Newly-released security camera footage shows the moment last month’s magnitude 6.8 quake shook Kumamoto General Hospital in Japan.

Four surgeries were under way at the time. Footage from a camera in an operating room where an abdominal surgery was being performed shows medical staff shielding the patient with their bodies as equipment swayed violently, and a nurse opening a door to secure an evacuation route.

According to the hospital, all four operations were successfully completed.

Kumamoto General Hospital resumed normal outpatient services on 5 August , after suspending them following the earthquake on 28 July.

Although there is statutory maternity and paternity leave – which guarantees time off and partial income compensation – not everyone takes it.

Women can get six weeks before their due date and eight weeks after giving birth. Fathers get up to four weeks of flexible paid leave within eight weeks of a child’s birth.

Both parents are also entitled to childcare leave until the child turns one, during which eligible employees receive 67% of their wages for the first 180 days and 50% thereafter. Since April 2025, some parents can receive more support for the first 28 days if both parents take leave.

“I do think many people are watching to see how situations like this – when a woman gives birth while serving as a mayor – can be handled in practice,” Deputy Mayor Shigeto Nose says.

The 62-year-old father-of-two is set to exercise all mayoral authority during Kawata’s absence, discussing major matters with her remotely once a week.

He never took any parental leave himself and left virtually all of the childcare to his wife. “When I came home, I was tired. Even if the baby cried during the night, I left it to my wife. Looking back now, I genuinely feel that’s something I should reflect on.”

Now, his son-in-law is taking six months off work to help his daughter take care of their second child. “Seeing that makes me happy. Times have really changed and it’s great to see them working together like that.”

Kawata says part of the criticism against her stems from the strongly held belief that those in certain positions – like public office – must abandon their private life and devote themselves entirely to the people.

When asked what her future child will think about the attention surrounding her pregnancy, she says: “I really hope they will be surprised.”

“I think we really need to create a society where it’s so common for women to do both – and not have to choose between working and having a family.”

The Indo-Pacific security landscape is undergoing a notable recalibration, as diplomatic and legislative developments across the region signal a more networked and operational phase of strategic alignment among key middle powers. The recent meeting of QUAD foreign ministers in New Delhi on 26 May was followed immediately by a significant domestic shift in Japan’s security apparatus, with Japan’s parliament on 27 May approving legislation to establish a National Intelligence Council and a National Intelligence Bureau. The reform marks the most consequential restructuring of Japan’s intelligence architecture since the post-war system was established in 1952.

Taken together, these developments reflect a broader trajectory: Japan’s steady transition from a largely reactive, pacifist security posture toward a more proactive role as a regional security provider within a rules-based Indo-Pacific order.

The creation of a centralized intelligence coordination framework is widely interpreted as an effort to streamline Japan’s analytical, operational, and inter-agency intelligence capabilities at a time of heightened regional volatility. The National Intelligence Council is expected to function as a strategic fusion center, integrating assessments across ministries, while the National Intelligence Bureau will consolidate collection and analysis functions that have historically been dispersed across bureaucratic silos.

The reform aligns with Japan’s broader National Security Strategy, which has progressively expanded the country’s security toolkit beyond its traditional self-defense constraints. While Japanese officials have emphasized continuity with its pacifist constitution, the institutional redesign reflects an increasing recognition of intelligence as a core component of deterrence and alliance interoperability.

The legislative shift follows an active period of diplomatic engagement under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, whose administration has accelerated outreach across Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific. Her visits to Australia, Vietnam, and the Philippines in late April, combined with the Philippine President’s subsequent visit to Japan in May, underscored Tokyo’s intent to deepen defense and security ties beyond traditional economic cooperation frameworks.

Analysts note that this represents a gradual departure from the legacy of the Fukuda Doctrine, which historically emphasized economic engagement and non-military political relations with Southeast Asia. The emerging model instead integrates security cooperation, capacity building, and defense-industrial collaboration as central pillars of Japan’s regional diplomacy.

A key instrument in this shift has been Japan’s use of the Official Security Assistance (OSA) framework and Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAA). Together, these mechanisms are enabling Japan to provide non-lethal defense equipment, training, and infrastructure support while facilitating joint operational access with partner militaries.

The RAA framework, in particular, has transformed Japan’s defense relationship with the Philippines, allowing for the mutual deployment of forces under agreed conditions. This has enabled more frequent and sophisticated joint exercises, including maritime drills involving anti-ship missile simulation, amphibious coordination, and coastal defense scenarios.

Japan has also signaled potential transfers of high-end defense assets, including Abukuma-class destroyers and maritime patrol aircraft, to enhance the Philippines’ surveillance and deterrence capacity in the South China Sea. While such transfers remain politically sensitive, they represent a notable evolution in Japan’s long-standing restrictions on defense exports.

Among ASEAN partners, the Philippines has emerged as the most advanced test case for Japan’s evolving defense cooperation model. The partnership now extends beyond symbolic alignment into operational integration, particularly in maritime domain awareness and joint readiness activities.

This trajectory is increasingly viewed as a template for Japan’s broader maritime security engagement in Southeast Asia. However, the Philippines’ direct exposure to Chinese maritime pressure also distinguishes it from other ASEAN states, making it a unique case where Japan’s security contributions are both more visible and more operationally urgent.

Japan’s security partnerships across Southeast Asia are increasingly differentiated, reflecting varying threat perceptions, political sensitivities, and institutional capacities.

In the case of Singapore, cooperation is characterized less by hardware transfer and more by deep interoperability and advanced technological collaboration. Joint exercises emphasize submarine rescue operations, cyber defense, and military medical coordination. This model positions Singapore as a high-end partner for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, particularly in addressing grey-zone threats and cyber vulnerabilities.

