Key points

• The West Bank has been under Israeli occupation since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. 
• Israeli settlements began expanding in the occupied West Bank soon after 1967. 
• In 2005, Israel evacuated four settlements in the northern West Bank. 
• The occupied territory is central to plans for a future Palestinian state, but violent settlement expansion is a growing obstacle to a negotiated two-State solution.

According to reports, the United States has been involved in efforts to end the siege that began on Sunday, with the US Ambassador to Israel calling for the removal of what he called “Israeli terrorists”.

Three Palestinian families – around 15 people in total, including at least two children – have remained confined to their homes “in a state of terror” in the Ras al Ein area of Qusra village, south of Nablus, OHCHR said, alleging that the settlers had cut their power and water. 

“These criminal actions by the settlers, supported or acquiesced to by Israel, the Occupying Power, are making life unbearable for these Palestinian families and are clearly aimed at forcing them to leave their homes and their land,” the UN office said. “Time is running out for these three families before they are forcibly displaced”.

Nowhere to go 

Following the initial OHCHR statement, head of the UN office in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Ajith Sunghay, told UN News that the families had been subsequently moved into just one home, which remains surrounded by Israeli settlers.

“Again, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is either unable or unwilling to protect Palestinian communities, which they are expected to do so under the Geneva Convention; or worse, that the IDF is in collusion with the Israeli settlers, all aimed at displacing Palestinians and occupying their lands,” Mr. Sunghay said.

He also noted that about 20 Palestinian families from Qusra had been evacuated by Israel Defense Forces soldiers “for security purposes”, before stressing the urgent need for international assistance to end the increasingly dangerous situation in the occupied territory.

He added: “We really welcome statements, we really welcome dialogue…However, this is simply not enough. I think we are past the stage of boiling point. We are seeing unprecedented level of settler violence and we call on Member States to act, use its leverage in every possible manner.”

OHCHR noted that Palestinians living in Qusra have been the target of “increasingly frequent attacks” since November 2025, when Israeli settlers established an outpost nearby.

Previous requests from the Palestinian families to the Israeli military present at the site to intervene have not helped.

“Instead, Israeli security forces seem to have blocked medics, solidarity activists and journalists from reaching the families,” OHCHR said, adding that although soldiers dismantled settlers’ tents on Wednesday, they continued to surround the Palestinians’ homes.

Escalating situation 

Mr. Sunghay noted that the dramatic events in Qusra were unfolding alongside other deeply worrying settler-driven incidents in the occupied West Bank.

This includes the IDF move to cordon off Taybeh town to people who do not live there on Tuesday, allegedly to protect them from Israeli settler attacks. 

“In such circumstances…it’s the Palestinians who pay the price and face the brunt of the problems, although it’s the Israelis who are settlers who are creating violence, attacks, and issues for the Palestinians,” the OHCHR senior official insisted. 

In another blow to peace efforts in the occupied West Bank, Mr. Sunghay noted that Israeli settlers have moved back into Ganim, one of four Israeli settlements in the northern West Bank that were evacuated in 2005 (the others being Kadim, Sa-Nur and Homesh). “This is a trend that we have seen repeatedly that’s happening in West Bank,” he said.

Latest data from the UN agency for Palestinian refugees, UNRWA, on Thursday highlighted how Israeli settler “violence and harassment” have continued to target Palestinian communities across the West Bank. This includes those living in the South Hebron Hills and Jordan Valley. 

“In parallel, settlement expansion continued, including the establishment of several new settlement outposts,” UNRWA said.

Reality of Operation ‘Iron Wall’

The agency noted that Israeli forces have extended a military closure order affecting the Tulkarm and Nur Shams camps in the northern West Bank until 30 September 2026 and Jenin camp until 20 August 2026.

The move is a renewal of earlier closure orders which have severely restricted access to the largely emptied camps, UNRWA insisted. Today, more than 34,000 Palestinian refugees remain forcibly displaced from Tulkarm, Nur Shams and Jenin camps as a result of the Israeli military’s operation “Iron Wall”, which began in January 2025.

The reported revelation that the United Arab Emirates conducted a covert military strike inside Iran has significantly altered prevailing assessments of Gulf security dynamics, suggesting a quiet but consequential expansion of direct interstate conflict beneath the surface of the wider 2026 regional confrontation involving the United States, Israel, and Iran.

According to reporting published by the The Wall Street Journal on May 11, citing individuals familiar with the operation, Emirati forces allegedly carried out an airstrike against Iran’s Lavan Island refinery infrastructure. The strike is described as having been executed using advanced Western-supplied combat aircraft and precision-guided munitions, marking a notable shift from defensive air operations to offensive strikes against strategic Iranian energy assets.

If confirmed, the operation would represent one of the most significant clandestine escalations in the Gulf since the onset of sustained missile, drone, and maritime attacks across the region, and it would signal a recalibration of Emirati military doctrine under prolonged pressure from Iranian long-range strike capabilities.

For years, the UAE has invested heavily in integrated air and missile defense systems designed to intercept Iranian ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and one-way attack drones targeting key infrastructure. However, the reported strike on Lavan Island suggests a doctrinal shift toward deterrence through retaliation rather than interception alone.

The alleged use of platforms such as the Dassault Mirage 2000 fleet, alongside F-16 variants equipped with precision-guided weapons, indicates that Abu Dhabi may now be willing to directly target Iranian industrial infrastructure in response to repeated attacks on its own territory.

Iranian missile and drone operations over the past year have reportedly targeted Emirati airports, ports, energy installations, and logistics hubs, placing sustained pressure on the UAE’s role as a regional commercial and financial center. In this context, analysts argue the alleged strike reflects a belief within Emirati strategic circles that deterrence credibility now requires visible offensive capability.

