While leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) gathered in France last week to discuss the future of the global economy and security, a parallel diplomatic event unfolded thousands of kilometers away in the Russian city of Kazan. There, Russia hosted ASEAN leaders for a summit that carried significance far beyond bilateral cooperation. The meeting offered a glimpse into Moscow’s evolving vision of a post-Western international order and highlighted an emerging geopolitical competition not between ideological camps, but between rival regional architectures.

The timing was striking. As Western leaders sought to reinforce their collective influence through the G7 framework, Russian President Vladimir Putin used the Russia-ASEAN Summit to project a different image of global politics—one centered on Eurasian integration, multipolarity, and the creation of alternative networks of trade, connectivity, and governance.

For Putin, the summit was particularly important. Since the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict in 2022, Western governments have attempted to diplomatically and economically isolate Russia through sanctions and political pressure. By hosting ASEAN leaders in Kazan simultaneously with the G7 summit, Moscow sought to demonstrate that Russia remains an active and influential player on the international stage. The participation of multiple Southeast Asian leaders underscored a reality often overlooked in Western capitals: much of Asia continues to engage with Russia despite geopolitical tensions and sanctions.

The summit also reflected the growing importance of ASEAN in Russia’s foreign policy strategy. Since 2022, Moscow has accelerated its much-discussed “pivot to Asia,” searching for new markets, investment opportunities, and diplomatic partnerships outside the Western system. Southeast Asia, with its rapidly expanding economies and strategic location, has become a critical component of that effort.

This shift was institutionalized through the adoption of the Comprehensive Plan of Action for implementing the Russia-ASEAN Strategic Partnership for 2026–2030. The agreement outlines cooperation across a wide range of sectors, including trade, investment, transport, technology, energy, and security. While such declarations often receive limited attention, they provide the practical framework through which long-term regional relationships are developed.

Energy cooperation emerged as one of the summit’s most important outcomes. A joint statement formalized collaboration in oil and gas development, renewable energy projects, hydrogen technologies, and broader energy security initiatives. For Russia, which is seeking to redirect exports and investment flows away from Europe, ASEAN represents an increasingly attractive market for energy resources and technological partnerships.

Yet the summit’s significance extended far beyond economics. The declaration’s repeated emphasis on multipolarity provided Russia with an opportunity to advance one of the central themes of its contemporary foreign policy. Moscow argues that global power should be distributed among multiple centers rather than concentrated within a Western-led system. This concept has become a recurring feature of Russian diplomacy, particularly as relations with Europe and the United States have deteriorated.

The most consequential element of the summit, however, was its endorsement of closer cooperation between ASEAN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Putin framed this initiative within the broader concept of a “Greater Eurasian Partnership” (GEP), a long-standing Russian proposal aimed at linking various regional institutions into a comprehensive continental framework.

The idea is not new. Russia has promoted versions of the Greater Eurasian Partnership for years, even before the Ukraine conflict dramatically altered its relationship with the West. At its core, the concept seeks to connect Russia, Central Asia, China, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and potentially parts of the Middle East through integrated networks of trade, infrastructure, finance, energy cooperation, and security coordination.

The logic behind the project is fundamentally geographic rather than ideological. Unlike Cold War alliances, which were often organized around competing political systems, the Greater Eurasian Partnership is based on connectivity and economic interdependence. Geography, logistics, transportation corridors, and supply chains are viewed as the foundations of influence.

For Russia, this strategy addresses a profound geopolitical challenge. Historically, Russian power rested partly on its ability to operate simultaneously in Europe and Asia. The breakdown of relations with the West has significantly weakened one half of that equation. As a result, Moscow has increasingly concentrated its strategic attention on Eurasia, viewing the continent as its primary sphere for future influence and growth.

Within this vision, the EAEU, the SCO, and ASEAN each serve distinct functions. The Eurasian Economic Union acts as the economic integration mechanism. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization provides a framework for security cooperation and strategic coordination. ASEAN, meanwhile, serves as the region’s economic growth engine and a bridge connecting Eurasia to the broader Indo-Pacific.

One particularly noteworthy aspect of Putin’s presentation was what he did not emphasize. While discussing the future partnership between ASEAN, the SCO, and the EAEU, the Russian leader made little reference to BRICS, despite Moscow’s active role within that grouping.

The omission appears deliberate. Russia increasingly views BRICS as a broad political coalition rather than a practical mechanism for regional integration. As BRICS expands and becomes more geographically dispersed, its members possess widely differing priorities and economic interests. Countries such as Brazil and South Africa, while important participants in Global South diplomacy, have limited relevance to Eurasian trade corridors, transportation networks, or continental integration projects.

From Moscow’s perspective, discussions about logistics, connectivity, and regional economic architecture naturally revolve around institutions embedded within Eurasia itself. In that context, the SCO and EAEU possess greater operational utility than BRICS.

There may also be a subtle strategic calculation regarding China. BRICS has become increasingly associated with China’s economic influence and global reach. The SCO, by contrast, is often viewed as a joint Russia-China institution, while the EAEU remains a distinctly Russian-led project. By highlighting these organizations, Moscow signals its intention to maintain an independent role within the emerging Eurasian order rather than simply operating within frameworks dominated by Beijing.