By contrast, Japan’s engagement with Indonesia is increasingly oriented toward defense-industrial collaboration. Discussions around potential joint production of Mogami-class frigates highlight a shift from supplier-client dynamics toward co-development frameworks. If realized, such cooperation would mark a structural change in Japan’s defense export policy, positioning Tokyo as a participant in regional military-industrial ecosystems rather than a sole exporter.

The Mogami-class platform, known for its automation and reduced crew requirements, is seen as particularly suited for ASEAN navies seeking to modernize without extensive personnel expansion. For Indonesia, localized production could accelerate naval modernization while preserving strategic autonomy.

Vietnam presents a more constrained but strategically important partnership. Under its “Four No’s” defense policy, Hanoi maintains a cautious balance between major powers. Japan’s approach here has been deliberately low-profile, focusing on non-lethal assistance, maritime surveillance systems, and coast guard training through OSA channels.

This allows Vietnam to enhance maritime domain awareness in its Exclusive Economic Zone while avoiding overt military alignment that could provoke escalation. The arrangement also reflects Japan’s interest in maintaining supply chain stability and maritime security in the South China Sea without forcing binary geopolitical choices.

Malaysia represents another emerging node in Japan’s maritime security network. Proposed cooperation includes coastal radar systems and maritime patrol aircraft aimed at improving surveillance coverage in the Strait of Malacca and surrounding waters. Given the strategic importance of these sea lanes to Japan’s energy imports, enhanced Malaysian capabilities are viewed as directly contributing to Japanese economic security.

A persistent challenge for Tokyo is ensuring that its expanding defense partnerships do not fragment ASEAN unity or create perceptions of bloc formation. Japan has therefore emphasized ASEAN centrality as a guiding principle, seeking to avoid dividing the region into pro- and anti-Japan alignments.

In this context, engagement with countries such as Laos and Cambodia has focused on non-traditional security domains, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), demining operations, and climate resilience. This dual-track approach is intended to reinforce Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision while avoiding overt militarization of its regional diplomacy.

By expanding cooperation across both maritime and mainland Southeast Asia, Japan aims to build a layered network of partnerships that collectively enhance regional resilience without formal alliance structures.

The cumulative effect of Japan’s OSA programs, RAA agreements, and defense-industrial outreach is the gradual emergence of a more interoperable regional security environment. Coastal surveillance systems, maritime domain awareness platforms, and shared training protocols are increasingly creating a de facto “standardized language” for maritime security across multiple ASEAN states.

This interoperability enables more efficient information sharing and joint operational planning, even in the absence of formal multilateral defense commitments. For Japan, it also creates a buffer zone extending from the first island chain toward the broader Indonesian archipelago, reinforcing its strategic depth in an increasingly contested maritime environment.

At the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Japan’s Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi reiterated Tokyo’s commitment to regional stability and rejected characterizations of Japan’s evolving posture as “new militarism.” He emphasized that Japan’s defense expansion remains firmly anchored in defensive doctrine and international cooperation under a rules-based order.

The remarks reflect Tokyo’s continuing effort to balance capability enhancement with normative constraints, ensuring that its expanded security role is interpreted as stabilizing rather than revisionist.

Japan’s simultaneous intelligence reform and defense diplomacy expansion underscore a broader transformation in the Indo-Pacific security order. Rather than replacing existing alliances, Tokyo is constructing a modular network of partnerships tailored to different strategic contexts across Southeast Asia.

China’s escalating restrictions on Japanese defence-linked companies have largely been framed as a bilateral clash between Asia’s two largest economies. Yet the consequences extend far beyond Tokyo and Beijing. Across Southeast Asia, where supply chains for rare earths, electronics, automotive components and defence technologies are deeply interconnected with both powers, governments and businesses face a sobering reality: the room to manoeuvre between the United States and China is shrinking.

On February 24, China’s Ministry of Commerce placed 20 Japanese organizations on a restricted list under the country’s 2020 Export Control Law. The targets included subsidiaries of major defense contractors Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and IHI Corporation, the national space agency Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, and the National Defense Academy of Japan. Entities on the list are banned from receiving dual-use items — goods with both civilian and military applications — from China.

A further 20 organizations, including carmaker Subaru and Sumitomo Heavy Industries, were placed on a watch list requiring case-by-case approval for access to Chinese dual-use exports.

The move followed a broader January measure banning dual-use exports to Japan for any end use that could strengthen its military. The two-step escalation — from a sweeping restriction to a calibrated targeting of specific companies — suggests a deliberate, strategic approach rather than a reactive protest.

The proximate trigger was Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s November statement that Japan could help defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. For Beijing, Taiwan remains a core sovereignty issue and an explicit red line. Takaichi’s remarks were interpreted as crossing into direct involvement in a potential cross-strait contingency.

China’s response has been multi-layered. Beyond export controls, Beijing has imposed tourism restrictions, tightened seafood import inspections, and canceled cultural exchanges. But it is the supply-chain measures aimed at Japan’s defense-industrial base that represent the most consequential step.

By invoking its Export Control Law and framing the measures as nonproliferation safeguards, Beijing has grounded its actions in domestic legislation that is harder to challenge under international trade law. Unlike earlier quota-based restrictions on rare earths that were struck down by the World Trade Organization in 2014, the current system is couched in national security language that many countries, including the United States, also employ.

If such controls can be applied effectively against a G7 economy like Japan, smaller economies across Southeast Asia have reason to pay attention.

For members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the dispute underscores the fragility of strategic neutrality. Most ASEAN governments have avoided taking positions on Taiwan’s status. Yet several have deepened security cooperation with Washington or Tokyo in recent years.

The Philippines, for instance, has expanded defense ties with both Japan and the United States, including granting greater access to American forces under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement and exploring new maritime security arrangements with Tokyo. Even modest rhetorical shifts in support of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” could now risk triggering graduated economic pressure.

The message from Beijing appears clear: statements about Taiwan that imply military involvement carry tangible economic costs.