The reported Emirati operation took place shortly after U.S. President Donald Trump announced a fragile ceasefire following weeks of U.S. and Israeli air operations against Iranian-linked military and strategic assets across the region.

Despite the ceasefire declaration, the operational environment across the Gulf remained volatile. Iranian missile and drone activity reportedly continued, and Gulf air defense systems remained active in intercepting incoming threats. Maritime disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz further contributed to instability, affecting shipping flows and raising insurance costs for commercial carriers.

The alleged Emirati strike therefore appears to have occurred in an environment where formal diplomatic de-escalation had not translated into operational restraint on the ground.

Lavan Island occupies an important position in Iran’s energy export architecture, hosting infrastructure linked to oil processing and maritime logistics routes. Damage to facilities on the island, if accurately reported, would represent not only a physical disruption but also a symbolic demonstration of vulnerability within Iran’s coastal energy network.

The strike reportedly caused significant fires and disabled a substantial portion of refining capacity for several months. Importantly, there were no confirmed reports of mass casualties, suggesting the operation may have been calibrated to prioritize infrastructure degradation over population-level harm.

Military analysts have increasingly described energy infrastructure as a central battleground in modern Gulf conflict dynamics, where economic disruption can serve as a coercive tool comparable to direct battlefield victories.

Iran’s response to prior Gulf-based strikes has reportedly involved large-scale missile and drone campaigns targeting infrastructure across multiple states, including the UAE and Kuwait. Some estimates cited in regional defense discussions suggest more than 2,800 missiles and drones were launched at Emirati targets during the broader conflict cycle, although exact figures remain unverified.

These attacks exposed vulnerabilities in traditional point-defense systems, particularly when confronted with saturation-style assaults combining ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and low-cost unmanned aerial systems launched from multiple vectors.

The UAE’s energy infrastructure, aviation hubs, and maritime logistics networks—central to its economic model—have therefore become strategic pressure points in the wider confrontation.

One of the most significant implications of the reported Lavan Island operation is the growing normalization of deniable precision warfare among Gulf states. Rather than engaging in openly declared war, regional actors are increasingly believed to be adopting covert strike doctrines designed to impose costs while avoiding full-scale escalation triggers.

Such operations typically rely on intelligence-driven targeting, long-range strike aircraft, and highly controlled operational secrecy. The goal is not territorial gain, but rather calibrated deterrence—signaling capability while maintaining plausible ambiguity.

The Emirati Foreign Ministry, according to the WSJ report, neither confirmed nor denied the strike, instead reiterating past statements affirming the country’s right to respond to threats against national security and economic stability. That ambiguity aligns with broader Gulf strategic messaging intended to preserve escalation flexibility.

The alleged operation also underscores evolving alignment between Gulf states and broader Western strategic objectives. The The Pentagon reportedly responded positively to Emirati actions, reflecting a tacit acceptance of Gulf participation in pressure campaigns against Iranian strategic infrastructure.

Such alignment reinforces Iranian perceptions that Gulf states are increasingly integrated into a coordinated regional posture involving the United States and Israel, particularly in the context of ongoing tensions over Iran’s missile and drone capabilities and its regional proxy network.

This perception, analysts warn, may increase the likelihood of expanded Iranian retaliation against Gulf infrastructure in future escalation cycles.

Despite formal ceasefire announcements, the operational tempo across the region suggests a persistent state of active confrontation. Missile interceptions, drone incursions, and maritime disruptions continue to occur intermittently, indicating that strategic tensions remain unresolved.

The ceasefire, therefore, appears less as a stable peace agreement and more as a temporary pause in a multi-domain conflict involving cyber operations, covert strikes, proxy engagements, and maritime interference.

The possibility of additional undisclosed operations—either by the UAE or other regional actors—further complicates efforts to stabilize the situation, as attribution uncertainty increases the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.

Beyond regional security concerns, the reported strike has significant implications for global energy markets. The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s most critical oil transit corridors, with approximately one-fifth of global petroleum shipments passing through its waters.

Even limited disruptions in this corridor can generate immediate effects on oil pricing, shipping insurance rates, and global supply chain stability. Recent Iranian maritime disruption operations have already contributed to fuel shortages and volatility in energy markets.

The emergence of the UAE as an active strike participant inside Iran therefore introduces an additional layer of uncertainty for global traders, particularly regarding the potential for expanded infrastructure targeting across the Gulf.

Despite the reporting by the Wall Street Journal, no independent public verification has yet confirmed additional Emirati strikes inside Iran beyond the Lavan Island incident. The scale, frequency, and operational scope of any covert campaign remain unclear.

What is evident, however, is that even the perception of such an operation has already reshaped strategic calculations across the Middle East. It signals that Gulf states may no longer be willing to absorb sustained missile and drone attacks without responding directly against Iranian infrastructure.

This shift represents a potential turning point in Gulf security architecture—one defined not solely by defense and deterrence through interception, but increasingly by offensive retaliation, covert warfare, and reciprocal economic targeting.

Authorities in Iran have put on a show of strength to mark the 47th anniversary of the Islamic revolution, weeks after they used unprecedented force to put down anti-government protests.

The BBC is visiting Tehran for the first time since the crackdown, during which at least 6,490 protesters were killed across the country, according to human rights activists.

The BBC’s chief international correspondent Lyse Doucet says the bunting lining the capital’s streets and large crowds of government supporters embody the image of the nation the government wants to see on the streets: Iranians coming out to show their support for the Islamic Republic and the revolution.

