President Donald Trump has threatened that the US would destroy an Iranian bridge or power plant any time its forces attack a ship in the Strait of Hormuz.

Potential targets would include ones “located next to, or in,” the capital Tehran, he said in a post on Truth Social.

The military response would follow any form of attack on shipping in the vital waterway, “whether it be by missile, rocket, drone, or any other device or weapon”.

His threat follows the US launching strikes on Iran for the 11th consecutive night, with Tehran warning the US against targeting its nuclear facilities.

US Central Command (Centcom) said the wave of strikes were “designed to continue degrading Iran’s ability to threaten commercial shipping” in the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian state media reported that air defences were activated in the capital Tehran. Explosions were also reported in the north-western city of Tabriz, the south-eastern ports of Chabahar and Konarak, and in the southern city of Bushehr, home to Iran’s only nuclear power plant.

Iran, which has retaliated against the US and its Middle East allies, warned of reprisals after Trump said the US would soon hit an underground nuclear site near Natanz.

Iran and the US agreed a ceasefire in April, but hostilities resumed last week as both countries battled over control of the vital Strait of Hormuz waterway.

Centcom said US forces had targeted Iranian military operations centres, maritime capabilities, aircraft hangars, drone storage facilities, and military logistics infrastructure.

It also accused Iran of attacking “more than 30 commercial vessels” passing through the Strait of Hormuz over the past three months.

“The unwarranted attacks have endangered hundreds of innocent mariners and undermined freedom of navigation,” it said, adding the waterway remained “open for commercial vessel transit”.

Kuwait’s army said on Wednesday that its air defences had engaged with drone attacks from Iran, while Bahrain and Jordan said they had also intercepted drone and missile strikes.

The price of oil jumped in response to the latest escalation, reaching $94 on Wednesday.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said Washington is still willing to engage in diplomacy with Tehran, but added that he did not believe Iran was serious about talks.

Back in April, Trump threatened to bomb civilian infrastructure in Iran, including bridges and power plants.

UN human rights chief Volker Türk responded at the time by saying: “Under international law, deliberately attacking civilians and civilian infrastructure is a war crime.”

The 1949 Geneva Conventions on humanitarian conduct in war prohibit attacks on sites considered essential for civilians.

“I’ll save the energy targets for last, but ultimately we’ll hit energy targets,” Trump said in an interview on Special Report with Bret Baier that aired on Tuesday night.

He said US negotiators had conveyed to their Iranian counterparts on Tuesday evening that they “‘better make a deal, or you’re not going to have anything left'”.

The escalation in rhetoric comes after Trump said a 20% toll he had threatened to impose in the Strait of Hormuz would be replaced by “massive” trade and investment deals with Gulf states.

The announcement came hours before the US military carried out a seven-hour wave of strikes on Iran and resumed a blockade of its ports.

US Central Command (Centcom) said “dozens” of Iranian military targets near the Strait of Hormuz, with the aim to “further degrade Iran’s ability to threaten commercial shipping and civilian crews”.

Meanwhile, Tehran fired missiles and drones on US targets in Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain, Iranian state-run television IRIB reported.

In the early hours of Wednesday, Kuwait’s military said it was intercepting Iranian attack drones, while Bahrain activated air raid sirens.

“Kuwaiti air defences are currently engaging hostile drone attacks following the nefarious Iranian aggression,” the Kuwaiti army said. Bahrain’s interior ministry urged citizens and residents to remain calm and head to the nearest safe place.

The US also said Iran had “intentionally targeted civilians” in the region by attacking seven commercial ships, which had resulted in “nearly a dozen civilian crew members killed, missing, or injured”, the commander of Centcom said in a statement late on Tuesday.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) said on Monday night that Iranian cruise missiles had targeted two national tankers, killing an Indian crew member and wounding eight others, four seriously.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) later confirmed the strikes via a statement to Telegram, where it said two tankers had ignored warnings, turned off navigation systems and attempted to pass through a mined route.

It was unclear which other attacks the Centcom statement was referring to. The IRGC did not immediately comment.

Renewed strikes between the US and Iran triggered a sharp rise in oil prices as tanker traffic through the Strait has virtually stalled.

It underscores the strategic importance of the waterway – with Iran accusing the US of interfering in its management of Hormuz – but controlling it means Tehran can also threaten the global economy.

On Monday, Trump declared that the US was now the “guardian” of the Strait of Hormuz, and vowed to impose a 20% charge on all cargo shipped through the waterway to pay for protecting it.

Raising the stakes further, Trump said the US would also reimpose its naval blockade on Iran in a bid to further squeeze the country’s struggling economy.

In his latest post on Truth Social, Trump wrote: “I have decided to replace the 20% United States Reimbursement Fee with Trade and Investment Deals that the various Gulf States will be making into the United States.

“Those Investments will be MASSIVE but, at the same time, extraordinarily good for them, and their future.”

The US president provided no further details.

He also said the strait “is open to ALL Ship traffic except for Iran” and that “oil is flowing like never before, thanks to the awesome Power of the United States Military”.

Speaking later, after talks in Washington with the new Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, Trump said: “I don’t like the concept of a fee, but at the same time, it’s not fair that we’re protecting this Strait for the entire world.”

He said he had changed his initial fee plan after receiving numerous calls from Gulf leaders.

In response to Trump’s announcement, Iran said it would remain in control of the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said Trump’s blockade decision “has, in a way, dismantled” an earlier agreed truce deal, the AFP news agency reported.

Gharibabadi also told state television, as quoted by Reuters news agency: “If the US thinks that by tightening its measures against us, its military actions and its economic blockade, we will return to negotiations, it is making a mistake.”

The US first imposed a naval blockade of all Iranian ports in April to put pressure on Tehran. Roughly five weeks later, the US military said it had redirected 100 commercial vessels and disabled four under the blockade.

The US lifted the blockade in June as part of a deal – known as a memorandum of understanding – between the two countries that aimed to end the conflict, but a dispute over the strait has become a key point of contention.

Meanwhile, shipping data shows traffic through the strait has slowed to a two-month low. The benchmark Brent Crude oil price has also risen sharply.

Additional reporting by Ella Kipling

Ukrainian authorities reported eight civilians killed and 35 others wounded in Russian attacks on the city of Dnipro on Monday, while Russian authorities reported at least six people killed by Ukrainian strikes on Russian and Russian-controlled territory over the weekend.

Moscow began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, eight years after annexing the Crimean Peninsula. 

The UN has repeatedly and forcefully condemned Russia’s full-scale invasion, with multiple General Assembly resolutions demanding Russia withdraw its forces while the UN and its partners continue to provide crucial humanitarian assistance.

The latest civilian casualties come as Russia and Ukraine escalate attacks on critical energy infrastructure. Russian authorities reported on Sunday that Ukrainian forces set a major oil refinery ablaze, which could deepen Russian fuel shortages.