For Southeast Asian policymakers, the challenge is acute. Their economies depend heavily on trade with China, yet many seek to diversify security partnerships amid concerns about maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea. As economic and security domains become more tightly linked, hedging strategies grow more complicated.

At the heart of the dispute lies the rare earth supply chain — an area where China retains overwhelming dominance. China accounts for roughly 70 percent of global rare earth mining and, according to the International Energy Agency, about 94 percent of the world’s sintered permanent magnets. These high-performance magnets are essential components in electric vehicle motors, wind turbines, advanced electronics and precision-guided munitions.

Japan has spent more than 15 years attempting to reduce its reliance on Chinese rare earth supplies, especially after a 2010 incident in which Beijing curtailed exports during a diplomatic standoff. Much of that diversification strategy runs through Southeast Asia.

Vietnam occupies a central position in these efforts. Japanese chemical giant Shin-Etsu Chemical operates rare earth refining and magnet manufacturing facilities in Hai Phong province with a combined capacity of around 2,200 tonnes per year — one of its only sintering facilities outside Japan.

Yet capacity at the site has not expanded since completion in 2018, and it still relies on feedstock that traces back to Chinese-dominated supply chains. Efforts to secure alternative upstream sources have been halting.

Japan’s earlier attempt to develop Vietnam’s Dong Pao rare earth deposit in Lai Chau province — one of the world’s largest — illustrates the fragility of such ventures. Japanese investors withdrew after China drove down global rare earth prices, undermining commercial viability. A 2023 restart effort faltered when the chairman of a local partner company was arrested. As of early 2026, the planned auction of mining concessions had yet to occur.

Japan’s most ambitious alternative — deep-sea mining of rare-earth-rich sediment from the Pacific seabed — remains years from commercial feasibility. A February test retrieved material from depths of 6,000 meters, but scaling up extraction and processing poses enormous technical and environmental hurdles.

The vulnerability of supply chains became starkly visible in April 2025, when China imposed export controls on seven heavy rare earth elements in response to U.S. tariffs. Though the restrictions were global rather than Japan-specific, Japanese automakers felt the impact quickly.

Nissan and Suzuki reported supply disruptions, and Suzuki temporarily suspended production of its Swift model. European prices for certain rare earth products surged to as much as six times domestic Chinese prices, underscoring the asymmetry of leverage.

In October, Beijing introduced extraterritorial provisions requiring Chinese export licenses for foreign-made products containing more than 0.1 percent Chinese-origin rare earths by value. Though these measures were suspended for a year as part of a diplomatic understanding reached in Busan, they were delayed rather than withdrawn. The underlying licensing architecture remains in place.

For Southeast Asian firms, this is a warning. Even if they are not direct parties to the China–Japan dispute, they may find themselves ensnared by rules governing the origin and content of inputs in their products.

Vietnam has sought to position itself as a beneficiary of supply chain realignment. A ban on exports of unprocessed rare earths, effective January 1, 2026, signals Hanoi’s ambition to capture more value domestically by encouraging local refining and magnet production.

Yet this strategy carries risks. China remains deeply embedded in earlier stages of processing and provides key inputs and technical expertise. A Council on Foreign Relations report notes that after mid-2025, China’s exports of finished permanent magnets returned to near-normal levels, while exports of rare earth metals and compounds — the upstream materials Southeast Asian processors need — stayed below historical baselines.

The implication is clear: Beijing is selectively easing pressure downstream while retaining control over raw materials that confer the greatest leverage.

If Vietnam and its neighbors expand processing capacity without securing diversified upstream inputs, they risk becoming dependent intermediaries in a supply chain still anchored in China.

The February measures against Japanese entities also contain extraterritorial clauses. Overseas companies and individuals are explicitly prohibited from transferring Chinese-origin dual-use goods to the 20 blacklisted organizations. Violations could expose third parties to criminal liability under Chinese law.

This creates a chilling effect. A Vietnamese rare earth processor supplying a Mitsubishi subsidiary, or a Thai electronics firm integrated into IHI’s supply chain, may decide that the regulatory risk outweighs the commercial benefit. Such decisions could effectively extend Beijing’s reach into ASEAN economies without direct diplomatic confrontation.

The United States, for its part, has accelerated efforts to build alternative critical minerals networks. Since mid-2025, Washington has signed critical minerals agreements or frameworks with more than 20 countries, including Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Japan.

Participation offers Southeast Asian states economic opportunity and potential investment. But it also increases exposure to geopolitical contestation. Should Beijing reactivate its extraterritorial controls after November 2026, firms embedded in U.S.-aligned supply chains may face renewed scrutiny.

The China–Japan export control dispute shows little sign of easing. With Prime Minister Takaichi’s White House visit scheduled for mid-March, further alignment between Tokyo and Washington on Taiwan contingencies could prompt additional measures.

For ASEAN governments, the central question is whether their economic strategies adequately account for the weaponization of supply chains. Control over critical minerals — once a niche industrial concern — has become a frontline instrument of statecraft.

Diversification, long touted as the solution, is proving more complex than anticipated. Building processing capacity outside China does not automatically eliminate dependence if feedstock, specialized equipment or intellectual property still originate there. Nor does participation in Western-led frameworks guarantee insulation from pressure.

Southeast Asia’s growth model has thrived on openness and integration. Yet as geopolitical rivalry intensifies, integration itself becomes a vulnerability.

The present dispute between Beijing and Tokyo is not merely about bilateral grievances. It is a test case for how far China is willing to use economic tools in response to perceived security threats — and how resilient regional supply chains truly are.

For policymakers from Hanoi to Jakarta to Manila, the lesson may be sobering. In an era where dual-use goods and rare earth elements are instruments of geopolitical leverage, neutrality is harder to maintain, and economic decisions are inseparable from strategic alignment.