Our correspondent is reporting from Tehran on condition that none of her material is used on the BBC’s Persian Service. These restrictions apply to all international media organisations operating in Iran.

China’s decision to proceed with the establishment of a major military drone manufacturing facility in Bangladesh marks a significant inflection point in South Asia’s evolving defence-industrial and geopolitical landscape. Valued at Tk608 crore—approximately US$55.3 million, The project embeds Beijing deeper into the Bay of Bengal security architecture while testing India’s strategic comfort zone along its eastern flank.

Approved by Bangladesh’s finance ministry, the government-to-government agreement designates the Bangladesh Air Force as the implementing authority, with technology transfer from China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) International. CETC is a state-owned conglomerate with an expansive global footprint in radar systems, electronic warfare, secure communications, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) electronics, supplying defence technologies to more than 110 countries.

Formally titled “Establishment of Manufacturing Plant and Transfer of Technology (ToT) for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)”, the project allocates Tk570.60 crore—roughly US$51.9 million for the importation and installation of manufacturing infrastructure and associated technologies. The remaining funds cover domestic expenditures, including site development, training, and ancillary logistics. Disbursements will be spread across four fiscal years, beginning with Tk106 crore—around US$9.6 million in the current budget cycle.

While official documentation refrains from naming specific platforms, converging industry and security assessments suggest the production line will prioritise the Wing Loong II family of medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) combat drones. Often compared to the US-made MQ-9 Reaper, the Wing Loong II is a combat-proven system that combines intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and precision-strike roles, and has been exported widely across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

The announcement has triggered unease in New Delhi, where strategists increasingly interpret Chinese defence projects in Bangladesh as part of a broader pattern of incremental strategic encirclement. India’s concern is amplified by Bangladesh’s geographic proximity to its vulnerable northeastern corridor, a region connected to the Indian mainland by the narrow Siliguri Corridor and long viewed as strategically sensitive.

The geopolitical resonance of the drone factory is further magnified by political recalibration in Dhaka following the 2024 transition of power. Interim leader Muhammad Yunus has accelerated economic and defence engagement with Beijing, culminating in multi-billion-dollar agreements during his March 2025 visit to China. These moves reflect a broader effort by Bangladesh to diversify partnerships and assert strategic autonomy amid intensifying great-power competition.

Academic Md Obaidullah of Daffodil International University noted that India’s response has been inconsistent. “India has adopted a contradictory approach: resisting Chinese military sales to Bangladesh but failing to present itself as a credible alternative,” he said, highlighting what many analysts describe as structural deficiencies in New Delhi’s regional defence diplomacy.

Dhaka’s leadership, however, has adopted a deliberately cautious public tone. Finance Adviser Salehuddin Ahmed declined to comment directly on the drone factory or potential fighter jet acquisitions, stating, “I will not comment on the establishment of a drone plant or the import of fighter jets… Let everything be finalised first.” The remark signalled an attempt to manage regional sensitivities without derailing Bangladesh’s strategic objectives.

Taken together, these decisions frame the drone factory not as a discrete industrial project but as a strategic signal. Bangladesh appears to be recalibrating its defence sovereignty, supply chains, and external alignments as competition intensifies across the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.

For China, the willingness to transfer UAV manufacturing technology reflects a calculated effort to anchor long-term defence-industrial dependence while projecting influence into the Bay of Bengal. This maritime space has grown in strategic importance due to energy shipping routes, submarine chokepoints, and its proximity to India’s eastern seaboard.

From Bangladesh’s perspective, the factory aligns with its Forces Goal 2030 modernisation blueprint, which emphasises indigenous sustainment, reduced lifecycle costs, and greater operational autonomy. Historically, the Bangladesh Air Force has relied heavily on imported platforms and foreign maintenance pipelines, limiting flexibility and increasing long-term expenses.

CETC’s role goes beyond basic assembly. Its core competencies in sensor fusion, secure datalinks, and electronic warfare architectures offer Bangladesh the opportunity to integrate UAVs into a broader network-centric battlespace, rather than operating them as isolated reconnaissance assets. This represents a qualitative leap in capability, particularly in ISR and maritime domain awareness.

Financially, the project’s structure—Tk608 crore spread across four years—reflects Beijing’s preference for scalable defence investments that bind recipient states into extended technical cooperation without triggering the political shockwaves associated with single, high-profile acquisitions. Such an approach deepens institutional dependence while maintaining a relatively low political profile.

Strategically, situating drone manufacturing in Bangladesh provides China with logistical depth and export optionality. A facility in South Asia offers a geographically central hub from which Beijing could service regional markets in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and potentially the Middle East, leveraging Bangladesh’s competitive labour costs and improving industrial base.

The drone factory also complements China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative-linked investments in Bangladeshi ports, power plants, and transport corridors. Together, these projects reinforce dual-use synergies that blur the line between civilian infrastructure development and latent military utility, a pattern observed in several Belt and Road partner states.

China is already Bangladesh’s largest arms supplier, accounting for an estimated 11 percent of global Chinese arms exports between 2019 and 2023. This relationship has been underpinned by sales of submarines, surface combatants, combat aircraft, and missile systems. By embedding production rather than merely exporting finished platforms, Beijing elevates its relationship with Dhaka from transactional arms sales to structural defence-industrial integration.

Such integration raises the strategic cost for Bangladesh should it later seek to pivot away from Chinese systems, as supply chains, training pipelines, and upgrade paths become increasingly intertwined. In regional terms, the move signals that the Bay of Bengal is no longer a peripheral theatre but a core node in China’s Indo-Pacific defence diplomacy.