Meanwhile, Russian armed forces targeted energy facilities across Ukraine throughout the 2025-26 winter months, causing emergency electricity outages affecting millions of Ukrainian civilians, according to a UN human rights office (OHCHR) report released on Monday.

Attacks target electricity and heating

The OHCHR report said that Russian attacks had destroyed energy generation, transmission and distribution facilities through the frigid winter months. 

“Loss of electricity and heating during winter affected people’s health, safety and ability to maintain an adequate standard of living, particularly for older people, those with disabilities and families with children,” Danielle Bell, Head of the UN’s Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, said in a press release.

The report, titled Attacks against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and update on the human rights situation in Ukraine, finds that Russia carried out at least 423 attacks on electricity generation, transmission and distribution facilities, as well as at least 74 strikes on centralised heating infrastructure, which supplies heating and hot water to most Ukrainian urban households.

Russian attacks caused hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian civilians to lose access to heating during the country’s coldest winter since 2010.

Due to extensive damage, OHCHR said it will not be possible to fully restore energy generation capacity by next winter, meaning that civilians may be left to face the cold once more.

Civilian death toll rises

The report also documents increased civilian casualties, continuing violations against prisoners of war, and ongoing restrictions on fundamental rights in territory occupied by Russia.

It details 1,272 civilians killed and 6,871 injured in Ukraine from 1 December 2025 to 31 May 2026, a 40 per cent increase from the same period the previous year. Long-range missile and drone attacks remained the leading cause of civilian casualties, according to the report.

“Our findings highlight several deeply worrying trends: sustained attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure during winter, rising civilian casualties across Ukraine, continued torture and ill-treatment of prisoners of war, and ongoing restrictions on fundamental rights in occupied territory,” Ms. Bell said.

The growing use of short-range drones near frontline areas has increased risks to civilians, impeded evacuations and humanitarian operations, and increased some communities’ isolation, OHCHR said.

Violations against POWs

The report highlights serious violations against both Russian and Ukrainian prisoners of war, based on 1,926 interviews with victims and witnesses.

Nearly all Ukrainian prisoners of war interviewed for the report described torture, beatings, sexual violence, electric shocks and denial of medical care by Russian forces. Meanwhile, most Russian prisoners of war held by Ukraine also reported torture or ill-treatment.

OHCHR recommended that Russia and Ukraine strengthen civilian protection, ensure accountability and restore essential infrastructure.

“All prisoners of war must be treated humanely and in accordance with international humanitarian law,” OHCHR’s press release reads.

In Russian-occupied territories, the report documents restrictions on freedom of expression and other fundamental freedoms, torture, forced conscription, and prohibitions of the Ukrainian curriculum in schools. OHCHR continues to request access to occupied territory for independent monitoring.

UN agencies step up

Four years after the full-scale invasion began, UN agencies continue to deliver food kits and medical supplies to frontline areas, deploying emergency personnel and mobile clinics, distributing trauma kits to most Ukrainian cities, and supporting health and sanitation programs for Ukrainian civilians affected by the conflict.

Leaders of the world’s most advanced economies have gathered at the French lakeside resort of Evian for the annual summit of the Group of Seven (G7), a forum that for nearly half a century has played a central role in shaping the global economy and responding to international crises.

Yet as the leaders meet against a backdrop of shifting geopolitical alliances, intensifying trade disputes, and the rise of new economic powers, a fundamental question hangs over the summit: Does the G7 still possess the influence it once commanded, or is the balance of global power moving elsewhere?

The gathering comes at a pivotal moment. Economic influence is becoming increasingly dispersed, with emerging powers in Asia, the Middle East, and other regions challenging the dominance traditionally held by Western economies. At the same time, longstanding alliances are under pressure, and institutions that emerged from the post-World War II order are facing growing scrutiny.

French President Emmanuel Macron, hosting this year’s summit, acknowledged the challenges facing the group but expressed confidence in its continued relevance.

“We must succeed in finding consensus to move forward on less contentious issues and create the elements of cooperation that make this G7 worthwhile,” Macron said ahead of the meeting. “On major crises, as well as on issues of partnership or rebalancing of the macroeconomic model, this G7 should enable progress.”

The origins of the group date back to 1975, when leaders from France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States met for the first G6 summit. The meeting was organized in response to economic turbulence triggered by the oil shocks and inflation of the early 1970s.

Canada joined the following year, creating the G7. The group became an influential platform for coordinating economic policies among the world’s leading industrialized democracies.

During the Cold War, the forum brought together major market economies outside the Communist bloc. It evolved into a key venue for addressing global economic challenges, financial crises, and international security concerns.

In 1996, Russia joined the organization, transforming it into the G8. However, Moscow’s membership was suspended in 2014 following its annexation of Crimea, returning the group to its original seven-member format.

Today, the G7 consists of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Canada. The European Union also participates in discussions and is represented at the summit.

Collectively, the G7 economies account for more than $50 trillion in economic output, representing approximately 44 percent of global GDP. Yet they represent less than 10 percent of the world’s population, highlighting a growing mismatch between economic influence and demographic realities.

When the G7 was formed, its members dominated the global economy. Their combined economic strength gave them unparalleled influence over international finance, trade, and development.

However, the global economic landscape has changed dramatically over the past several decades.

Emerging economies have expanded rapidly, particularly in Asia. Countries such as China and India have transformed into major economic powers, while regional blocs and developing nations have become increasingly important drivers of global growth.

The rise of China, in particular, has reshaped international economic dynamics.

While China is not a member of the G7, it has become one of the central topics of discussion at this year’s summit. G7 leaders are expected to focus heavily on what they view as structural imbalances in the Chinese economy and their implications for global markets.

Western governments argue that China produces significantly more goods than it consumes domestically, resulting in large export surpluses that are placing pressure on industries in Europe and North America.

European concerns have intensified in recent years. In 2025, the European Union recorded a trade deficit with China exceeding $350 billion, underscoring the scale of economic dependence and competition between the two sides.

Beyond trade, China’s dominance in critical minerals has become a strategic concern for G7 nations.

Beijing controls much of the global supply chain for rare earth minerals, which are essential components in advanced technologies ranging from electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy systems to semiconductors and military equipment.

As a result, G7 members are increasingly seeking ways to diversify supply chains and reduce dependence on Chinese production. Discussions at the summit are expected to focus on investment strategies, industrial policies, and international partnerships aimed at securing alternative sources of critical materials.

Economic issues are not the only pressing concerns on the summit agenda.

Global security challenges are also expected to dominate discussions, particularly Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and growing tensions involving Iran.

European members of the G7 have been pushing for a unified approach toward supporting Ukraine and maintaining pressure on Russia. The conflict continues to have significant implications for European security, energy markets, and international stability.

Meanwhile, the United States is seeking support for its broader strategy toward Iran, reflecting concerns about regional instability and security threats in the Middle East.

