The U.S. Navy is moving toward replacing its remaining F-5E/F Tiger II aggressor aircraft with surplus F/A-18E/F Super Hornet platforms, according to newly released language in the House Armed Services Committee’s draft fiscal 2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The provision requires the Department of the Navy to report on efforts to transfer Super Hornets to Navy Reserve units in order to assume the adversary training mission currently performed by F-5s.

The move represents the clearest legislative signal yet that the Navy intends to phase out its upgraded but aging F-5 fleet in favor of a more capable fourth-generation platform. It also underscores a broader Department of Defense trend toward increasing realism in “red air” adversary training, particularly as U.S. forces prepare for potential high-end conflict scenarios in the Indo-Pacific.

The NDAA language directs the Secretary of the Navy to deliver a report to congressional defense committees by March 2027 detailing the status of transferring F/A-18E/F aircraft to replace F-5s in adversary squadrons. The report must also evaluate risks to fleet readiness, mission execution, and aircrew and maintainer proficiency during the transition period.

Lawmakers are also requesting a detailed timeline for the shift, including procurement of support equipment, spare parts provisioning, pilot training pipelines, and maintenance infrastructure adjustments.

While the provision stops short of mandating immediate divestment of F-5s, it effectively formalizes what had previously been an informal and partially observable trend: the gradual replacement of legacy adversary aircraft with more capable tactical jets drawn from operational fleets.

For decades, the Navy’s Fighter Squadron Composite (VFC) units have relied heavily on the F-5 as a cost-effective adversary platform. These squadrons provide “dissimilar air combat training” (DACT), simulating enemy aircraft to train fleet pilots in realistic combat engagements.

Today, the Navy maintains four VFC squadrons performing this role. One of them, VFC-12 “Fighting Omars,” has already transitioned to the F/A-18E/F at Naval Air Station Oceana. VFC-13 “Saints,” based at NAS Fallon, Nevada, operates surplus F-16C/D aircraft acquired from Air Force stocks, having previously flown F-5s.

The remaining F-5 operators include VFC-111 “Sundowners” at NAS Key West, Florida, and VFC-204 “River Rattlers” at NAS Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, Louisiana. VFC-204 is a relatively recent F-5 convert, having transitioned from legacy Hornets.

If the proposed plan proceeds, these two squadrons would likely represent the final phase of Navy F-5 operations, ending a lineage that stretches back to the earliest days of the Navy’s Topgun adversary program.

In recent years, the Navy has invested in extending the F-5’s service life through the Avionics Reconfiguration and Tactical/Modernization for Inventory Standardization (ARTEMIS) program. The effort, led by Tactical Air Support, Inc. (TacAir), modernized cockpit systems and mission capability to improve training realism.

The ARTEMIS upgrade includes modern safety and avionics systems such as Mk 16 ejection seats, Digital Air Data Computers, ADS-B transponders, and updated cockpit displays. More advanced elements derived from TacAir’s F-5 Advanced Tiger (F-5AT) configuration include a Nemesis radar, open-architecture mission computer, updated radar warning receiver suite, datalink integration, and helmet-mounted display compatibility.

The modernization effort also incorporates threat-replication software designed to emulate modern weapons engagement zones and sensor behaviors, giving pilots more realistic exposure to modern aerial threats despite flying a Cold War-era airframe.

The Navy’s F-5 inventory includes approximately 30 active airframes, supplemented by ex-Swiss Air Force aircraft converted into F-5N+/F-5F+ variants. These jets are divided between Navy and Marine Corps adversary units.

Despite these improvements, defense analysts note that the F-5 remains fundamentally constrained by its design limitations, particularly in radar performance, thrust, and sensor integration compared with modern fourth- and fifth-generation fighters.

The F-5E/F Tiger II is a lightweight, twin-engine fighter originally designed during the Cold War for high-agility dogfighting and export affordability. While its small size and maneuverability make it useful for simulating certain threat profiles, it cannot fully replicate the radar, sensor fusion, and kinematic performance of modern fourth-generation fighters.

In particular, the aircraft struggles to represent high-end platforms such as Chinese J-16 or Russian Su-35 derivatives in beyond-visual-range engagements. Its limited radar and electronic warfare systems also reduce its effectiveness in simulating modern networked air combat environments.

However, the F-5 has remained valuable for generating “mass” in training exercises. Its low operating cost allows the Navy to field multiple adversary aircraft simultaneously, enabling fleet pilots to train against numerically dense threat formations—an increasingly important factor in Pacific theater scenarios.