If the Wing Loong II becomes the primary production focus, it would introduce a significant shift in Bangladesh’s airpower profile. The drone boasts an endurance of up to 32 hours, a payload capacity of around 480 kilograms, and compatibility with precision-guided munitions such as BA-7 air-to-ground missiles and LS-6 glide bombs. These capabilities enable persistent surveillance and precision strike missions previously absent from Bangladesh’s operational inventory.

Such attributes are particularly relevant for maritime patrol over Bangladesh’s expansive exclusive economic zone, supporting efforts to counter piracy, illegal fishing, and grey-zone coercion. The platform’s electro-optical, infrared, and synthetic aperture radar sensors allow all-weather, day-night operations—an important advantage in the monsoon-affected Bay of Bengal.

Cost considerations further favour Chinese UAVs. Lower acquisition and sustainment costs allow Bangladesh to field meaningful fleet sizes rather than symbolic numbers, especially when domestic production reduces foreign exchange outflows and supports incremental upgrades tailored to local requirements.

For India, opposition to the drone factory reflects deeper anxieties over China’s expanding military-industrial footprint along its periphery. The prospect of armed MALE UAVs operating from Bangladeshi soil raises concerns about surveillance reach, electronic intelligence collection, and the broader implications of Chinese-origin systems operating close to India’s northeastern states.

Yet Dhaka’s frustration with India’s defence engagement record complicates this narrative. Several Indian initiatives, including a US$500 million line of credit pledged in 2019, have progressed slowly, undermining New Delhi’s credibility as a defence partner. Bangladesh’s earlier decision to opt for Chinese-origin JF-17 fighters over India’s Tejas was driven largely by delays and uncompetitive terms rather than ideological alignment.

As Md Obaidullah observed, attempts to block Chinese military hardware without offering viable alternatives risk pushing Dhaka further toward Beijing. India’s accelerated domestic investments in indigenous UAVs and counter-drone systems address internal needs but do little to shape outcomes in neighbouring states.

Beyond platforms, CETC’s involvement introduces sophisticated electronic warfare and network integration dimensions that could reshape Bangladesh’s ISR ecosystem. For India, concerns extend beyond individual drones to the systemic implications of integrated UAV and electronic warfare architectures operating nearby.

As the factory moves toward anticipated operational status by late 2026, its symbolic weight may prove as consequential as its physical output. More than a manufacturing site, it signals Bangladesh’s assertion of defence autonomy in a contested strategic environment—and underscores how industrial decisions are increasingly inseparable from geopolitical alignment in South Asia.

Morocco’s ongoing negotiations with the United States for the acquisition of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II represent a potential turning point in North African military aviation, signaling Rabat’s ambition to join the global cohort of fifth-generation airpower operators. Analysts estimate the potential acquisition package at between US$17 billion and US$18 billion (approximately RM80–85 billion) over the aircraft’s projected life cycle, highlighting the strategic and fiscal commitment Morocco is willing to undertake to leapfrog legacy platforms.

The pursuit of the F-35 carries far-reaching implications for regional security dynamics. Should Morocco succeed, it would become the first African nation and only the second in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region after Israel to operate a fifth-generation stealth fighter. This move is poised to reshape regional perceptions of deterrence credibility, technological parity, and alliance alignment amid a contested security environment spanning the Sahel, the Atlantic approaches, and the Western Mediterranean.

Morocco’s initiative marks a shift from incremental modernization toward transformational capability acquisition. The Royal Moroccan Air Force (RMAF) aims to close enduring gaps in survivability, deep-strike reach, electronic warfare dominance, and sensor-fusion capabilities—deficiencies that cannot be addressed by upgraded fourth-generation platforms alone. Modernized F-16s or Mirage 2000s, even with advanced avionics, cannot replicate the strategic advantages offered by a platform designed from inception for stealth, sensor integration, and network-centric operations.

The strategic rationale for Morocco’s F-35 pursuit has been indirectly reinforced by U.S. policymakers. In a November 2025 engagement with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, then-U.S. President Donald Trump commented, “I know they’d like you to get planes of reduced calibre, but as far as I’m concerned, I think they are both at a level where they should get top of the line.” Defense analysts interpreted this statement as indicative of Washington’s evolving flexibility on fifth-generation exports to trusted partners, signaling a potential policy window for Morocco.

Morocco’s interest in the F-35 should therefore be viewed as a calculated strategic posture rather than a routine procurement. The acquisition reflects a desire to enhance airpower modernisation, strengthen alliance politics, reinforce deterrence in Western Sahara, and anchor Morocco more firmly within U.S.-led security architectures amid intensifying great-power competition across Africa.

The proposed program underscores Morocco’s confidence in its long-term fiscal and operational sustainability. Beyond the initial procurement cost, the F-35 demands decades of sustained investment in software upgrades, classified infrastructure, training cycles, and secure maintenance systems. The willingness to shoulder these responsibilities reflects disciplined defence planning and a commitment to enduring capability rather than short-term capability boosts.

Strategically, the F-35 would transform Morocco’s air defense doctrine from platform-centric operations to effects-based operations. Its stealth, networked sensors, and persistent ISR capabilities would enable Rabat to influence adversary behavior through battlespace awareness, precision strikes, and pre-emptive control rather than reactive responses. The aircraft’s operational flexibility would also allow Morocco to serve as a regional stabilizer in alignment with U.S. strategic objectives, extending influence without necessitating direct American military presence.

The F-35’s potential integration would also catalyze doctrinal and organizational reforms within the RMAF. Command-and-control structures, joint-force integration, data fusion, and decision-making processes would need to adapt to a high-speed, networked operational environment, elevating Morocco’s military effectiveness beyond the raw size of its fleet. In essence, the F-35 would not merely augment Morocco’s airpower but redefine its strategic identity as a technologically sophisticated, alliance-integrated actor in North Africa.