The ability of the G7 to present a united front on these issues could prove crucial in determining the effectiveness of any policy initiatives that emerge from the summit.

However, achieving consensus may be more difficult than in previous decades.
One of the most significant challenges facing the G7 is not external competition but internal disagreement.

Historically, the group’s influence stemmed not only from its economic power but also from the shared values and policy coordination of its members.

In recent years, however, differences over trade, security, and foreign policy have become increasingly visible.

Last year, U.S. President Donald Trump imposed a series of sweeping tariffs affecting both rivals and traditional allies. The measures triggered difficult negotiations and raised concerns among partner nations about the future of international trade cooperation.

The tariffs were part of Trump’s broader “America First” agenda, which emphasized protecting domestic industries and reducing trade imbalances.

While some countries ultimately reached agreements with Washington, the disputes exposed fractures within the alliance and highlighted differing national priorities.

Disagreements have also emerged over approaches to international conflicts and burden-sharing among allies. Trump has criticized some partner nations for what he views as insufficient support on key strategic issues, further straining relationships within the group.

These tensions raise questions about whether the G7 can continue to act as a cohesive force in addressing global challenges.

Economic shifts within the G7 itself also reveal changing power dynamics.

Although the United States has always been the largest economy in the group, its relative dominance has increased over time.

Comparisons between the economic size of G7 members in 2000 and today show that the U.S. economy has expanded its lead over other members, while several European economies and Japan have experienced slower growth.

This growing imbalance has implications for the group’s decision-making process.

As the economic weight of the United States increases, some analysts argue that the G7 risks becoming more dependent on Washington’s priorities and leadership. Others contend that American economic strength remains essential to maintaining the group’s global influence.

Either way, the changing distribution of economic power within the G7 reflects broader transformations occurring throughout the international system.

The central challenge facing the G7 is whether a forum designed for a different era can remain effective in today’s multipolar world.

Supporters argue that despite its limitations, the group continues to bring together influential democratic economies capable of coordinating responses to major global challenges. They point to its role in addressing financial crises, supporting Ukraine, and promoting cooperation on climate and technology issues.

Critics, however, argue that the world has outgrown institutions dominated by a small group of advanced economies. They note that many of today’s most significant economic and geopolitical developments involve countries outside the G7, including China, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and other emerging powers.

As leaders conclude their discussions in Evian, the summit may offer important clues about the future of global governance.

Whether the G7 can adapt to a rapidly changing world—or whether it will increasingly find itself reacting rather than leading—remains one of the defining questions of international politics in the 21st century.

The group retains considerable economic influence and diplomatic reach. But in a world where power is becoming more diffuse and competition more intense, maintaining that influence may require a new vision, renewed unity, and a willingness to adapt to realities far different from those that existed when the first summit convened in France more than 50 years ago.

In a significant step toward strengthening its domestic defence manufacturing ecosystem, the Indian Navy has issued an Expression of Interest (EoI) inviting Indian defence firms to design, develop, and produce indigenous 80mm air-to-ground rockets for its carrier-based fighter fleet. The initiative underscores New Delhi’s accelerating push toward self-reliance in critical munitions under the “Aatmanirbhar Bharat” framework, even as the service prepares for a generational shift in its carrier aviation capabilities.

The move is primarily aimed at equipping the Navy’s existing fleet of MiG-29K/KUB multirole fighters with a reliable, domestically sourced unguided rocket system, reducing dependence on foreign suppliers amid growing global supply chain volatility and wartime export constraints.

The Naval Armament Inspectorate, which issued the EoI, has called upon domestic defence manufacturers with proven design, testing, and production capabilities to participate in the program. The requirement is not limited to final assembly alone; it explicitly mandates full indigenous development, including subassemblies and propulsion systems, with no reliance on foreign original equipment manufacturers (OEMs).

Officials familiar with the development say the requirement reflects lessons drawn from recent global conflicts, where high-intensity combat operations have exposed the fragility of international arms supply chains. In prolonged conflicts, exporting nations have often struggled to maintain steady deliveries of munitions, forcing sudden pauses or rationing of critical stocks.

For naval aviation, where operational tempo from aircraft carriers can be sustained for weeks far from shore-based logistics, uninterrupted access to expendable weapons such as rockets is considered essential.

The EoI specifies a highly detailed technical envelope for the proposed 80mm rocket system. The weapon is expected to be approximately 1.54 meters in length, with a total weight of around 11.3 kilograms. It must achieve speeds of up to 600 meters per second and have an effective operational range between 1.3 and 4 kilometers.

Durability and environmental resilience form a key part of the specification. The rocket must retain full functionality across extreme temperatures ranging from -60°C to +60°C, allowing deployment from tropical maritime conditions to high-altitude cold environments. Additionally, the system must maintain a minimum service life of 15 years.

Operational flexibility is also emphasized. The rocket must be certified for launch from aircraft operating up to 17,500 meters, while also being fully sealed for missions reaching altitudes of 20,000 meters.

In terms of lethality, the warhead requirement is substantial for an unguided system. The 0.9-kilogram explosive payload must be capable of penetrating up to 400mm of armor at direct impact and producing at least 400 fragmentation pieces, each weighing approximately 3 grams.

The Navy has also mandated the development of a training variant without a warhead but with identical flight characteristics, ensuring realistic pilot training without expending live ordnance.

According to the EoI, the Navy intends to procure approximately 2,400 training rounds and 273 live rockets once a prototype is successfully developed and validated through testing. The provisional induction timeline has been set for 2026–2027, indicating an accelerated development and qualification schedule.

Industry sources suggest that this timeline reflects urgency not only in replacing foreign-sourced stockpiles but also in aligning the new munition ecosystem with broader naval aviation modernization plans.

The EoI further notes that, at present, no domestic source exists for this specific 80mm rocket category, and all current stocks are derived from foreign OEMs. This dependency is explicitly described as a vulnerability that the Navy intends to eliminate.

While modern naval aviation is often associated with precision-guided missiles and advanced standoff weapons, unguided rockets continue to play a critical tactical role. The 80mm rocket class represents a cost-effective, high-volume air-to-ground weapon designed for flexible battlefield applications.

These rockets are typically deployed from underwing pods and are used against a wide range of targets, including enemy troop concentrations, lightly armored vehicles, radar installations, bunkers, and logistical infrastructure.

Unlike guided munitions, they rely on pilot aim, aircraft maneuvering, and firing solution timing. This makes them particularly useful in close air support scenarios and in environments where electronic warfare or target ambiguity limits the effectiveness of precision-guided systems.

Their primary advantage lies in cost efficiency and payload density. A single sortie by a carrier-based fighter can carry dozens of rockets, enabling saturation attacks against dispersed or soft targets without expending expensive missile inventory.

For carrier strike groups operating far from supply bases, this flexibility becomes strategically valuable. Sustained operations at sea require weapons that are both logistically easy to store and available in large quantities—conditions that rockets fulfill effectively.