The Kazan summit therefore sheds light on a broader debate about the nature of the post-Western world. Two competing narratives currently shape discussions about global transformation. The first focuses on the rise of the Global South and institutions such as BRICS, emphasizing reforms to global governance and greater representation for developing countries. The second centers on the concept of Greater Eurasia, which seeks to build a geographically integrated super-region stretching from Eastern Europe to the Pacific.

Recent developments suggest that Russia is increasingly prioritizing the latter approach. Rather than relying primarily on expansive political coalitions, Moscow appears focused on creating tangible networks of infrastructure, trade, and connectivity that bind together the Eurasian continent.

This shift carries significant implications for India. Although New Delhi remains a member of both BRICS and the SCO, its position within Russia’s evolving Eurasian strategy is increasingly complex. Historically, India has valued BRICS because it provides a platform where it engages with Russia and China on relatively equal terms. However, the Greater Eurasian Partnership is centered on physical integration across the Eurasian landmass, an area where India faces structural limitations.

India is not a member of the EAEU, and its engagement within the SCO remains constrained by broader regional dynamics. Moreover, its long-standing tensions with Pakistan complicate access to key overland transportation routes connecting South Asia with Central Asia and beyond. These realities limit New Delhi’s ability to participate fully in the continental connectivity projects envisioned by Moscow.

As Russia deepens economic engagement with ASEAN while simultaneously strengthening ties with China and maintaining cooperation with Pakistan, India may find that its traditionally privileged position in Russian strategic thinking becomes less central than it once was.

This does not mean Russia and India are moving toward estrangement. The relationship remains important for both sides. However, it does suggest that Moscow’s strategic priorities are evolving in response to changing geopolitical realities.

For India, the key question is whether the Greater Eurasian Partnership will develop into a substantive economic and strategic framework or remain largely a diplomatic concept. If the project gains momentum and produces meaningful integration across Eurasia, New Delhi could face a major foreign policy decision during the next decade: whether to seek deeper engagement with an SCO-EAEU-centered continental order or continue emphasizing maritime strategies linked to the Indo-Pacific and initiatives such as the Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor.

The implications extend beyond India alone. ASEAN’s growing role within Russia’s Eurasian vision places Southeast Asia at the center of competing models for organizing the international system. The region increasingly represents the intersection between two powerful geopolitical concepts: the Indo-Pacific framework championed by many Western and regional partners, and the Eurasian integration model promoted by Russia and, to varying degrees, China.

As these competing visions evolve, Southeast Asia is likely to become one of the most strategically significant regions of the coming decades. The contest may not be defined primarily by military rivalry or ideological confrontation. Instead, it will revolve around infrastructure, trade corridors, supply chains, digital networks, energy partnerships, and institutional influence.

In that emerging landscape, ASEAN is no longer merely a regional organization. It is becoming a pivotal crossroads where competing visions of world order converge. For countries across Asia, including India, engagement with Southeast Asia will increasingly shape their ability to influence the future balance of power.

The events in Kazan suggest that the next phase of global competition may not be fought between rival ideological blocs, but between competing regional architectures. If Russia succeeds in linking ASEAN, the SCO, and the EAEU into a coherent continental network, the Greater Eurasian Partnership could emerge as one of the defining geopolitical projects of the twenty-first century. In such a scenario, BRICS may remain an important political symbol, but Eurasia itself could become the arena where power, trade, and connectivity are ultimately organized.

The extraordinary virtual summit of BRICS, convened on 8 September 2025 under Brazil’s rotating presidency, offered both a reaffirmation of the bloc’s multipolar ambitions and a sobering reminder of its enduring internal asymmetries. While the grouping — now enlarged and increasingly diverse — continues to project itself as a vanguard of a fairer, multipolar world order, its ability to deliver tangible outcomes remains constrained by diverging strategies, competing political systems, and uneven economic power among its members.

From its early days as BRIC — an acronym coined in 2001 for Brazil, Russia, India, and China — to its present form encompassing South Africa, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia, BRICS has come to represent 55 per cent of the global population and over a quarter of global GDP. It is widely viewed as the primary geopolitical counterweight to the G7, advocating for an alternative to the Western-led order. Yet, as the 8 September virtual summit revealed, BRICS’ internal complexities may hinder its capacity to move from symbolism to substance.

The Rio de Janeiro–hosted summit was billed as “extraordinary,” convened to address the challenges facing the emerging multipolar order and to craft a unified response to renewed U.S. tariffs and trade restrictions. In tone and ambition, the summit sought to underscore BRICS’ collective vision of a more inclusive world order. But in practice, it reflected widening differences over how such an order should be achieved.

China and Russia, facing international isolation and economic pressure from the West, continue to see BRICS as a strategic platform to counterbalance U.S. dominance. Their shared vision is one of systemic contestation — building parallel financial and governance institutions to challenge Western hegemony. Brazil and India, by contrast, adopt non-aligned and cautious approaches, focusing on reforming existing multilateral structures rather than replacing them outright.