The foundation for Morocco’s F-35 aspirations lies in its longstanding bilateral defense relationship with the United States. Designated a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2004, Rabat has enjoyed preferential access to advanced U.S. military technology, facilitating high-value arms transfers that have progressively reshaped the RMAF’s operational profile. This relationship gained additional momentum following the 2020 Abraham Accords, which normalized Morocco’s relations with Israel in exchange for U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. This diplomatic realignment removed barriers to high-end technology transfer and enhanced Rabat’s strategic value within Washington’s Middle East and Africa calculus.

Since 2020, trilateral security convergence with Israel and the United States has expanded through intelligence sharing, joint training, and interoperability initiatives. Notably, the November 2021 meeting between Moroccan Defence Minister Abdellatif Loudiyi and Israeli Defence Minister Benny Gantz established formal frameworks for military cooperation that directly support fifth-generation operational concepts. By 2025, the U.S.–Morocco Defense Cooperation Roadmap (2020–2030) further codified this partnership, encompassing counter-terrorism, maritime security, and port security initiatives. Within this framework, the F-35 emerges as a strategic instrument to consolidate Morocco’s transformation into a high-trust security partner interoperable with U.S., Israeli, and European forces.

At the technical level, the F-35’s capabilities would fundamentally alter Morocco’s air combat dynamics. Its low-observable design, AN/APG-81 AESA radar, Distributed Aperture System, and advanced electronic support measures provide situational awareness and targeting dominance in contested environments. Powered by the Pratt & Whitney F135 engine, generating roughly 191 kilonewtons of thrust, the F-35A offers multi-role precision strike, deep penetration, and ISR capabilities across distances exceeding 1,200 kilometers, directly supporting territorial defense and expeditionary missions.

RMAF planners anticipate a fleet of up to 32 F-35A aircraft, complemented by simulators, secure maintenance infrastructure, encrypted data systems, and advanced munitions integration, collectively driving the program’s lifecycle cost toward US$18 billion. Beyond aircraft numbers, the investment represents a qualitative shift in doctrine toward information-dominant warfare, emphasizing network integration and sensor fusion as force multipliers.

Morocco’s post-2020 defense normalization with Israel plays a critical role in shaping regional acceptance of this acquisition. Israel’s assessment framework for F-35 sales prioritizes intent and alignment over platform parity, and Morocco is considered a defensive, status-quo actor focused on territorial deterrence, Western Sahara stability, and Sahel security rather than power projection against Israel. Moreover, Israel retains structural superiority through its uniquely modified F-35I “Adir,” which incorporates sovereign avionics, electronic warfare suites, mission software, and classified subsystems inaccessible to other operators. Geographic separation and alignment with U.S. and Israeli strategic interests further mitigate concerns, allowing Morocco to modernize without challenging Israel’s qualitative edge.

The prospective F-35 acquisition also has implications for Algeria, whose air force modernization relies on Russian platforms such as the Su-30MKA, Su-34, and potential Su-57 purchases. While Algeria emphasizes numerical mass and kinetic payload, Morocco’s stealth-enabled F-35 capability would provide an asymmetrical advantage through first-look engagement, deep ISR, and precision strike, complicating any adversary’s air defense planning. Within the context of Western Sahara, such capabilities would strengthen deterrence by imposing high operational costs for potential aggression.

Morocco’s defense budget trajectory supports this high-end acquisition. The national defense budget rose from approximately 124 billion dirhams (US$12.4 billion) in 2024 to 133 billion dirhams (US$13.3 billion) in 2025, with further increases anticipated for high-end acquisitions. Investments in AH-64E Apache helicopters, M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams tanks, and MQ-9B SeaGuardian drones are being integrated into a multi-domain architecture, with the F-35 serving as a critical airborne command node for synchronized land, maritime, and air operations.

Beyond military capability, the pursuit of the F-35 sends a strong geopolitical signal. By aligning its most sensitive airpower capability with U.S. systems, Morocco strengthens interoperability, intelligence sharing, and political alignment, countering the proliferation of Russian and Chinese defense technologies in Africa. It positions Morocco as a reference point for African modernization, potentially influencing procurement patterns as nations reassess the trade-offs between capability, cost, and alliance integration.

While congressional approval and long-term sustainment costs remain challenges, Morocco’s calculated pursuit of the F-35 demonstrates a commitment to enduring deterrence credibility, strategic leverage, and the transformation of its airpower into a technologically sophisticated, alliance-integrated force capable of shaping North African security outcomes for decades to come.

Iranian state television has confirmed the first officially acknowledged death linked to nationwide protests that erupted last week over rising living costs and economic hardship. A member of Iran’s security forces was killed during unrest in western Lorestan province, according to a regional official cited on Thursday (Jan 1).

State TV reported that a 21-year-old member of the Basij paramilitary force from the city of Kouhdasht was killed late Wednesday during clashes with demonstrators. The broadcaster quoted Said Pourali, deputy governor of Lorestan Province, as saying the young man died after being attacked by what officials described as “rioters” while attempting to maintain public order.

“This individual was killed while defending security during the unrest,” Pourali said. He added that 13 police officers and Basij members were injured during the demonstrations in Kouhdasht, largely due to stone-throwing by protesters.

The confirmation marks the first official fatality since protests began on Sunday. Demonstrations initially started peacefully in the capital, Tehran, where shopkeepers staged strikes to protest soaring prices, declining purchasing power, and prolonged economic stagnation. Over the following days, unrest spread to several other cities, gaining momentum after students at at least 10 universities joined demonstrations on Tuesday.