The Russian-origin twin-engine MiG-29K/KUB fleet remains the primary fixed-wing combat asset aboard India’s aircraft carriers, including INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant. The aircraft serves as the backbone of the Indian Navy’s carrier air wings, providing air superiority, strike capability, and maritime interdiction roles.

The MiG-29K can carry up to 5,500 kilograms of ordnance and has an operational radius of approximately 700–900 kilometers, significantly extending the reach of carrier strike groups. Its design allows for short take-offs and arrested recoveries, making it suitable for ski-jump equipped carriers.

Despite its operational importance, the platform has faced recurring challenges, including engine reliability issues, lower-than-expected serviceability rates, and structural fatigue concerns. Nevertheless, it continues to serve as the primary naval fighter until the arrival of next-generation platforms.

During heightened regional tensions in recent years, including the 2025 India-Pakistan standoff, MiG-29Ks deployed aboard INS Vikrant were reportedly positioned for potential long-range strike missions, highlighting their strategic deterrence role in the Arabian Sea.

India’s naval aviation landscape is on the cusp of a major transition with the induction of the French-built Rafale-M. In 2025, India signed an agreement to procure 26 Rafale-M jets, marking the country’s first and only international naval operator status for the platform.

The Rafale-M was selected over competing platforms, including Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, due in part to interoperability advantages with the Indian Air Force’s existing Rafale fleet. The shared logistics ecosystem, training pipelines, and weapons compatibility are expected to streamline maintenance and operational deployment.

A key operational advantage is the “buddy-buddy” aerial refueling capability, allowing one Rafale to act as a tanker for another, extending mission endurance during carrier operations or long-range maritime strikes.

Four twin-seat trainer variants are included in the order, with deliveries expected to begin in 2028. However, the Rafale-M is viewed primarily as a transitional capability pending the development of an indigenous carrier fighter.

The long-term vision for India’s carrier aviation rests on the Twin Engine Deck-Based Fighter (TEDBF) program, led by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) as the manufacturing partner.

The program aims to develop a next-generation carrier-capable fighter to eventually replace both MiG-29K and imported platforms. While the design has been periodically showcased, including at Aero India 2025, the project has experienced significant delays.

Initial plans targeting a first flight by 2026 and production by 2031 have slipped, with revised expectations placing first flight closer to 2028–2030 and potential induction around 2038. These delays stem from complex design refinements, funding cycles, and the inherent challenges of naval aircraft development, which requires reinforced structures, corrosion resistance, and carrier landing capability.

Despite skepticism in some defense circles, Indian authorities continue to support the program, viewing it as essential for long-term strategic autonomy in carrier aviation.

The EoI for indigenous 80mm rockets is expected to attract a wide range of domestic defence manufacturers, including established public sector undertakings and emerging private firms. The requirement for full indigenous production, including propulsion systems and warhead design, is likely to drive investment in niche missile technologies and energetic materials.

Industry analysts suggest that the program could act as a stepping stone for more complex unguided and guided rocket systems, potentially expanding into modular air-to-ground munitions for both naval and air force applications.

By mandating in-country development and eliminating foreign OEM dependency, the Navy is effectively attempting to create a parallel munitions ecosystem that is resilient to geopolitical disruptions.

The Indian Navy’s decision to pursue indigenous 80mm rockets may appear incremental in comparison to high-profile acquisitions like Rafale-M or future carrier fighters, but it represents a foundational shift in operational logistics and combat sustainability.

In modern naval warfare, where supply chains can be as decisive as firepower, ensuring uninterrupted access to basic munitions is increasingly viewed as a strategic necessity. By localizing production of even relatively simple weapons such as air-to-ground rockets, the Navy is reinforcing its broader doctrine of self-reliance.

As India prepares for a mixed-era carrier aviation fleet—comprising legacy MiG-29Ks, incoming Rafale-M jets, and future indigenous fighters—the success of programs like this EoI may ultimately determine how effectively the country can sustain high-tempo maritime operations in a contested Indo-Pacific environment.

At the International Maritime Defense Show Fleet 2026, Russia has unveiled a significantly upgraded export-oriented variant of its Amur-class submarine family, the Amur-1650 submarine, equipped with a vertical launch system (VLS) designed to accommodate either the BrahMos supersonic missile or Club-S cruise missile family. The presentation, led by the United Shipbuilding Corporation, marks a deliberate effort by Moscow to reassert its competitiveness in the global conventional submarine export market at a time of intensifying naval modernization across the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

The unveiling positions the Amur-1650 not merely as a refined diesel-electric attack submarine, but as a multi-role underwater strike platform capable of combining stealth endurance, modular weapon configurations, and long-range precision missile capability in a compact displacement hull. Russian defense officials and designers associated with the Rubin Design Bureau emphasized that the platform represents a new generation of export submarines optimized for survivability and distributed maritime strike operations.

According to specifications presented at the defense exhibition, the Amur-1650 is designed to carry up to 28 weapon units, including heavyweight torpedoes, anti-ship missiles, and precision-guided munitions. This places it among the most heavily armed non-nuclear submarines in its class, reflecting a design philosophy that prioritizes sustained combat endurance rather than limited engagement profiles typical of earlier export diesel-electric boats.

The submarine’s most significant structural innovation is its vertical launch architecture. The system reportedly allows integration of either Russian-developed Club-S cruise missiles or the Indo-Russian BrahMos missile, significantly expanding the platform’s operational envelope. This configuration enables the submarine to conduct simultaneous anti-ship and land-attack missions without relying exclusively on torpedo tubes, a constraint that has historically limited conventional submarine strike flexibility.

Defense analysts at the exhibition noted that this VLS integration fundamentally alters the operational concept of diesel-electric submarines, shifting them from primarily coastal denial assets to platforms capable of distributed precision-strike operations across contested maritime theaters.

The potential integration of BrahMos missiles is particularly notable due to the missile’s high supersonic terminal velocity and reduced reaction time for enemy defenses. By deploying such a system from a stealthy underwater platform, the Amur-1650 introduces a layered strike capability that compresses adversary decision-making windows in naval engagements.

The inclusion of BrahMos also reflects deepening defense-industrial cooperation between Russia and India, extending a missile system traditionally deployed on surface ships and aircraft into a submerged launch environment. This shift significantly broadens the strategic relevance of conventional submarines, allowing them to participate in deep strike and anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) missions previously associated with nuclear-powered attack submarines.

Military observers at Fleet 2026 suggested that this capability could complicate adversary threat assessments, as submarines equipped with such systems may alternate between intelligence gathering, anti-ship targeting, and land-attack strike roles without external indicators of mission intent.

A central feature of the Amur-1650 design is its emphasis on acoustic stealth. The United Shipbuilding Corporation claims the submarine achieves noise reduction levels approximately twice as low as comparable export submarines. While such figures remain unverified independently, the design incorporates multiple quieting technologies, including a variable-speed permanent magnet synchronous propulsion system intended to reduce mechanical vibration.