Australia’s Qantas Group will fully exit Jetstar Japan in 2026, selling its remaining stake in the low-cost carrier to a consortium of Japanese investors and triggering a complete rebrand, according to a Reuters report. The move will bring to a close more than a decade of Qantas’ direct equity involvement in Japan’s domestic aviation market, underscoring a broader strategic shift by the Australian airline group toward concentrating capital on its core businesses and long-term fleet renewal.

Jetstar Japan, which operates primarily from Tokyo’s Narita International Airport, has been a familiar presence in the country’s low-cost segment since its launch in 2012. Focused on domestic routes and short-haul regional services, the airline has catered largely to price-sensitive leisure travelers, a niche that has proven difficult but not impossible to sustain in Japan’s traditionally conservative aviation market. While the airline will continue flying after the ownership change, it will no longer use the Jetstar name once the transition is complete, marking the end of its formal association with the Jetstar brand family.

Under the terms of the agreement, Qantas will sell its roughly 33% minority stake to a group of local investors. Jetstar Japan is currently jointly owned by Japan Airlines (JAL), Tokyo Century Corporation, and Qantas, with the Japanese partners holding the majority. The transaction is expected to be finalized by July 2026, subject to regulatory approvals. Financial details were not disclosed, but Qantas said the sale would have no material impact on its earnings, signaling that the decision is driven more by strategic clarity than immediate financial necessity.

For passengers, Qantas and Jetstar Japan have stressed that the short-term impact will be minimal. Aircraft, routes, and staffing are expected to remain unchanged during the transition period, and the airline will continue to operate as a low-cost carrier. Branding, marketing, and customer-facing elements will evolve more gradually, extending well into 2027. The new brand identity is scheduled to be unveiled in October 2026, after the ownership transfer is completed and regulatory approvals are secured.

Qantas Group Chief Executive Vanessa Hudson framed the exit as a moment of pride rather than retreat. “We’re incredibly proud of the pioneering role Jetstar Japan has played in the low-cost aviation sector in Japan and sincerely thank our Jetstar team members for their unwavering commitment to maintaining excellent safety, operational and service standards for millions of customers,” Hudson said in a statement. Her comments reflect Qantas’ effort to position the move as a natural evolution rather than a response to operational or financial stress at the Japanese carrier.

The announcement may initially have unsettled some passengers, particularly in light of Jetstar Asia’s closure in July 2025. However, industry observers and company officials have been quick to draw a clear distinction between the two cases. Jetstar Asia, based in Singapore, struggled with rising costs, intense competition, and a less favorable operating environment, ultimately leading Qantas to shutter the airline. Jetstar Japan, by contrast, has long been regarded as one of the more stable low-cost operators in the country, with a well-established domestic network and a consistent operating model.

Operating a fleet of Airbus A320 aircraft, Jetstar Japan serves dense domestic routes that link major metropolitan areas with regional destinations. Its business model has emphasized simplicity, high aircraft utilization, and competitive fares, rather than attempting to lure high-yield corporate travelers dominated by Japan’s full-service airlines. In a market where punctuality, service reliability, and brand trust are paramount, Jetstar Japan has gradually built a reputation as a dependable budget option, even as other low-cost ventures have faltered.

Japan’s experience with low-cost carriers has been mixed since the early 2010s, when deregulation and new airport capacity sparked optimism about a budget travel boom. Several startups either failed outright or were absorbed into larger airline groups. Peach Aviation, backed by All Nippon Airways (ANA), has emerged as the strongest player, while Spring Japan operates with ties to China’s Spring Airlines. Against this backdrop, Jetstar Japan’s survival and steady growth stand out, highlighting the importance of strong local partnerships and disciplined cost management.

The rebranding of Jetstar Japan also reflects a broader trend in Japan’s aviation sector: the gradual shift away from foreign-branded joint ventures toward greater local ownership and control. While foreign expertise played a critical role in introducing low-cost concepts to Japan, domestic investors and airlines have increasingly taken the lead as the market matures. For Jetstar Japan, full Japanese ownership could allow greater flexibility in tailoring the brand and service offering to local consumer preferences, which are often shaped by a strong sense of loyalty and familiarity.

At the same time, the airline’s future success will depend on maintaining the core principles that allowed it to carve out a niche in the first place. Low-cost aviation margins remain thin, and pressures are mounting. Fuel prices have been volatile, labor shortages are affecting airlines worldwide, and airport charges in Japan remain relatively high compared to some other Asian markets. Any significant drift away from cost discipline could quickly erode the competitiveness that Jetstar Japan has worked to establish.

From Qantas’ perspective, the exit fits neatly into a broader strategy of simplifying its portfolio and sharpening its focus. In recent years, the group has emphasized investment in new aircraft, including long-haul widebodies and next-generation narrowbodies, as well as upgrades to digital platforms and customer experience. It has also prioritized strengthening its core Australian domestic network and key international routes. Minority investments in overseas joint ventures, while strategically useful in the past, have become less central to this vision.

Jetstar Japan has always been a minority, non-controlling investment for Qantas, limiting the Australian group’s ability to shape long-term strategy. By selling its stake, Qantas frees up capital and management attention while still retaining a presence in Japan through commercial partnerships. The group has confirmed that it will continue codeshare and other cooperative arrangements in the Japanese market, ensuring that passengers can still benefit from network connectivity between Qantas and Japanese airlines.

The Jetstar brand itself operates under a federated model rather than as a single unified airline. Each Jetstar-branded carrier is locally owned and regulated, holding its own air operator’s certificate and managing day-to-day operations independently. Common elements include branding philosophy, cost-control principles, and shared digital distribution systems. This structure has allowed Jetstar Japan to function with a high degree of autonomy, making the transition to full local ownership less disruptive than it might otherwise have been.