The Basij, a volunteer paramilitary force affiliated with Iran’s powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is frequently deployed to help police protests and enforce public order. During previous waves of unrest, state media have routinely referred to demonstrators as “rioters” or agents of foreign influence, while opposition groups describe the protests as spontaneous expressions of economic frustration.

President Masoud Pezeshkian acknowledged the depth of public discontent on Thursday, urging government officials to address worsening economic conditions. Speaking at an event broadcast on state television, Pezeshkian warned that failure to improve living standards would have grave moral consequences.

“From an Islamic perspective, if we do not resolve the issue of people’s livelihoods, we will end up in hell,” he said, in unusually blunt remarks that underscored mounting pressure on the administration.

Iran’s authorities declared Wednesday an unexpected bank holiday, officially citing the need to conserve energy during cold weather amid fuel shortages. While no official connection was made to the protests, the timing raised questions as demonstrations intensified in several cities. Iran’s weekend begins on Thursday, with Saturday being a long-standing national holiday, effectively limiting public activity for several days.

The country’s prosecutor general said on Wednesday that peaceful economic protests were legitimate but issued a stern warning against violence or unrest. “Any attempt to turn economic protests into a tool of insecurity, destruction of public property, or implementation of externally designed scenarios will inevitably be met with a legal, proportionate and decisive response,” he said.

State-linked Tasnim news agency reported on Wednesday evening that seven individuals had been arrested for alleged ties to groups “hostile to the Islamic Republic” based in the United States and Europe. The report claimed they had been tasked with provoking violence during demonstrations, though it did not specify when the arrests took place or provide further details.

Iran’s economic troubles have deepened over the past year. The national currency, the rial, has lost more than one-third of its value against the US dollar, accelerating inflation and eroding household incomes. According to the Statistical Centre of Iran, the official inflation rate stood at 52 percent year-on-year in December, intensifying public frustration after years of high prices, sanctions-related pressure, and sluggish growth.

As protests continue to spread, the death of a security force member raises concerns that the unrest could escalate further, testing the government’s ability to contain demonstrations while addressing deep-rooted economic grievances.

On Thursday, the UN and Iraq signed a new agreement, the Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for 2025 to 2029, to assist the country in making progress on its national goals, which are also reflected in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the UN’s vision for the world. 

The agreement comes ahead of the closure of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), which has been helping the government with key policy issues for more than two decades.

“Signing the Framework is a natural and honourable transition of the relationship between the United Nations and the Republic of Iraq,” said UNAMI chief Mohamed Al Hassan. “It reflects an orderly and responsible departure from support to political stability to the stage of consolidating sustainable development partnership between Iraq and the organization.” 

Listen to our interview with Mr. Al Hassan on UNAMI’s closure.

About the framework 

In order to achieve the 2030 Agenda, which also includes the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), countries need not only to work collectively, but to also do their part on a national level.  

Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks are agreements between the UN and individual governments which give countries the tools to achieve these goals, from planning to implementation and monitoring.  

The plan for Iraq focuses on four main strategic priorities that align with the country’s national development plan:  

1. Improved access to education, health and social services. 
2. Creating opportunities for jobs and economic growth. 
3. Protecting the environment and addressing climate change. 
4. Strengthening rule of law and good governance. 

How will it be achieved? 

The implementation, monitoring and reporting of the UN-Iraq development framework will be guided by a steering committee co-chaired by Iraq’s Ministry of Planning and the UN Resident Coordinator who leads the country team. 

Government institutions and UN agencies will come together to review progress annually and ensure the framework remains on track.  

Implementation will be supported by a dedicated fund, alongside a strategy to mobilise resources for necessary funding. 

UN Mission closes

UNAMI was created in 2003 after the fall of Saddam Hussein and has supported Iraq through political transition, post-conflict recovery and the fight against ISIL, also known as Da’esh. The special political mission ends its mandate on 31 December. 

With the country now significantly more stable than it was some 20 years ago, Iraq is working towards greater self-reliance.  

“Iraq believes it is ready to move to another phase, solidifying its sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Mr. Al Hassan previously told UN News. “I wholeheartedly believe that Iraq is ready for that.” 

In an interview with UN News, Mr. Mohamed Al Hassan, Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and UNAMI chief, said the Mission’s end reflects how far Iraq has come since it was set up in 2003, when the country was emerging from decades of dictatorship, regional wars and the terror wrought by ISIL – known more widely in the Middle East as Da’esh.

“When UNAMI started, Iraq used to be a very different place than today”, he told UN News. Just days into the mission in August 2003 the UN came under attack at its Baghdad headquarters, leaving 22 staffers dead and over 100 wounded.

Today, a new era has dawned: “With the sacrifices of the Iraqis first and foremost, and with international support, in particular the United Nations, Iraq believes it is ready to move to another phase, solidifying its sovereignty and territorial integrity. I wholeheartedly believe that Iraq is ready for that.”

UN Secretary-General António Guterres will travel to Baghdad to join Iraqis and the diplomatic community in marking the Mission’s closure – an event he called a clear signal that this is “mission accomplished”.

Democratic progress

Mr. Al Hassan said Iraq’s recent political developments underscore how dramatically the country has stabilised.

The parliamentary elections held in November, which UNAMI supported, were widely viewed as among the most credible to date. With a 56 per cent voter turnout, they were also a demonstration of renewed public engagement.

“It was the most fair, free and peaceful elections,” he said. “When you see an election that fair and democratic, you know that that’s a belief in a new Iraq.”

