abdullah Al-Swaha also talked about DeepSeek and said that it is beating all AI models.   

“We have to celebrate the ChatGPT moment of 2022, but we also have to appreciate the DeepSeek moment. The world does not need polarization in the intelligent age. We need to work collectively to celebrate these advancements, where DeepSeek so far is beating all AI models,” the minister said.   

Al-Nahhas added that Saudi Arabia has a massive opportunity to set global benchmarks by developing AI and deep tech in-house, and can ensure that technology is not just made for the Kingdom, but can be exported worldwide, contributing to the growth of the country’s economy.   

“Competing on the global stage requires a mindset shift: Saudi Arabia is not just a consumer of technology, we are creators, driving the next wave of innovation from the Kingdom to the world,” said Al-Nahhas.   

Dhruv Verma, founder and CEO of Thriwe, a tech-driven benefits as a platform company which expanded its presence to Saudi Arabia in 2023, said that stringent data protection laws may pose hurdles for foreign tech companies, making long-term private sector engagement vital for sustainable growth.   

“As digitalization accelerates, the risk of cyber threats and data breaches increases, emphasizing the need for robust cybersecurity measures and cross-border collaborations,” said Verma.   

Arun Bruce, CEO of Dubai-based management consultancy firm TransformationX, told Arab News that Saudi Arabia should strengthen its startup ecosystem to ensure that the technology sector will thrive long term.   

He also echoed the views of Al-Nahhas that the Kingdom should avoid over-dependence on international technologies, and should develop advanced innovations locally.   

“The tech startup scene in KSA is certainly strengthening  — with multiple accelerators and government initiatives — but still has some way to go as it competes with global and regional startup hubs,” said Bruce.   

He added: “As Saudi Arabia seeks to grow, localizing its tech inputs becomes important. Companies like PIF-backed ALAT are certainly taking the Kingdom in the right direction.” 

China and Cambodia have officially launched the Yunyang Port Support and Training Center, a new joint facility located near Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base, marking a significant step forward in their growing defense partnership. The center began full operations on April 5, 2025, with both Chinese and Cambodian personnel stationed at the site to handle daily operations and coordination.

Announced by China’s Ministry of National Defense, the Yunyang Port facility is described as the product of “mutual respect and equal consultation” between Beijing and Phnom Penh. Officials from both sides stress that the center is intended to provide practical military cooperation, enhance technical training, and support public security efforts. Importantly, both governments have underscored that the center is “not directed at any third party” — a line clearly aimed at easing regional anxieties.

Yet, the timing, location, and scale of this development leave little doubt about its wider significance, especially against the backdrop of rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific.

The Yunyang Port Support and Training Center sits in close proximity to the Ream Naval Base — a Cambodian military facility that has drawn intense scrutiny from defense analysts and foreign governments over the past several years.

Satellite imagery published in 2023 first revealed major expansion works at Ream, including a large dry dock facility, new piers, and significant infrastructure upgrades. Of particular note was the construction of a pier reportedly capable of hosting aircraft carriers or large amphibious assault ships — vessels far beyond the current needs or capabilities of Cambodia’s small navy.

Such upgrades, analysts say, suggest a dual-use strategy: a facility that nominally serves Cambodian interests but can be rapidly scaled for use by China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) if required.

Geography is a crucial part of this story. The expanded Ream Naval Base and the nearby Yunyang Port facility lie just outside the mouth of the Gulf of Thailand, providing easy access to the South China Sea. But more importantly, they are within strategic striking distance of the Malacca Strait — the world’s busiest shipping lane, and a vital artery for global energy flows.

Roughly 60% of China’s imported oil passes through the Malacca Strait. This bottleneck — long referred to by Chinese strategic thinkers as the “Malacca Dilemma” — represents a critical vulnerability for Beijing, particularly in any scenario involving a U.S.-led naval blockade.

With its growing network of bases, ports, and logistics hubs stretching across the South China Sea and into the Indian Ocean, China is clearly working to ease that vulnerability. The new Yunyang Port center is just the latest piece of that expanding infrastructure puzzle.

Both Phnom Penh and Beijing insist that their cooperation is entirely transparent and defensive in nature. Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Manet has emphasized that the country’s constitution prohibits the establishment of foreign military bases on Cambodian soil.

However, critics argue that the line between “base” and “logistics hub” is increasingly blurred. “China doesn’t need to fly a flag over Ream Naval Base to benefit from its capabilities,” says a Southeast Asia defense analyst based in Singapore. “It just needs access — and from what we’ve seen, it appears to have that.”

U.S. officials have expressed longstanding concerns over China’s military presence at Ream, suggesting that it could provide Beijing with its first dedicated naval facility in Southeast Asia — a major development in its broader Indo-Pacific strategy.