Operationally, Jetstar Japan has relied heavily on standardized low-cost practices, particularly in ground operations. Across the Jetstar Group, rapid aircraft turnaround and lean staffing are central to keeping unit costs low. Ground handling is typically outsourced to local providers, with standardized procedures designed to ensure consistency and efficiency. In Japan, this approach has involved working closely with local partners who understand Narita Airport’s operational constraints and the unique characteristics of domestic passenger flows.

Narita, historically Japan’s main international gateway, has increasingly sought to attract low-cost carriers as part of its diversification strategy. Jetstar Japan’s presence has been a key component of that effort, helping to boost domestic traffic and better utilize airport capacity. Any future changes to the airline’s network or operating model will therefore be watched closely by airport authorities and regional governments that rely on affordable air links to stimulate tourism and economic activity.

The forthcoming rebrand raises important questions about how the airline will position itself in a crowded and competitive market. A locally tailored brand could resonate more strongly with Japanese travelers, but building brand recognition from scratch is both costly and risky. Retaining the trust of existing customers while attracting new ones will require careful execution, particularly during a period of transition when uncertainty can deter bookings.

Industry analysts note that Jetstar Japan’s experience illustrates both the opportunities and limits of foreign airline partnerships in Japan. While overseas expertise helped introduce new concepts and operational efficiencies, long-term sustainability has depended on deep local engagement. Full Japanese ownership may therefore represent not a retreat from globalization, but a maturation of the low-cost sector, where domestic players feel confident enough to chart their own course.

For employees, Qantas and Jetstar Japan have emphasized continuity. Staffing levels and employment conditions are expected to remain stable during the transition, and the airline has sought to reassure workers that the rebrand does not signal downsizing or retrenchment. Maintaining morale will be crucial, particularly in an industry where skilled labor is increasingly scarce.

Looking ahead, Jetstar Japan’s next chapter will be shaped less by its Australian origins and more by domestic strategic priorities. The airline will need to navigate rising costs, evolving consumer expectations, and intensifying competition, all while preserving the low-fare proposition that underpins its appeal. Whether under the Jetstar name or a new identity, its performance will serve as a barometer for the health of Japan’s low-cost aviation sector.

For Qantas, the exit marks the end of an era but not the end of its engagement with Japan. By stepping back from ownership while maintaining commercial ties, the group is signaling a pragmatic approach to international partnerships—one that favors flexibility and focus over sprawling equity interests. As the aviation industry continues to adapt to post-pandemic realities, such recalibration is likely to become increasingly common among global airline groups.

In that sense, the sale of Qantas’ stake in Jetstar Japan is less a story of withdrawal than one of transition. It reflects shifting priorities, maturing markets, and the evolving balance between global brands and local control. For Japan’s travelers, the skies will look much the same in the near term. For the industry, however, the change offers fresh insight into how low-cost aviation in Japan is entering a new, more locally driven phase.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said on Wednesday that she remained “always open” to dialogue with China, even as diplomatic tensions between Tokyo and Beijing continue to simmer following her remarks on Taiwan that triggered a sharp backlash from Beijing.

Speaking at a news conference, Takaichi sought to strike a conciliatory tone, stressing the importance of maintaining stable ties with Japan’s largest neighbour. “China is an important neighbour for Japan, and we need to build constructive and stable relationships,” she said. “Japan is always open to dialogue with China. We’re not shutting our door.”

Her comments come amid a deepening row sparked by statements she made in November suggesting that Japan could intervene militarily in the event of an attack on Taiwan. China, which claims the self-ruled democratic island as part of its territory, reacted angrily, accusing Tokyo of crossing a red line and interfering in its internal affairs.

Beijing has repeatedly warned that it reserves the right to use force to bring Taiwan under its control, and it views any suggestion of foreign military involvement as unacceptable. Following Takaichi’s remarks, China issued strong diplomatic protests and urged its citizens to avoid travelling to Japan, a move that is now beginning to show tangible effects.

Official data released on Wednesday indicated that Chinese visitor numbers to Japan have slowed markedly. According to the Japan National Tourism Organization (JNTO), arrivals from mainland China last month rose by just three per cent compared with a year earlier, the weakest growth recorded since January 2022.

About 560,000 travellers from China visited Japan during the month, the JNTO said, noting that the travel warning issued by Chinese authorities was among the factors behind the modest increase. This represents a sharp deceleration from previous months, when year-on-year growth had remained firmly in double digits — 22.8 per cent in October, 18.9 per cent in September and 36.5 per cent in August.

Tourism officials and businesses say the impact of the slowdown is being cushioned by strong demand from other markets. Takayuki Kitanaka, a spokesman for the Osaka Convention and Tourism Bureau, said that although many group tours from China had been cancelled, the overall picture remained resilient.

“The decline of Chinese guests is offset by visitors from other countries,” Kitanaka told AFP. “Many businesses are making efforts so that they would be ready to welcome back Chinese visitors once things calm down.”

China remains Japan’s largest single source of foreign tourists. Official figures show that almost 7.5 million Chinese visitors travelled to the Japanese archipelago in the first nine months of 2025, accounting for roughly a quarter of all inbound tourism during that period. Lured by a weak yen, Chinese tourists spent an estimated US$3.7 billion in the third quarter alone.

Spending data underscore the importance of the market for Japan’s tourism-dependent economy. According to the JNTO, each Chinese visitor spent on average 22 per cent more than tourists from other countries last year, making them a particularly valuable segment for retailers, hotels and regional economies.

A recent survey by major research firm Teikoku Databank suggests that Japanese companies are divided over the broader economic implications of the diplomatic spat. While 43 per cent of surveyed firms said the trend was negative for the Japanese economy, 41 per cent said they did not expect any significant impact.

“These results suggest that many companies are taking the current travel restrictions relatively calmly,” Teikoku Databank said in its analysis, pointing to diversified tourist inflows and pent-up domestic demand as stabilising factors.