The submarine’s single-hull architecture and compact displacement—reported at approximately 1,765 tons—are also optimized to reduce sonar cross-section and improve survivability in littoral and deep-water environments. In addition, a large-area conformal sonar array paired with advanced digital signal processing is intended to improve detection capability in acoustically complex coastal waters.

Russian engineers further claim that passive detection range performance exceeds competing export submarines by a factor of two, a specification that, if operationally validated, would represent a significant advancement in conventional undersea surveillance capability.

The Amur-1650 optionally incorporates air-independent propulsion (AIP), allowing extended submerged endurance without the need for snorkeling. This capability is particularly significant in modern maritime environments saturated with airborne surveillance systems, satellite tracking, and electronic intelligence collection platforms.

AIP integration is expected to extend submerged endurance to approximately 45 days, depending on mission profile, allowing the submarine to operate in contested chokepoints, archipelagic regions, and strategic sea lanes with reduced exposure risk. Combined with a reported maximum operational depth of 300 meters and submerged speeds up to 21 knots, the platform is designed for sustained covert operations and rapid repositioning during combat scenarios.

The Amur-1650’s compatibility with multiple missile types enhances its export appeal by allowing customer navies to tailor configurations according to regional threat environments and budget constraints. The dual compatibility with Club-S and BrahMos systems creates a modular strike ecosystem capable of engaging surface vessels, coastal infrastructure, air-defense installations, and command centers.

This flexibility aligns with emerging naval doctrines emphasizing distributed lethality, in which multiple smaller platforms contribute to coordinated strike networks rather than relying on a few high-value capital ships.

The vertical launch system also improves survivability during missile deployment by enabling rapid salvo launches without exposing the submarine to prolonged firing sequences through torpedo tubes. This reduces vulnerability during high-intensity engagements and enhances the platform’s ability to execute coordinated strike operations against carrier groups or shore-based targets.

Russia’s unveiling of the Amur-1650 comes amid intensifying global competition in the conventional submarine export sector. The platform enters a crowded marketplace that includes Germany’s Type-214 variants, South Korea’s KSS-series submarines, France’s Scorpène-class designs, Turkey’s emerging MILDEN program, and expanding Chinese export offerings.

By emphasizing BrahMos integration, stealth performance, and modular weapon systems, Moscow appears to be targeting navies seeking high-end deterrence capabilities without the cost and infrastructure requirements of nuclear-powered submarines. The strategy reflects a broader Russian effort to maintain relevance in global defense exports despite geopolitical pressures and increased competition from NATO-aligned and Asian shipbuilders.

Defense officials at Fleet 2026 suggested that export customization options—including flexible combat systems, mixed weapon loadouts, and optional propulsion packages—are intended to attract mid-tier naval powers seeking asymmetric advantages in regional maritime disputes.

The Amur-1650’s design is closely aligned with anti-access and area-denial doctrines increasingly adopted across the Indo-Pacific, Middle East, and other contested maritime regions. Its combination of stealth, endurance, and precision strike capability makes it particularly suited for operations in environments such as the South China Sea, Arabian Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and Baltic approaches.

In these regions, dense sensor networks, patrol aircraft coverage, and surface combatant density create complex operational challenges for submarines. The Amur-1650’s reduced acoustic signature and extended submerged endurance are intended to mitigate these challenges by enabling prolonged covert positioning and rapid strike execution.

The platform also supports secondary mission profiles including mine warfare, intelligence collection, and special operations deployment, further enhancing its utility in gray-zone maritime competition scenarios where ambiguity and deterrence signaling are critical.

The introduction of vertical-launch missile capability into a compact diesel-electric submarine represents a broader trend in undersea warfare evolution: the convergence of stealth platforms with strategic strike capability. Historically, such capabilities were primarily associated with nuclear-powered submarines operated by major naval powers.

By integrating supersonic missile systems into a conventional export platform, Russia is effectively lowering the threshold for advanced maritime strike capabilities among medium-sized navies. This could contribute to increased regional deterrence complexity, particularly in contested maritime regions where submarine detection and classification remain difficult.

The Amur-1650’s combination of intelligence gathering, strike capability, and survivability also reflects modern naval warfare’s shift toward multi-domain integration, where submarines operate as nodes in larger sensor-to-shooter networks.

The unveiling of the Amur-1650 at Fleet 2026 underscores Russia’s intent to remain a key player in the global submarine export market while adapting to rapidly evolving naval warfare dynamics. By combining vertical launch missile systems, optional BrahMos integration, extended submerged endurance, and advanced acoustic stealth technologies, the platform represents a significant evolution in conventional submarine design philosophy.

While many of its performance claims remain subject to operational validation, the strategic message is clear: diesel-electric submarines are no longer confined to coastal defense roles but are increasingly being positioned as flexible, long-range precision-strike assets capable of influencing maritime power balances across multiple theaters.

These include countries coping with, or recovering from, conflict such as Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, in a region acutely affected by the high temperatures driven by the climate crisis.

The UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) is working with partners to provide sustainable energy solutions that support everyday life, create equal opportunities and expand access to essential services.

Read the full multimedia story here.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) is confronting an increasingly constrained set of options for maintaining its technological edge in the coming decades, as both its indigenous fifth-generation fighter program and the two leading sixth-generation international collaborations it is tracking face structural delays, funding uncertainties, and industrial disagreements.

At the center of India’s long-term air power roadmap is the indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), being developed under the aegis of the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA). While the program represents New Delhi’s ambition to join the elite group of nations capable of designing and producing stealth combat aircraft, it remains at least a decade away from induction. Even optimistic timelines place initial operational capability in the mid-to-late 2030s, with full-scale production likely stretching into the 2040s.

This delayed trajectory has forced Indian planners to hedge their bets internationally. Earlier this year, India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) informed the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence that the country is actively evaluating participation in two competing sixth-generation fighter ecosystems: the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) and the Future Combat Air System (FCAS). The document stated that the Indian Ministry of Defence would “seek to join one of them,” underscoring a strategic intent to avoid technological obsolescence as peer competitors accelerate their own next-generation programs.

However, both programs India is considering have begun to show significant strain. The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)—a tri-national initiative led by the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan—was originally envisioned to field an operational sixth-generation fighter by around 2035. But recent reporting suggests that this timeline is increasingly optimistic.

According to defense industry assessments cited in The Telegraph, the UK’s Defense Investment Plan (DIP) is unlikely to release sustained funding for GCAP until the mid-2030s. This effectively pushes operational induction into the late 2030s or even early 2040s. The DIP itself has been delayed amid internal disagreements between the British Treasury and the Ministry of Defence over long-term budget allocations.

To maintain momentum, the GCAP International Government Organisation (GIGO) signed a bridging contract in April 2026 with Edgewing, the industrial joint venture responsible for aircraft development. However, this arrangement is temporary, expiring in June, and does little to resolve structural financing uncertainty.