An anonymous U.S. defense official was quoted in regional media saying: “The scale of construction at Ream exceeds any plausible Cambodian requirement. This looks far more like a forward operating support site for PLAN than a local naval upgrade.”

For Southeast Asian nations, the deepening China-Cambodia military relationship sends a clear signal: Beijing is consolidating its foothold on the western side of the South China Sea.

Vietnam, which shares historical tensions with both Cambodia and China, has been especially wary. Analysts suggest that Hanoi views the Ream developments as a potential threat to its own maritime security and freedom of navigation in the region.

Thailand and Malaysia, while officially silent, are likely watching closely. Both nations sit near the Malacca Strait, and any Chinese military expansion in the region raises obvious strategic calculations.

Indonesia, with its sprawling archipelago and major energy transport routes, is also assessing the shifting balance of power.

For Phnom Penh, aligning closely with China offers both rewards and risks.

On the one hand, Chinese investment has poured into Cambodia over the past decade, funding everything from infrastructure projects to real estate and energy developments. Military cooperation is a natural extension of that relationship.

The joint training center at Yunyang Port provides Cambodian naval personnel with access to advanced Chinese technical expertise and equipment, strengthening their operational capabilities.

On the other hand, Cambodia risks becoming overly dependent on Beijing — a concern that some in the region and within Cambodia itself have raised quietly.

By allowing Japan’s naval vessel to visit Ream soon after its expansion — as Cambodian officials have stated — Phnom Penh may be attempting to demonstrate that its ports remain open to multiple partners, not just China.

The Yunyang Port development fits into a larger pattern of Chinese activity in the Indo-Pacific.

Beijing has invested heavily in port facilities, naval logistics hubs, and infrastructure projects across the region under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). From Gwadar in Pakistan to Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Djibouti in East Africa, China is assembling what some have called a “string of pearls” — a network of facilities that could support military operations if needed.

Ream Naval Base and the Yunyang Port center appear to be Southeast Asia’s contribution to that network.

“China is playing a long game here,” says an Asia-Pacific security analyst. “Every port, every logistics hub, every training center gives the PLAN more flexibility and reach. It’s about creating options, not necessarily launching immediate operations.”

As operations begin at Yunyang Port, the next few months will be closely watched.

• Will Chinese warships make regular calls at Ream or Yunyang?
• How will the U.S., Australia, and Japan respond to the growing Chinese presence?
• Will Cambodia seek to balance China’s influence by deepening ties with other regional players?
• Could Vietnam or other ASEAN members ramp up their own naval modernization in response?

Already, the U.S. has stepped up its naval engagements in the region, conducting freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea and increasing defense ties with the Philippines and Vietnam.

The opening of the Yunyang Port Support and Training Center marks a new phase in China-Cambodia defense cooperation. While both governments frame the development as peaceful and focused on public security, the strategic implications are clear.

For China, it represents another step in securing critical sea lanes and projecting power in Southeast Asia. For Cambodia, it offers both enhanced military capabilities and deeper dependence on its largest foreign patron.

RIYADH: Saudi Arabia’s financial markets are on a sharp upward trajectory despite challenging global economic trends, experts have told Arab News.

Market volatility across the world — as seen by the S&P 500 dropping below 6,000 on Wednesday — together with US President Donald Trump’s policies prompting oil market uncertainty, and continuing supply chain disruptions, are increasing investment risks.

However, the Kingdom’s economic resilience, backed by Vision 2030’s diversification efforts and strong regulatory reforms, has helped Saudi Arabia mitigate these challenges.

In 2024, the economy rebounded with a 1.3 percent growth, driven by a 4.6 percent increase in non-oil activities, despite a decline in oil activities.

Saudi Arabia’s financial ecosystem is poised for even greater growth, but the key question remains: Can it continue to solidify its position as a global financial hub in such an unpredictable environment?

Vikas Papriwal, leader of FTI Consulting Middle East and Africa, told Arab News the Kingdom is very much in charge of its own destiny in this regard.

“The key to future-proofing against oil market volatility and maintaining leadership in the global energy industry is for Saudi Arabia to continue to place significant emphasis on researching, developing, and innovating in the space of renewable and sustainable energy and be leaders in the global energy transition,” he said.

Saudi Arabia’s progress can also be seen in its extensive regulatory reforms. The country has worked hard to ensure that its financial markets align with international best practices, providing greater transparency, stability, and ease of access for investors.

“Reforms that can fortify the Kingdom’s position as a financial powerhouse include further easing processes for operating and starting businesses, particularly through legal and tax reforms,” said Papriwal.

Rezwan Shafique, principal of financial services at Arthur D. Little, told Arab News that those reforms are just the starting line, emphasizing that the path toward becoming a powerhouse is now underway.