The Navy’s apparent shift toward the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet as an adversary platform reflects a broader demand for higher-fidelity training environments.

With its AN/APG-79 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, advanced electronic warfare systems, and sensor suite, the Super Hornet is capable of closely replicating the performance of modern fourth-generation adversary aircraft. When configured appropriately, it can simulate threats such as the J-16-class “Flanker” derivatives with considerable realism.

The aircraft’s aerodynamic performance also contributes to its suitability in the adversary role. In a clean or lightly loaded configuration, the Super Hornet demonstrates strong energy maneuverability and slow-speed handling characteristics, making it a credible surrogate for high-performance enemy fighters in close-in engagements.

Its ability to carry infrared search and track (IRST) systems further enhances its realism in simulating modern sensor fusion and passive detection environments.

However, this shift raises logistical and operational questions. The Super Hornet is the Navy’s primary carrier-based strike fighter, with more than 500 aircraft currently in inventory supporting carrier air wings and global operations. Diverting airframes to adversary squadrons could create tension between training requirements and operational readiness.

As of recent budget disclosures, the Navy maintains roughly 575 Super Hornet variants in service, including both single-seat F/A-18Es and two-seat F/A-18Fs. These aircraft form the backbone of carrier strike aviation and have seen extensive operational use in the Middle East and other theaters.

The potential use of these aircraft in adversary squadrons reflects a broader shift in U.S. military training philosophy: prioritizing realism and high-end threat replication over cost efficiency alone.

At the same time, the Navy is facing a constrained tactical aviation inventory, making any redistribution of aircraft a complex trade-off. Maintenance cycles, deployment schedules, and readiness requirements all factor into how many Super Hornets could realistically be assigned to adversary units without degrading fleet performance.

To mitigate shortfalls in adversary capacity, the Navy and other services have increasingly relied on contractor-operated “red air” providers such as Tactical Air Support, Inc. These companies operate upgraded F-5AT aircraft and other platforms to supplement military adversary training.

While these contractor fleets provide essential capacity, they are generally limited in representing advanced peer threats. This has driven demand for more sophisticated solutions, including operational fighters repurposed into adversary roles and, increasingly, experimentation with unmanned systems.

Looking ahead, the Navy is expected to incorporate a mix of manned and unmanned systems into its adversary training architecture. Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) concepts, already being explored by the Air Force, may eventually play a role in generating distributed threat environments alongside manned Super Hornets and F-16s.

Such systems could provide scalable adversary mass at lower cost while simulating advanced networked warfare scenarios more effectively than legacy platforms.

The Navy, however, is moving more cautiously than other services in adopting CCA-like concepts for training purposes, preferring incremental integration rather than rapid transformation.

The U.S. Marine Corps continues to operate its own adversary F-5 units, including VMFT-401 “Snipers” at MCAS Yuma and VMFT-402 “Grim Reapers” at MCAS Beaufort. These aircraft are being upgraded with modern datalink systems and cockpit enhancements under a program known as Red Net.

The Marine Corps’ Aviation Plan indicates F-5 retirement is unlikely before 2040, with future replacement expected under a broader “Adversary Next” family-of-systems approach.

The potential replacement of F-5 adversary aircraft with Super Hornets marks more than a fleet modernization decision—it reflects a structural shift in how the Navy prepares for high-end conflict.

As potential adversaries field increasingly capable fourth- and fifth-generation fighters, legacy adversary platforms are becoming less adequate for realistic training. The Super Hornet, despite being a frontline combat aircraft, is emerging as a bridge solution: expensive but necessary, capable of replicating modern threats with greater fidelity than Cold War-era trainers ever could.

The missiles reportedly destroyed a girl’s primary school in Minab, southern Iran, killing around 150 and wounding almost 100. Many students are believed to be among the dead.

In a statement released on social media, UNESCO expressed deep alarm at the impact of the military attacks, which continued into Sunday, and noted that pupils in a place dedicated to learning are protected under international humanitarian law, and that “attacks against educational institutions endanger students and teachers and undermine the right to education.”

UNESCO joined a host of bodies from across the United Nations system and senior officials, including Secretary-General António Guterres, to condemn the military attacks, as well as the retaliatory strikes by Iran that hit several Middle Eastern countries.

Malala ‘heartbroken and appalled’ by strike

United Nations Messenger of Peace and Nobel Peace laurate Malala Yousafzai announced that she was heartbroken and appalled by the bombing of the school. 

“The killing of civilians, especially children, is unconscionable, and I condemn it unequivocally,” she said in a social media post, and called for the escalation of violence across the region to end, and for justice and accountability to follow.