Tensions escalated further this month when Japanese authorities said Chinese military aircraft locked radar onto Japanese jets during an encounter, a move Tokyo described as dangerous. Japan responded by summoning China’s ambassador to lodge a formal protest, underlining the fragile state of relations despite Takaichi’s renewed call for dialogue.

As economic interdependence clashes with growing security concerns, both sides face the challenge of managing disputes without allowing them to spiral into broader confrontation.

Japan is moving closer to deploying directed-energy weapons at sea, as a Japanese defense agency has confirmed that a high-energy laser system capable of shooting down drones is being installed on a naval vessel for future trials. The development marks a significant step in Tokyo’s effort to modernize its maritime defenses amid a rapidly deteriorating security environment in East Asia.

A laser weapon is a form of directed-energy system that uses concentrated energy rather than conventional shells or missiles to disable or destroy targets. Because it does not rely on physical ammunition, the cost per shot is significantly lower, and firing capacity is effectively limited only by power generation and cooling. These attributes have made laser weapons increasingly attractive for defending ships against swarms of drones and other low-cost aerial threats, a challenge highlighted by recent U.S. naval operations in the Red Sea against Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

Photos shared on X on December 3 show what appears to be a prototype laser weapon mounted on JS Asuka, a test ship operated by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. The Japanese Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) confirmed that the system shown is a 100-kilowatt-class high-energy laser currently under research and development. According to ATLA, the weapon is being prepared for installation on the Asuka to conduct at-sea illumination and performance tests in the future.

The system appears identical to a laser weapon previously revealed by ATLA in 2023, when the agency released footage demonstrating its potential to disable mortar shells and unmanned aerial vehicles. ATLA said the laser has already undergone land-based trials, successfully igniting a mortar shell and shooting down a small drone, demonstrating its basic effectiveness against aerial threats.

ATLA, which operates under Japan’s Ministry of Defense, is tasked with maintaining the country’s technological edge and delivering advanced equipment to the Self-Defense Forces in what it describes as an “increasingly severe security environment.” That environment has been shaped largely by China’s expanding military power and more assertive regional posture.

Japan’s push to develop shipborne laser weapons and other advanced systems comes as Beijing continues to showcase its growing military capabilities, including during a major parade held in September. Relations between Tokyo and Beijing have also worsened sharply in recent months following remarks by Japanese officials suggesting the possibility of military involvement should China attempt to blockade Taiwan.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Japan’s laser weapon development.

Defense outlet Naval News reported that the laser installed on the Asuka could be evaluated across a wide range of criteria, including destructive power, continuous engagement capability, target acquisition and tracking, sensor integration, and overall operational performance in a maritime environment.

Japan’s efforts are unfolding alongside similar developments by its closest ally. The U.S. Navy has forward-deployed the laser-armed destroyer USS Preble to Japan since October 2024. The ship is equipped with a 60-kilowatt High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS) system, designed to counter drones and fast-attack craft.

Despite their promise, laser weapons still face notable operational limitations. Defense outlet The War Zone has noted that such systems generally engage only one target at a time and require sustained focus on a target for several seconds to achieve an effect. Their effective range can be limited, atmospheric conditions such as rain or fog can degrade performance, and the sensitive components require significant hardening for sustained military use.

As Naval News observed, Japan’s Ministry of Defense views high-energy lasers as a low-cost interceptor option compared with traditional air-defense missiles, particularly for point defense against drones. However, whether Japan will eventually deploy laser systems across its frontline naval vessels to counter China’s increasingly sophisticated ship-sinking capabilities remains an open question.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) has confirmed plans to establish a new F-35A Lightning II squadron at Chitose Air Base in Hokkaido, marking another major step in the country’s fleet modernization and regional defense expansion. The decision designates Chitose as the location of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s (JASDF) fifth F-35A unit, following squadrons already assigned at Misawa and Komatsu air bases.

According to the MoD, the Chitose squadron will transition from the long-serving F-15J/DJ Eagles to the 5th-generation F-35A, with the shift expected to begin in the early 2030s. The Ministry said the selection of Chitose came after a comprehensive review, citing adequate space for hangars and maintenance facilities, favorable training airspace, and efficient integration with other F-35A units already operating in northern Japan.

Japan plans to procure 147 F-35 aircraft—105 F-35As and 42 F-35Bs—making it the largest operator of the type outside the United States. Forty of these aircraft fall under the current five-year defense buildup plan covering FY 2023–2027. While the jets under FY 2023 and FY 2024 budgets will continue reinforcing the Misawa and Komatsu squadrons, the eight aircraft requested in the FY 2026 budget cycle are expected to be the first F-35As assigned to Chitose, with deliveries scheduled for FY 2030 onward.

A full squadron of around 20 aircraft will eventually be based at Chitose. The MoD noted that either the 201st or 203rd Tactical Fighter Squadron—both currently flying F-15J/DJs—will convert to the F-35A, while the other will continue operating the Eagle for the foreseeable future. Since the F-35A introduction will follow a one-to-one replacement model, the overall number of aircraft assigned to the base is expected to remain largely unchanged. Surveys and design work for base upgrades will begin in FY 2026, with no major personnel shifts anticipated.

The JASDF already operates three squadrons of F-35As. The 301st and 302nd Tactical Fighter Squadrons, both based at Misawa, transitioned from the aging F-4EJ Kai fleet between 2019 and 2020. The 303rd TFS at Komatsu began its transition from the F-15J/DJ this year and currently operates a mixed fleet as the process continues. The prioritization of these units reflects the MoD’s strategy of replacing older or less capable aircraft first. Misawa’s two squadrons previously flew the oldest F-4 variants, while the 303rd’s pre-MSIP F-15Js had fewer modern upgrades than F-15 units stationed at bases such as Naha.

Some of the Chitose-based Eagles also fall into the older, pre-MSIP category, reinforcing the logic behind the selection of the base for modernization.