“Government and regulatory reforms, such as Companies Law, CMA (Capital Market Authority) strategic plans, and MISA (Ministry of Investment) guidelines, have laid the groundwork by improving corporate transparency, stability, and predictability. The Kingdom is now in a phase to communicate opportunities to global players,” Shafique added.

He noted that Saudi Arabia has already made progress in this area, highlighting that the country’s share in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index has risen to 4 percent from 2.7 percent in 2019. He also pointed out that foreign ownership in the Saudi Exchange has increased 25-fold over the past five years, reaching $100 billion, signaling expanding opportunities for global investors.

“Gaining traction on new listings and becoming a multi-jurisdictional player should be a key focus. A number of factors will need to converge, including Saudi Arabia actively forging ties between itself, China, Singapore, and African nations through strategic partnerships,” he said.

Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s ambition to lead the region in financial services is evident. Over the past few years, its exchange, Tadawul, has made tremendous strides, earning a spot among the top 10 global stock markets.

Its market capitalization reached $2.9 trillion as of late 2024, with the Kingdom continuing to attract significant foreign investments, especially in light of the world’s largest initial public offering — Aramco’s listing in 2019, which raised over $25 billion.

“Tadawul’s inclusion in major global indices like MSCI and FTSE has increased foreign investor participation, while the size and scale of recent initial public offerings have showcased the Kingdom’s ability to attract significant global capital,” said Serkan Teker, financial services partner at Deloitte Middle East.

He added that to rival global giants such as Wall Street and London, Saudi Arabia must continue evolving its capital markets by enhancing liquidity, diversifying sector representation, and improving transparency.

Teker also highlighted how the banking sector has been a significant driver of the Kingdom’s non-oil gross domestic product expansion. It posted an “impressive annual growth of almost 11 percent between 2018 and the beginning of 2023, maintaining strong asset quality with non-performing loans gradually declining since the first shock waves of the COVID-19 pandemic.”

Beyond the financial sector, Saudi Arabia’s broader economic strategy also focuses on creating new business environments and fostering innovation to attract foreign investors.

Teker said: “The Kingdom could also look into creating new free zones and specialized economic zones for key areas of strategic focus, such as healthcare, biotech, and information and communications technology. Additionally, continued investment in transformative urban projects that allow KSA to act as a central hub for commerce and hospitality will further strengthen its position on the global stage.”

The Deloitte partner went on to explain that Saudi Arabia’s rapid advancements in artificial intelligence, fintech, and digital banking are transforming the country into a global innovation hub. And he cited regulatory initiatives including the FinTech Sandbox and the adoption of Open Banking as helping the Kingdom become a magnet for tech startups and international investors.

He added that initiatives such as digital-only banks and AI-driven solutions in finance and healthcare are positioning Saudi Arabia at the forefront of cutting-edge financial technology.

The Kingdom’s fintech market, in particular, has experienced exponential growth — up 25 percent in 2024 according to the Saudi Central Bank — reflecting the increasing importance of digital transformation to the economy.

“Saudi Arabia is making significant investments in AI and related infrastructure, including a $40 billion tech fund and targeted investments in AI companies and startups. The launch of the Saudi Artificial Intelligence Authority is expected to accelerate innovation across key industries such as healthcare, finance, and manufacturing,” FTI Consulting’s Papriwal added.

Tadawul, however, is not without its challenges. Geopolitical instability in the Middle East remains a persistent concern, and the volatility of global markets — particularly oil price fluctuations — continues to affect the broader economy.

“Tadawul needs to evolve in two ways: first, from a domestic exchange to multi-regional, and second, toward a technology company enabling financial services firms to develop and execute investment strategies,” said Arthur D. Little’s Shafique.

Looking ahead, Saudi Arabia’s ability to expand its financial markets, further diversify its economy, and continue its digital transformation will be crucial in maintaining its upward trajectory.

The Kingdom is already focusing on innovation, sustainable finance, and digital platforms as part of its broader Vision 2030 agenda. This vision positions Saudi Arabia not only as a regional player but also as a leader in global financial markets.

Teker emphasized that Saudi Arabia can strengthen its claim as a global financial powerhouse by expanding digital and financial inclusion through digital banking solutions and financial literacy programs would help reach underserved segments of the population.

Additionally, he highlighted the importance of deepening capital market reforms, introducing advanced financial instruments, and attracting foreign participation to enhance liquidity and diversify investment options.

Teker also explained that by leveraging regulatory frameworks, fostering partnerships between banks and fintech firms, and attracting international digital players, Saudi Arabia can establish itself as a global fintech hub and strengthen its position in the rapidly evolving financial services sector.

“We believe some of these forward-looking actions, aligned with Vision 2030’s ambitious goals, can further propel Saudi Arabia into global financial leadership while driving inclusive and sustainable economic growth,” he said.