“All states and parties must uphold their obligations under international law to protect civilians and safeguard schools,” she wrote. “Every child deserves to live and learn in peace.”

Malala became an international symbol of the fight for girls’ education after she was shot in 2012 for opposing Taliban restrictions on female education in her home country of Pakistan.

The United States has signalled a significant shift in its approach to deterring a nuclear-armed North Korea, indicating it will play a “more limited” role and place greater responsibility on South Korea to take the lead in defending the Korean Peninsula. The change, outlined in a newly released Pentagon policy document, is likely to spark debate in Seoul over the future balance of the US–South Korea alliance.

The new National Defense Strategy, published on Friday, states that South Korea is now capable of assuming “primary responsibility” for deterring North Korea, with the United States providing critical but reduced support. The document argues that this recalibration aligns with Washington’s broader strategic priorities and reflects South Korea’s growing military capabilities.

“South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but more limited US support,” the strategy said. “This shift in the balance of responsibility is consistent with America’s interest in updating US force posture on the Korean Peninsula.”

The policy shift comes at a time of heightened tensions on the peninsula. Earlier this month, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un approved the launch of multiple ballistic missiles toward the country’s eastern waters, a move widely seen as a signal of defiance toward Washington and its allies. Pyongyang has continued to accelerate its weapons development, including nuclear-capable missiles that can potentially reach the US mainland.

South Korea currently hosts about 28,500 US troops, stationed under a decades-old alliance formed after the Korean War. The presence of American forces has long been viewed as a cornerstone of deterrence against North Korea. However, successive US administrations have increasingly questioned whether the current posture best serves America’s evolving global interests.

In recent years, US officials have suggested making American forces in South Korea more flexible, allowing them to operate beyond the peninsula if required. Such flexibility would enable Washington to respond to a wider range of regional contingencies, including tensions over Taiwan and China’s expanding military influence across the Indo-Pacific.

While South Korea has traditionally resisted any move that could weaken the US security guarantee, it has steadily expanded its own military strength over the past two decades. Seoul has invested heavily in advanced fighter jets, missile defence systems, submarines, and indigenous weapons production. For 2026, South Korea increased its defence budget by 7.5 per cent, underscoring its intent to play a larger role in its own security.

With an active-duty force of roughly 450,000 personnel, South Korea has also set a long-term goal of assuming wartime operational control of combined US–South Korean forces, a responsibility currently held by an American general. The transition, discussed for years, has been delayed amid concerns about North Korea’s nuclear threat, but remains a key objective for Seoul.

During a visit to Seoul last November, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth praised South Korea’s plans to further increase military spending, calling the country a “model ally” that is taking its defence obligations seriously. His comments reflected a broader US push for allies to shoulder more of the burden in maintaining regional stability.

The 25-page National Defense Strategy makes clear that defending the US homeland is the Pentagon’s top priority. In the Indo-Pacific, it says, Washington’s focus is on ensuring China cannot dominate the United States or its allies. The document emphasises competition rather than confrontation, arguing that outright conflict with Beijing is neither inevitable nor desirable.

“This does not require regime change or some other existential struggle,” the strategy said. “Rather, a decent peace, on terms favourable to Americans but that China can also accept and live under, is possible.”

Notably, the document did not mention Taiwan by name, despite ongoing concerns over cross-strait tensions. China claims democratically governed Taiwan as its own territory and has not ruled out using force to bring the island under its control. Taiwan rejects Beijing’s sovereignty claims, insisting that its future can only be decided by its people.

On the diplomatic front, Washington has renewed calls for dialogue with Pyongyang, though progress remains elusive. Former US president Donald Trump met Kim Jong Un three times during his first term in office, breaking decades of precedent, but the talks failed to produce a lasting agreement. North Korea has so far not directly responded to recent US overtures.

During a recent visit to the United States, South Korean Prime Minister Kim Min-seok discussed North Korea policy with US Vice-President JD Vance. According to Yonhap News Agency, Mr Kim suggested that Mr Trump consider appointing a special envoy to Pyongyang to restart negotiations and reduce tensions.

The Korean War ended in 1953 with an armistice rather than a peace treaty, leaving the peninsula technically still at war. North and South Korea remain divided by the heavily fortified Demilitarised Zone, one of the most militarised borders in the world.

As Washington reassesses its global military posture, the evolving division of responsibility on the Korean Peninsula is likely to become a central issue for the alliance. While US officials frame the shift as recognition of South Korea’s growing strength, concerns persist in Seoul that a reduced American role could embolden Pyongyang at a volatile moment in regional security.