Japan’s accelerating adoption of the F-35 comes amid a rapidly evolving regional security landscape. Neighboring countries—including China, Russia, and North Korea—have expanded and modernized their air forces with new-generation aircraft and more frequent patrols near Japanese airspace. Intercepts by the JASDF have risen sharply over the past decade, prompting calls for more advanced, networked, and survivable platforms.

Both the F-35A and the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B offer upgraded situational awareness, enhanced stealth, and superior interoperability compared to Japan’s older F-15J and F-2A/B fleets. Deliveries of the F-35B began in 2025, with aircraft temporarily stationed at Nyutabaru Air Base. The MoD plans to establish the first permanent F-35B unit as the 202nd Tactical Fighter Squadron.

Japan remains one of only three countries operating an F-35 Final Assembly and Check-Out (FACO) facility, located in Nagoya and run by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The plant assembles F-35As, conducts flight testing, and provides maintenance and overhaul support for the broader Asia-Pacific region, underscoring Japan’s strategic industrial role in the global F-35 program.

With the Chitose squadron now added to Japan’s modernization roadmap, the country’s transition toward a more advanced, distributed, and resilient air combat force appears firmly on track.

Japan has taken a major step toward fielding directed-energy weapons, moving ahead with sea-based trials of its new 100-kilowatt-class high-energy laser system installed aboard the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s (JMSDF) test vessel Asuka. The laser, developed by the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA), is now being prepared for maritime evaluation at Japan Marine United’s (JMU) shipyard.

The installation marks a milestone in Japan’s decade-long push to develop homegrown laser defense systems capable of countering fast, low-cost airborne threats. ATLA officials confirmed in a recent technical briefing that the weapon successfully destroyed mortar rounds and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) during ground testing earlier this year—performance results that paved the way for its integration onto a naval platform.

The new laser weapon, housed in two 40-foot, container-sized modules, features a domestically produced fiber-laser architecture. According to ATLA, ten 10kW-class fiber lasers are fused into a single beam exceeding 100kW, a power level considered critical for rapidly burning through hard targets such as metal casings or drone airframes.

The system’s compact footprint includes beam-control optics, a cooling system, and a dedicated power unit. JMU shipyard photos show the distinctive dome-shaped beam director mounted on Asuka’s aft deck, connected to fast-steering mirrors, thermal imaging cameras, and precision tracking sensors. This suite is designed to hold a stable lock on fast-moving airborne targets even under the ship’s constant motion at sea.

ATLA engineers say transitioning from earlier chemical-laser prototypes to fiber-laser technology allowed Japan to achieve safer operation, easier maintenance, and greater scalability. Japan first revealed its 100kW laser in February 2023, highlighting it as the culmination of multiple prototype generations, including earlier 50kW-class demonstrators.

One of the laser’s key operational advantages is its “unlimited magazine depth”—limited only by electrical power availability. With no conventional ammunition or interceptors consumed, ATLA stresses that the cost-per-engagement is dramatically lower than with conventional anti-drone or counter-mortar systems.

“Provided sufficient power, the system can continue to engage targets without running out of ammunition,” ATLA stated. Officials compared each firing to the cost of electricity usage, making the weapon particularly attractive for defeating swarming drone attacks or repeated low-cost projectile launches.

This cost-efficiency has become a global priority as militaries face growing volumes of inexpensive unmanned systems on the battlefield. Japan’s move follows parallel directed-energy weapons programs underway in the U.S., Israel, South Korea, and Europe.

The upcoming rounds of sea trials aboard Asuka will examine how well the laser performs against flying targets under real maritime conditions—factors such as atmospheric moisture, sea spray, ship roll, and thermal distortion can significantly impact laser propagation and accuracy.

Engineers will test the system’s ability to detect, lock onto, and destroy drones and similar threats at varying distances and altitudes while the ship is underway. These trials will help validate how effectively the weapon can function as part of a layered naval defense suite.

Japan plans to expand testing in 2026 to include interception of high-speed projectiles, further pushing the system toward counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) roles.

According to ATLA’s roadmap, the current test program is the foundation for long-term ambitions to integrate laser weapons into Japan’s future missile-defense architecture. However, officials caution that missile-defense applications remain several years away, requiring substantially higher power levels, advanced beam control, and sophisticated integration with naval combat systems.

For now, the focus remains on perfecting the laser’s near-term mission: neutralizing drones, UAV swarms, and mortar rounds—threats that are increasingly shaping modern conflict.

With Asuka preparing to leave the dock for its first live evaluations, Japan’s directed-energy program is entering its most critical stage yet, signaling the country’s intent to join the small but growing club of nations fielding operational high-energy laser weapons at sea.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has issued the most explicit warning yet from any Japanese leader regarding a potential Chinese assault on Taiwan, declaring that such an attack would directly threaten Japan’s national survival and could trigger Tokyo’s right to collective self-defense. Her comments have set off the most serious diplomatic confrontation between China and Japan since the 2012 Senkaku Islands crisis, sharply escalating tensions in East Asia.

Takaichi’s remarks, delivered during a parliamentary session earlier this month, revolved around a hypothetical Chinese naval blockade or full-scale invasion of Taiwan — scenarios she called a “survival-threatening situation.” The phrasing was deliberate: under Japan’s 2015 security legislation, a “survival-threatening situation” activates the country’s right to collective self-defense, meaning the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) could legally join military operations alongside allies, including the United States, to repel aggression.

Although Takaichi did not explicitly state that Japan would commit forces to fight China, the implication was unmistakable — and unprecedented.

Beijing reacted with fury, accusing Tokyo of making “reckless, dangerous and irresponsible statements.” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi issued a sharp rebuke on November 23, stating, “It is shocking that Japan’s current leaders have publicly sent the wrong signal of attempting military intervention in the Taiwan issue, said things they shouldn’t have said, and crossed a red line that should not have been touched.”