Recent discussions within UK defense circles have also indicated a potential additional £6 billion funding injection. Yet analysts caution that even this may only stabilize short-term development rather than restore the original timeline. If delays persist, there is growing speculation that Japan—one of GCAP’s core partners—could reassess its long-term commitment, especially given its parallel investments in indigenous aerospace capabilities through Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.

The implications for India are significant. Any entry into GCAP would likely mean participation in a program whose first operational aircraft may not arrive until well after India’s AMCA is expected to mature—raising questions about cost-benefit alignment and strategic timing.

The European rival program, the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), is facing even deeper structural friction. FCAS is a trilateral initiative involving France, Germany, and Spain, with core industrial leadership split between Airbus and Dassault Aviation. However, persistent disagreements over workshare distribution, intellectual property rights, and design authority have stalled progress.

France has insisted on maintaining design leadership through Dassault Aviation, while Germany and Spain—represented largely by Airbus—have pushed for a more distributed engineering and manufacturing model. These tensions have effectively frozen key development phases.

Industry analysts now assess that even if political agreements were reached immediately, a fully operational FCAS aircraft would not likely enter service before the mid-2040s. More pessimistic projections suggest further fragmentation of the program, with Airbus reportedly exploring deeper cooperation with Sweden’s Saab, raising the possibility of parallel or competing European next-generation fighter tracks.

For India, FCAS was once considered a potential technology-sharing avenue. But its current trajectory significantly reduces its attractiveness as a timely solution to India’s capability gap. These international uncertainties are compounding India’s own force-structure constraints. The Indian Air Force is currently operating at approximately 29 combat squadrons—well below its sanctioned strength—while facing simultaneous modernization requirements across multiple aircraft categories.

To address immediate shortfalls, India is moving toward acquiring 114 additional Rafale multirole fighters. A Letter of Request (LoR) has reportedly been finalized and is expected to be sent to France shortly under a government-to-government framework.

IAF Chief Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh is also currently on a high-level visit to France, where discussions with Dassault Aviation and other defense stakeholders are expected to focus on production timelines, industrial participation, and fleet expansion strategy.

The Rafale fleet, based on the Dassault Rafale platform, is expected to provide a critical numerical and capability boost in the short to medium term. However, defense analysts widely agree that while Rafale addresses near-term squadron depletion, it does not solve the long-term stealth and next-generation capability gap.

Parallel to foreign acquisitions, India continues to push forward with its indigenous fifth-generation platform, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA). The ADA has issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) to three shortlisted industry bidders for development of prototypes. The selected vendor will be responsible for producing five prototypes and one Structural Test Specimen. The contract stipulates an aggressive timeline: the first prototype is expected within 24 months of contract signing, and a maiden flight within 30 months.

However, defense observers remain skeptical about whether India’s domestic aerospace ecosystem—particularly private sector participants newly entering combat aircraft manufacturing—can meet such compressed schedules. Many analysts project a more realistic first flight timeline closer to 2032, with operational induction likely occurring only in the mid-to-late 2030s.

This places AMCA in direct temporal overlap with both GCAP and FCAS—rather than ahead of them—limiting India’s ability to leapfrog into sixth-generation ecosystems through indigenous sequencing alone.

The urgency of India’s situation is further underscored by developments in China’s military aviation sector. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force already operates two fifth-generation fighters: the Chengdu J-20 and the Shenyang J-35.

In addition, China is reportedly flight-testing two sixth-generation prototypes developed by the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation and Shenyang Aircraft Corporation. These platforms, commonly referred to in open-source reporting as J-36 and J-50, suggest an accelerated developmental cadence that could result in operational capability in the 2030s.

If these trajectories hold, China could field a mixed fleet of mature fifth-generation fighters and early sixth-generation platforms well before India’s AMCA reaches full maturity, potentially widening the regional airpower asymmetry.

Concerns are further amplified by reports that Pakistan may eventually acquire the Chinese J-35A, with indications that Pakistani pilots are already undergoing training in China. Such a development would introduce stealth capability into South Asia’s western theater, further compressing India’s technological margin.

Against this backdrop, India’s strategic flexibility appears increasingly constrained. A former IAF Vice Chief, Air Marshal Anil Khosla, noted that while GCAP and FCAS participation once offered diversification opportunities, both are now facing structural delays that reduce their attractiveness.

He emphasized that the convergence of GCAP funding uncertainty, FCAS industrial fragmentation, AMCA timeline slippage, and squadron shortfalls creates what he described as a “capability vacuum” in the coming decade.

According to veteran assessments, India’s planned Rafale expansion will help address numerical gaps but will not resolve qualitative asymmetry in stealth and next-generation avionics. This has revived discussion around limited interim procurement of fifth-generation platforms such as the Sukhoi Su-57.

Russia has been actively marketing the Su-57 to India, offering assembly partnerships, potential technology transfer, and integration with existing Indian infrastructure such as the Su-30MKI production ecosystem. More recently, Moscow has also indicated willingness to share source code elements and support localized production.

However, skepticism persists regarding the aircraft’s stealth performance and the depth of technology transfer Russia is willing to provide.

Another IAF veteran, Air Marshal Anil Chopra, has suggested a blended approach: accelerating indigenous programs like AMCA and Tejas, localizing Rafale production, and acquiring a limited number of Su-57 aircraft as an interim capability bridge.

If pursued, such a procurement would likely position India as a secondary export operator of the Su-57 after Algeria, while simultaneously maintaining focus on indigenous development pathways.

India now faces a narrowing decision window in which multiple programs—domestic and international—are simultaneously delayed or uncertain. The convergence of these timelines means that any misalignment in procurement strategy could result in a prolonged period without access to cutting-edge stealth capabilities.

For the Indian Air Force, the central challenge is no longer simply modernization, but synchronization: aligning indigenous development, foreign procurement, and industrial partnerships in a way that prevents a generational capability gap.

As global sixth-generation programs evolve unevenly and India’s AMCA progresses toward an uncertain but distant horizon, New Delhi’s next set of decisions will likely determine whether it maintains parity in advanced air combat capability—or enters the 2040s structurally behind its regional peers.

On the morning of May 26, three major capitals were confronting different dimensions of the same geopolitical crisis. In New Delhi, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Quad foreign ministers and warned that maritime security had become one of the defining strategic challenges of the modern era. Nearly 60 percent of global maritime trade, he noted, passes through the Indo-Pacific, making stability along key sea lanes a matter of global concern.

In Beijing, Russian President Vladimir Putin was strengthening ties with Chinese President Xi Jinping during another high-profile state visit. The two leaders signed more than forty bilateral agreements and issued a joint statement criticizing what they described as “unilateral bullying,” a phrase widely interpreted as a reference to U.S. foreign policy.