Over the years, UNAMI has provided critical support across a wide range of areas: advising the Government on political stabilisation, promoting inclusive national dialogue, and supporting community-level reconciliation in areas affected by conflict.

It has also played a central role in electoral assistance, helping Iraq conduct multiple rounds of local and national elections.

Security turnaround

Among UNAMI’s most significant legacies, Mr. Al Hassan said, is the dramatic improvement in security. He noted that Iraq “would have had no way to defeat Da’esh without the help of the United Nations and the international community” but emphasised that it was ultimately the courage and resilience of Iraqis that reversed the extremist group’s advances.

The country still feels the long-term impact of conflict. Roughly one million Iraqis remain internally displaced, including more than 100,000 Yazidis still living in camps after unimaginable suffering at the hands of Da’esh.

Many remain unable to return home, particularly to the Yazidi heartland of Sinjar, due to destroyed infrastructure and unresolved security issues.

“I hope they will have the time, the resources and the support to go back to the homes they were lifted from,” he said. “It’s about time.”

A gender lens

Advancing the rights of women has been integral to UNAMI’s mandate, and Mr. Al Hassan said Iraq must continue that work long after the Mission departs.

“Yes, Iraq today is much better than before on women’s rights,” he said. “But violence against women has unfortunately increased.”

He stressed that sustainable progress must come from within. “We want the Iraqis to be the sponsors and be advocates of women’s rights — through Iraqi law, Iraqi protection and Iraqi legislation,” he said. “At the end of the day is the protection of their own people”, Mr. Al Hassan added.

A major pillar of UNAMI’s mandate has been the promotion of human rights, including support for judicial and legal reforms, protection of vulnerable communities, and advancing the rights of women and minorities.

These responsibilities have shaped the Mission’s work up to its planned closure in December 2025.

As Iraq prepares to take its seat on the UN Human Rights Council, he said the country “must act as such”, ensuring full protection for women, youth and minorities and safeguarding freedom of expression.

UN presence remains in Iraq

While the political mission will close, Mr. Al Hassan emphasised that the UN’s broader footprint will remain unchanged.

“People confuse UNAMI with the United Nations,” he said. “All the specialised agencies – UNICEF, WHO, IOM, UNDP, and many others – will remain in Iraq. Even the World Bank and IMF are opening new offices.”

With significant oil reserves and a large GDP, Iraq is not seeking aid, he noted. “Iraq does not need charity; it needs the support and friendship of the international community.”

‘Success story’ in a turbulent region

Calling Iraq “a success story” and “a unique country”, Mr. Al Hassan urged the international community to give Iraq the space and support it needs to succeed.

“My message to the international community and neighbouring countries is give Iraq a chance to prove themselves they are worthy of the freedom that Iraqis paid a very heavy price for.”

UNAMI’s departure does not mark an end to the Iraq–UN partnership.

“I have no doubt that the Iraqis have flipped the page to another beautiful one that will take their country into a better position than before”, Mr. Al Hassan said.

Thailand’s decision to procure the Israeli-made BARAK MX air and missile defence system marks one of the most consequential modernisation moves undertaken by the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) in more than two decades. Valued at 3.44 billion baht (USD 107 million), the acquisition represents not just the purchase of a high-end weapons platform but a decisive recalibration of Thailand’s Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) as the kingdom confronts an increasingly volatile Southeast Asian security environment.

The BARAK MX, widely regarded as among the world’s most advanced High-to-Medium Air Defence (HIMAD) systems, offers Thailand a multi-layered shield against drones, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, loitering munitions, precision-guided weapons, and fast-moving aircraft. Its flexibility, modularity, and proven combat performance position it as one of the most future-ready air defence architectures in the Indo-Pacific.

The procurement comes as Southeast Asia enters its tensest period in recent memory. Geopolitical frictions have escalated from the South China Sea to the Myanmar borderlands, underscoring Bangkok’s urgency to modernise its overstretched and increasingly outdated air defence network.

Thailand’s southern insurgency—once dominated by small-arms attacks and IEDs—has seen the growing use of drones for reconnaissance and strike missions, exposing gaps in low-altitude defence. Meanwhile, spillover from Myanmar’s intensifying civil war has produced cross-border drone and helicopter incursions, testing Thailand’s airspace surveillance and interception capacity.

Along the Cambodian frontier, intermittent tensions have been amplified by Phnom Penh’s rapid military modernisation and procurement of advanced Chinese systems, raising concerns for Bangkok’s eastern corridor. More broadly, South China Sea militarisation, overlapping maritime claims, and great-power rivalry have heightened regional instability, with Thailand’s Exclusive Economic Zone intersecting zones of contention.

These pressures have magnified the strategic risks Thailand faces from ballistic and cruise missile proliferation across the Indo-Pacific—a threat that legacy platforms such as the U.S.-made HAWK and Chinese KS-1A can no longer adequately counter.

The RTAF’s IADS master plan, initiated in the mid-2020s, aims to unify radar networks, command-and-control nodes, interceptor batteries, and surveillance assets into a seamless real-time architecture. The BARAK MX, built from the ground up for network-centric warfare, aligns perfectly with this doctrine. Its plug-and-play integration allows Thailand to expand coverage nationwide as future procurement phases unfold.

The 2025 contract includes radars, launchers, C2 modules, and a family of interceptors offering short-, medium-, and long-range coverage. Full operational capability is expected by 2028 following extensive training and integration with Thailand’s existing radar grid.

This battery forms part of a broader air defence modernisation budget exceeding 10 billion baht, prioritising protection for Don Mueang Air Base, U-Tapao, Surat Thani, Chiang Mai, Bangkok’s government precincts, and the Eastern Economic Corridor—home to Thailand’s most critical industrial assets.