China, which considers self-ruled Taiwan a breakaway province, insists that any foreign military involvement in the Taiwan issue amounts to interference in its internal affairs. Beijing has vowed to achieve reunification — by force if necessary.

China escalated the diplomatic row by formally protesting at the United Nations. In a letter, China’s UN Ambassador Fu Cong warned that “if Japan dares to attempt an armed intervention in the cross-Strait situation, it would be an act of aggression. China will resolutely exercise its right of self-defense under the UN Charter and international law and firmly defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Tokyo has refused to retract or soften Takaichi’s comments. She has, however, declined to elaborate further on what specific Chinese actions would activate Japan’s collective-defense posture, maintaining strategic ambiguity.

In retaliation, China has announced the suspension of Japanese seafood imports — a move that Tokyo officials called “entirely political.” Beijing simultaneously stepped up military activities near Japanese territory. Chinese military drones flew near Yonaguni Island, Japan’s westernmost outpost located just 110 kilometers east of Taiwan, while Chinese Coast Guard vessels entered waters surrounding the contested Senkaku Islands over the weekend.

These actions, analysts say, represent China’s attempt to apply pressure while demonstrating its ability to challenge Japan’s territorial defenses.

The escalating crisis took a surprising turn on November 24 when Chinese President Xi Jinping placed a rare call to U.S. President Donald Trump, urging Washington to help “safeguard the post-WWII international order.” Notably, Xi did not directly mention Taiwan in China’s official readout, but the timing left little doubt as to the call’s context.

Takaichi also spoke with Trump within hours of Xi’s call. She later stated that she discussed relations with China but offered no details. Trump himself remained conspicuously silent on Taiwan; his Truth Social post after speaking with Xi did not address the Taiwan issue, fueling speculation that Washington is trying to preserve flexibility as tensions escalate between its two most powerful counterparts in Asia.

This ambiguity aligns with Trump’s previous remarks. During his meeting with Xi last month, he told reporters the issue of Taiwan “did not come up” — a statement widely interpreted as an effort to avoid locking the U.S. into firm public commitments while maintaining leverage.

Japan’s geographic proximity to Taiwan makes any cross-Strait conflict uniquely dangerous for Tokyo. Taiwan lies a mere 110 km from Yonaguni Island and just 170 km from the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands. A Chinese naval blockade, missile strike, or amphibious assault on Taiwan would bring PLA forces directly into Japan’s defense perimeter, and Japanese territory could easily come under accidental or deliberate fire.

Moreover, roughly 95% of Japan’s crude oil imports — lifeblood for the world’s third-largest economy — transit the waters between Taiwan and the Philippines. A Taiwan crisis could choke off these supply lines, inflicting immediate economic devastation.

For Japan, Taiwan’s fate is therefore inseparable from its own national security.

The strategic rationale is further reinforced by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Article V commits the United States to defend Japan if attacked, and in exchange, Washington maintains major military bases on Japanese soil. Any Chinese assault that endangered U.S. forces stationed in Japan — or targeted Japan’s southwest islands — would automatically draw the U.S. into combat, pulling Japan in with it.

Japan’s potential involvement in a Taiwan conflict has been extensively studied by military analysts. A landmark 2023 wargame conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), titled The First Battle of the Next War, simulated 24 scenarios involving a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 2026.

The results were grim: tens of thousands of casualties on all sides, the sinking of multiple U.S. aircraft carriers, and the near-destruction of China’s modernized PLA Navy. While the U.S. and its allies would likely prevail, the victory would be costly, and the regional balance of power would be shattered for years.

Crucially, the wargame highlighted Japan’s indispensable role:

Japanese bases — including Yokosuka, Kadena, and Misawa — were essential for U.S. strike operations.

Without access to these bases, U.S. response times would increase from hours to days, weakening Taiwan’s defense.

Chinese preemptive strikes on these bases were a central risk factor; in scenarios where Chinese missiles disabled Japanese installations, U.S. forces struggled significantly.

Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, although operating in a limited defensive capacity, performed critical tasks: air defense, anti-submarine warfare, maritime patrols, logistical support, and rear-area security. These contributions acted as a force multiplier for U.S. combat power.

CSIS concluded bluntly: “Japan is the linchpin. Without the use of bases in Japan, U.S. fighter/attack aircraft cannot effectively participate in the war.”

Takaichi’s new stance appears to align directly with these assessments, ending decades of Japanese ambiguity.

Japan has undergone a dramatic shift in defense policy since 2022, expanding military spending and acquiring long-range strike capabilities far beyond traditional “self-defense.” Tokyo is deploying anti-ship and surface-to-air missile batteries to islands close to Taiwan, including Yonaguni, Miyako, and Ishigaki. These assets are designed to counter Chinese aircraft, warships, and missiles — and they send a clear deterrent signal.

Japan’s modernization push:

Acquisition of Tomahawk cruise missiles

Development of domestic long-range missiles

Strengthening maritime surveillance in the East China Sea

Enhancing interoperability with U.S. forces

These moves underscore Tokyo’s belief that deterring China requires more than diplomacy; it requires credible defensive and offensive capabilities.

Prime Minister Takaichi’s statement marks a historic break from Japan’s postwar pacifist tradition. By explicitly linking Taiwan’s security to Japan’s survival, she has drawn a bright red line — one that Beijing sees as a direct challenge.

China’s economic retaliation, military maneuvers, and diplomatic mobilization indicate that the confrontation is far from over. Meanwhile, Washington’s silence adds a layer of uncertainty as the geopolitical triangle becomes increasingly volatile.

For now, East Asia stands at a precarious moment. Japan’s new clarity, China’s escalating pressure, and America’s strategic ambiguity are converging in a way that could define the region’s security landscape for years to come.