Meanwhile, in Doha, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf were engaged in negotiations aimed at securing a ceasefire framework that could end three months of direct military confrontation between Iran and the United States. At the same time, vessels belonging to U.S. Central Command and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard were reportedly exchanging fire near the Strait of Hormuz, with both sides characterizing their actions as measures of self-defense.

Taken together, these developments illustrate a deeper reality about the contemporary international system. While Washington, Beijing, and Moscow remain strategic competitors, each has become dependent on the others to manage one of the most dangerous regional crises of the post-Cold War era.

The Iran crisis has highlighted a significant shift in global diplomacy: China has emerged as an indispensable actor, not because it has replaced the United States as the world’s dominant power, but because it occupies a unique position that no major stakeholder can afford to ignore.

China’s growing influence can be understood through what analysts increasingly describe as “Broker Power” — the ability to maintain productive relationships with competing parties in a conflict and leverage those relationships to facilitate negotiations that others cannot.

Unlike traditional measures of power based on military strength or economic coercion, Broker Power depends on trust, access, and strategic neutrality. It allows a state to serve as an intermediary between rivals who may be unwilling or unable to communicate directly.

The ongoing crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates why such influence matters.

At its narrowest point, the Strait measures just 33 kilometers across, yet it remains one of the most important maritime chokepoints in the world. Roughly one-fifth of globally traded oil passes through the waterway every day. Any prolonged disruption would reverberate across the international economy, driving up energy prices, fueling inflation, disrupting supply chains, and increasing financial stress on governments and businesses worldwide.

For China, the stakes are especially high. More than 40 percent of its imported crude oil originates from Gulf producers. Continued instability in the region threatens not merely an important strategic interest but a critical component of China’s economic security.

The current conflict began on February 28, when U.S. and Israeli forces launched strikes against Iranian nuclear and missile facilities.

Since then, military operations have expanded into what has become one of the most costly confrontations in recent years. Operation Epic Fury has reportedly consumed tens of billions of dollars and resulted in substantial losses of aircraft and military equipment.

Despite these expenditures, the campaign has not achieved all of its political objectives. While Iranian missile capabilities have been degraded and several senior military figures eliminated, Tehran retains significant leverage. Its influence over the Strait of Hormuz remains intact, and its nuclear infrastructure has proven more resilient than many prewar assessments predicted.

Public opinion within the United States has also shifted. Growing concerns about the costs of the conflict and uncertainty regarding its ultimate objectives have increased pressure on policymakers to pursue a diplomatic solution.

As a result, negotiations in Doha have taken on heightened importance. Diplomats are reportedly discussing a framework that would include a 60-day ceasefire extension, the reopening of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, and a phased process addressing Iran’s nuclear program. More contentious issues, including sanctions relief and long-term enrichment limits, would be deferred to future negotiations.

China’s influence in these talks stems from a position that no other major power currently occupies.

First, Beijing serves as Iran’s most important economic partner. China remains the largest purchaser of Iranian oil and a crucial source of investment and trade. Since the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, Chinese economic engagement has helped Tehran withstand the impact of Western sanctions.

The long-term China-Iran Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement has further deepened these ties, creating extensive economic linkages that make Beijing an unavoidable stakeholder in any future settlement.

Second, China maintains strong relationships with Iran’s regional rivals.

The most notable example came in March 2023, when Beijing successfully brokered the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. That breakthrough surprised many observers because it achieved what years of diplomatic efforts by other powers had failed to accomplish.

China’s ability to engage both Gulf monarchies and Iran without being perceived as fully aligned with either side has strengthened its credibility as a mediator.

Third, and perhaps most significantly, Beijing may become the custodian of the most sensitive element in any future agreement: Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile.

Reports emerging from ongoing negotiations suggest that Iranian officials have explored the possibility of transferring highly enriched uranium to Chinese custody as part of a broader settlement. Such an arrangement would allow Iran to remove nuclear material from its territory without surrendering it directly to the United States. At the same time, Washington would gain reassurance that proliferation risks had been reduced.

If implemented, this proposal would place China at the center of the agreement’s enforcement mechanism, effectively making Beijing the guarantor of one of its most critical provisions.

Russia’s approach to the crisis has been characterized by careful ambiguity.

Moscow benefits from higher energy prices, which support government revenues and ease financial pressures associated with its ongoing confrontation with the West. The diversion of U.S. attention away from Europe and toward the Middle East also serves Russian strategic interests.

At the same time, Russia has little interest in a complete breakdown of regional stability.

A prolonged disruption of global energy markets would negatively affect China, Russia’s most important economic partner, and undermine broader efforts to strengthen Eurasian economic integration.

The strengthening relationship between Russia and Iran, formalized through strategic cooperation agreements in recent years, has further tied Moscow to developments in the Gulf. Yet Russia remains careful not to become directly entangled in a conflict that could escalate beyond anyone’s control.

Consequently, Moscow’s objective appears to be maintaining influence over the diplomatic process while avoiding a regional catastrophe.

The implications of the Iran crisis extend well beyond the immediate participants.

India, which imports more than 80 percent of its oil requirements, is particularly vulnerable to disruptions in Gulf energy supplies. Any sustained closure of the Strait of Hormuz would increase inflationary pressures and complicate economic planning for one of the world’s fastest-growing major economies.

The crisis also threatens broader strategic ambitions.

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), envisioned as a major connectivity initiative linking South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, depends heavily on regional stability. Continued conflict risks delaying or even undermining the project’s development.

At the same time, China’s growing role in Gulf diplomacy strengthens alternative regional connectivity frameworks involving Iran and Russia. This creates the possibility that Beijing could gain a decisive advantage in shaping future trade and transportation networks across Eurasia.

For New Delhi, the challenge is balancing its deepening partnership with Washington while ensuring that regional developments do not leave India marginalized within emerging economic architectures.

The Iran crisis offers an important lesson about the evolving nature of international influence.

The United States remains the world’s preeminent military power. Its armed forces possess unmatched global reach, and its ability to project force remains unrivaled. Yet military superiority alone has not resolved the conflict, secured the Strait of Hormuz, or produced a durable political settlement.

China, by contrast, lacks comparable military capabilities. Nevertheless, it has become essential to the diplomatic process because it maintains relationships with all major stakeholders and possesses the trust necessary to facilitate compromise.

This distinction highlights a broader transformation in world politics. In an increasingly multipolar environment, influence is no longer measured solely by the ability to coerce opponents. It is also measured by the ability to connect rivals, preserve communication channels, and provide solutions that competing powers can accept.

The Saudi-Iran rapprochement of 2023 demonstrated China’s growing diplomatic reach. The current discussions regarding uranium custody suggest that Beijing’s role has expanded even further.

The emerging reality is not the end of American power, nor the rise of a new global hegemon. Rather, it is the appearance of a system in which multiple forms of power coexist.