Developed by Israel Aerospace Industries, the BARAK MX operates on a unified architecture that merges land, air, and potential naval assets into a single defensive ecosystem. Its interceptor family includes:

BARAK MRAD (35 km) for aircraft, helicopters, guided munitions, and short-range ballistic threats.

BARAK LRAD (70 km) for cruise missiles, UAVs, and standoff weapons.

BARAK ER (150 km) for high-altitude ballistic missiles and extended-range intrusions.

All three interceptors launch from a universal canister, giving Thailand unprecedented flexibility to tailor its loadout to evolving threats. The system’s AESA radar can track more than 500 targets simultaneously and uses machine-learning algorithms to prioritise engagements. Its vertical launch capability ensures 360-degree coverage—critical for a country bordered by four neighbours and flanked by maritime approaches.

With real-world interception rates exceeding 90% and proven resilience in electronic warfare environments, the BARAK MX offers Thailand the most capable defensive reach in its history.

Confidence in the system’s reliability is reinforced by its performance during Israel’s Operation Rising Lion in June 2025—the largest missile and drone conflict ever recorded. During the crisis, Iran and allied militias launched more than 550 ballistic missiles and over 1,000 drones and loitering munitions at Israel. The BARAK MX emerged as one of Israel’s primary defensive layers, intercepting ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, swarming UAVs, and manoeuvring hypersonic-class threats.

One notable episode saw the system neutralise dozens of high-speed ballistic and quasi-hypersonic missiles within minutes—an operational stress test unmatched in contemporary warfare. For Thailand, this offers reassurance that the system can withstand saturation attacks, swarm tactics, and multi-vector intrusions increasingly common in the Indo-Pacific.

Thailand will become the first ASEAN state to induct the BARAK MX, potentially setting a benchmark as Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines reassess their air defence vulnerabilities. The acquisition also deepens Thailand–Israel defence ties, adding to ongoing collaborations involving SPIKE missiles, artillery systems, and border-security technologies.

At a geopolitical level, the deal reflects Bangkok’s strategy of diversifying its defence suppliers to preserve neutrality amid intensifying U.S.–China rivalry. The BARAK MX enhances Thailand’s autonomy, strengthens deterrence, and elevates its status among regional middle-power militaries with credible air denial capabilities.

Ultimately, the BARAK MX represents far more than an air defence purchase. It is a generational capability leap that reinforces Thailand’s national resilience, shields critical infrastructure, and positions the kingdom as a leader in ASEAN air and missile defence at a time of rapid regional militarisation.

ABU DHABI: Egypt’s Hamdy Abdelwahab and Palestine’s Abdul-Kareem Al-Selwady will bring power, passion and more than a little regional pride to the Etihad Arena at “UFC 321: Aspinall vs. Gane” on Oct. 25.

Abdelwahab, a former Olympic wrestler who represented Egypt at the Tokyo 2020 Games, made history as his country’s first UFC fighter. He returns to action in Abu Dhabi against American Chris Barnett.

“It feels great because it feels like I’m home, fighting in my hometown,” said Abdelwahab, who was born in Cairo.

“I just told the (Arab fans) that I need their support and I’d be happy if they came. I want everyone to be here; I hope I don’t make them disappointed or regret coming.”

Abdelwahab wants to deliver Barnett his fourth UFC defeat. “It doesn’t matter what it’s going to take,” he added. “It’s going to be his luck — whatever it comes out as — but we’re looking to finish this fight.”

The Egyptian praised Abu Dhabi’s efforts to promote martial arts.

“It’s a huge difference from a couple of years ago,” he said. “Abu Dhabi started growing in the sport and growing the organizations and everything, especially in the Middle East.

“I can rank Abu Dhabi as No. 1, you know, the home of martial arts. I also hear that jiu-jitsu has become one of the subjects in schools for kids, which is a great thing to do.

“You can see that any organization hosting fights here in Abu Dhabi, in general, becomes one of the most successful events in any sport. That puts Abu Dhabi at a very high level.”

Also taking to the octagon under an Arab flag will be Al-Selwady, for whom UFC 321 marks a comeback after more than a year out.

“Ever since my last fight, I’ve just been keeping my head down, training, and getting better,” said the Palestinian, who faces Brazil’s Matheus Camilo.

“I had two fights that didn’t go through — one where I got severely injured and the other two opponents kept pulling out. I just kept getting better and better during that time, reflecting on everything that happened.

“I believe this is all part of God’s timing, and right now is my time.”

Al-Selwady says fighting in Abu Dhabi brings his career full circle: “I like to look at it in a positive way wherever I am. If I fight anywhere, I know there’s going to be a good crowd and I know I have my friends traveling with me.

“But fighting here brings me back to when I started MMA in the Middle East. Of course, it’s nice to come back to your roots and represent in front of everyone. Seeing people who followed me from 10 years ago, eight years ago, all excited to come watch me again.”

Al-Selwady has witnessed firsthand the region’s rapid development in MMA. “I started MMA in 2012,” he said. “Back then, Jordan was the capital of MMA because there was a promotion based there.

“Seeing Abu Dhabi throughout the years start adopting MMA and really taking over to what it is right now is very beautiful. We’ve grown together, and to fight here right now is an amazing feeling and a great pleasure.”

Al-Selwady, nicknamed “The Pride of Palestine,” believes the healthy competition between Arab nations has helped the sport flourish.

“Seeing different countries participate in bringing the UFC here, I feel like it’s a very healthy competition between Arab countries (to see) who’s going to throw the biggest events. In the end, the fighters are the biggest ones to gain from that.”