Military strength remains important. Economic influence remains essential. But increasingly, diplomatic centrality—the ability to serve as the indispensable broker between competing actors—may prove just as significant.

As negotiations continue and the future of the Gulf hangs in the balance, China’s growing role reflects that changing reality. Whether Washington, Moscow, and New Delhi adapt to this new landscape may shape the next phase of global geopolitics.

India has taken a decisive step forward in its ambition to achieve self-reliance in advanced military aviation, with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) formally issuing the Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme—India’s most ambitious fifth-generation fighter jet initiative to date.

Defence officials confirmed on Wednesday that tenders have been released to three shortlisted private-sector contenders, marking a significant transition from concept development to competitive industrial execution. The move signals the government’s intent to accelerate indigenous capability building in high-end aerospace manufacturing under the broader Atmanirbhar Bharat framework.

The shortlisted bidders include Tata Advanced Systems Limited, which is participating independently; a consortium led by Larsen & Toubro in partnership with Bharat Electronics Limited; and a third joint bid combining Bharat Forge with BEML. These entities will compete to secure responsibility for prototype development and key integration roles in what is widely regarded as India’s most complex indigenous combat aircraft programme.

The RFP rollout follows the approval of the AMCA Programme Execution Model by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh last year. The model represents a structural shift in how India executes large-scale defence aerospace programmes, particularly those requiring deep technological integration and long-term industrial participation.

At the core of this framework is a deliberate effort to distribute development responsibility between public and private sector partners while ensuring competitive neutrality. Instead of relying solely on traditional public sector undertakings, the programme opens critical development pathways to private industry, reflecting a broader policy evolution in India’s defence procurement ecosystem.

The initiative is being spearheaded by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA)—a premier laboratory under the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The ADA is responsible for overall programme coordination, systems integration architecture, and oversight of design-to-production transition pathways. The DRDO’s long-standing experience in combat aircraft development provides the scientific backbone for the project, while industry partners are expected to bring scale, manufacturing agility, and supply chain depth.

Officials involved in the programme describe the AMCA as not just a single aircraft project, but a foundational step in creating an indigenous fifth-generation aerospace ecosystem. The competitive bidding structure is intended to cultivate multiple capable industrial clusters within India’s defence manufacturing landscape.

Each bidder brings distinct strengths to the table. Tata Advanced Systems Limited has developed a strong track record in aerospace manufacturing through global collaborations and component production for major aircraft platforms. The Larsen & Toubro–Bharat Electronics Limited consortium combines heavy engineering expertise with advanced defence electronics and radar systems integration capabilities. Meanwhile, the Bharat Forge–BEML partnership brings strengths in precision manufacturing, mobility systems, and large-scale industrial fabrication.

By enabling multiple industrial configurations to compete for leadership roles, the MoD aims to ensure redundancy, innovation pressure, and cost efficiency across the programme lifecycle. Officials also believe this approach will significantly reduce India’s dependence on foreign original equipment manufacturers for advanced combat aircraft technologies over time.

A major infrastructure component underpinning the AMCA programme is the Core Integration & Flight Testing Centre currently under construction in Puttaparthi, Andhra Pradesh. Estimated to cost around ₹2,000 crore, the facility is designed to serve as the nerve centre for assembly, systems integration, and flight validation of the aircraft.

On May 15, 2026, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister N. Chandrababu Naidu jointly laid the foundation stone for the facility. The event marked a symbolic and strategic milestone, underscoring the state’s emergence as a key node in India’s advanced aerospace manufacturing map.

Once operational, the centre will support end-to-end integration of avionics, stealth systems, propulsion interfaces, and flight control systems for the AMCA platform. It is also expected to play a critical role in future aerospace programmes beyond the fifth-generation fighter, including unmanned systems and next-generation combat aircraft concepts.

The government has sanctioned approximately ₹15,000 crore for the AMCA prototype development phase, reflecting the scale and complexity of the programme. Defence analysts note that this investment represents one of the largest allocations ever made by India for an indigenous combat aircraft development initiative.

The AMCA is envisioned as a twin-engine stealth multirole fighter designed exclusively for the Indian Air Force. Key design features include an internal weapons bay to reduce radar cross-section, advanced sensor fusion systems, and network-centric warfare capabilities enabling real-time data integration across multiple battlefield platforms.

Officials have described the aircraft as a “5.5-generation” platform, incorporating next-generation stealth shaping, artificial intelligence-enabled avionics, and adaptive mission systems that go beyond traditional fifth-generation fighter definitions.

At Aero India 2025, a full-scale model of the AMCA drew significant attention from defence delegations, aerospace experts, and international observers. The aircraft’s design emphasis on low observability and digital warfare integration was widely interpreted as a major leap in India’s combat aviation ambitions.

A notable feature of the AMCA programme is its heavy reliance on artificial intelligence and digital engineering. Engineers at ADA, working under the broader framework of the DRDO, are integrating AI-based systems into the aircraft’s digital backbone to enhance design optimisation, predictive maintenance capabilities, and mission adaptability.

This approach is expected to significantly reduce development cycles by enabling rapid simulation, testing, and iteration of complex aerodynamic and systems integration challenges. AI-enabled modelling is also expected to improve performance reliability and reduce lifecycle costs once the aircraft enters production and operational deployment.

The integration of advanced digital architecture positions the AMCA within a global trend where next-generation combat aircraft increasingly rely on software-defined systems rather than purely hardware-centric upgrades.

According to current programme timelines, the first AMCA prototypes are expected to roll out between late 2026 and early 2027. This will be followed by ground testing and progressive flight trials, with the maiden flight targeted for 2028.

If development proceeds as planned, serial production is anticipated to begin in the mid-2030s, with phased induction into the Indian Air Force thereafter. The timeline reflects the inherent complexity of developing a stealth-capable fifth-generation fighter from scratch, particularly within an emerging aerospace manufacturing ecosystem.

Officials caution that while the programme is progressing on schedule, sustained coordination between design agencies, manufacturing partners, and testing infrastructure will be critical to meeting long-term milestones.

The AMCA programme is increasingly being viewed as a defining test case for India’s evolving defence industrial policy. By combining state-led design authority with competitive private-sector manufacturing participation, the initiative represents a hybrid model that seeks to balance strategic control with industrial efficiency.

Defence experts argue that success in the AMCA programme could reshape India’s position in global aerospace manufacturing, potentially enabling it to transition from a major importer of advanced fighter aircraft to a producer of cutting-edge combat platforms.

It also reflects a broader geopolitical imperative: reducing reliance on foreign suppliers for critical defence technologies amid shifting global security dynamics.

With the issuance of the RFP and the entry of leading Indian industrial players into formal competition, the AMCA programme has entered its most decisive phase yet. Backed by strong institutional oversight from the Aeronautical Development Agency and the Defence Research and Development Organisation, and enabled by a policy framework approved by the Rajnath Singh, the project represents a landmark effort in indigenous defence capability building.