“BRICS is at a crossroads,” noted an analyst from the Brazilian Center for International Relations. “It wants to lead the new multipolar order, but its members disagree on what that order should look like.”

Since its founding, BRICS has been marked by power asymmetries — both economic and political. China’s GDP is larger than those of all other members combined, and its global infrastructure push under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) grants it substantial influence. This imbalance was evident during the summit, where Chinese President Xi Jinping outlined a sweeping vision structured around three pillars: multilateralism, openness through inclusive globalisation, and solidarity through cooperation in trade, finance, and technology.

Xi framed BRICS as a “bulwark against hegemonism,” implicitly positioning China as the leader of a new global South movement. Beijing also reaffirmed its commitment to expand the New Development Bank (NDB) and accelerate work on alternative payment systems, especially after Russia’s exclusion from SWIFT in 2022.

Russia, meanwhile, used the summit to advocate for deeper intra-BRICS trade and investment ties, particularly in energy and technology. Yet Moscow’s partial release of President Vladimir Putin’s remarks — reportedly omitting references to Ukraine — hinted at diplomatic caution amid Western scrutiny.

India’s participation stood out for its restraint. Represented by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar rather than Prime Minister Narendra Modi, New Delhi’s delegation emphasised rules-based multilateralism, fair supply chains, and climate action. India refrained from endorsing more radical ideas — such as aggressive de-dollarisation or a BRICS common currency — which could antagonise the United States, a key strategic partner.

“India values BRICS as a forum for South-South cooperation,” Jaishankar stated, “but multipolarity must not mean the replacement of one dominance with another.” His remarks subtly underscored India’s discomfort with China’s growing preponderance in the grouping.

The bloc’s recent expansion — adding the UAE, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia — has both amplified its global profile and intensified its internal contradictions. Iran, aligning closely with Russia and China, pressed during the summit for the introduction of a common BRICS currency to rival the U.S. dollar. In contrast, the UAE and Indonesia, whose economies are deeply integrated with Western markets, displayed reluctance toward any policy that might threaten their financial stability or relations with Washington.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi openly challenged the bloc’s endorsement of a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine, calling it “unrealistic” and urging an “inclusive one-state model.” His intervention highlighted the ideological fissures within the enlarged grouping — between democratic and authoritarian members, and between pragmatic and ideological foreign policies.

The inclusion of non-democratic states has also reignited debates about the bloc’s identity and credibility. Some members, particularly Brazil and India, worry that admitting states with authoritarian systems could undermine BRICS’ legitimacy as a voice of the Global South.

“The challenge is not expansion itself,” said a South African diplomat familiar with the discussions. “It’s whether BRICS can speak with one voice when its members view democracy, development, and sovereignty in fundamentally different ways.”

Despite these tensions, the bloc retains some pragmatic cohesion. India and China — despite their border disputes and strategic rivalry — have maintained limited cooperation within BRICS, including reciprocal support for each other’s upcoming summits. Russia and India’s engagement also serves as a counterbalance to a fully China-dominated grouping, giving BRICS a semblance of multipolar equilibrium.

Russia’s economic dependence on China has grown since Western sanctions took hold, yet Moscow continues to project independence through multi-platform diplomacy, including its outreach to Africa and Latin America. Brazil, under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has sought to restore its leadership credentials by championing South-South cooperation and resisting binary alignments.

India, meanwhile, has leveraged the forum to advocate for secure critical mineral supply chains, indirectly pointing to China’s dominance in rare earths processing. The proposal reflects New Delhi’s attempt to recast BRICS as a forum for practical economic cooperation, not just geopolitical posturing.

Among BRICS’ tangible achievements, the New Development Bank (NDB) remains the most significant. Established in 2014 to finance infrastructure and sustainable development projects, the NDB has approved more than US$35 billion in loans. Yet questions persist over its operational autonomy and the disproportionate influence of Chinese capital.

Efforts to establish alternative financial mechanisms — such as the BRICS Pay system and proposed cross-border digital currency frameworks — continue, but progress has been uneven. Brazil and India favour gradual reform within existing global systems, while Russia and China push for more radical detachment from Western institutions.

Beyond institutional reform, BRICS has become a political symbol for many developing countries seeking greater representation. Its emphasis on equitable global governance, trade inclusivity, and climate justice resonates with states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America frustrated with Western-dominated financial systems.

However, the bloc’s effectiveness as a collective negotiating platform remains uncertain. While it champions “Global South solidarity,” its members’ trade patterns and investment flows remain heavily dependent on Western markets and technologies. This dependence limits the bloc’s ability to act independently in the global economic arena.

Still, there have been modest diplomatic dividends. The Iran–UAE bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the 2024 summit marked a rare thaw in regional tensions, illustrating BRICS’ potential as a mediating platform for intra-South disputes.

As the extraordinary virtual summit concluded, leaders reaffirmed their shared vision of multilateralism, free trade, and inclusivity. Yet the fundamental question persists: can BRICS convert its rhetoric of multipolarity into real influence?

When Donald Trump returned to the White House in January 2025, few doubted he would double down on his trademark trade wars. What few predicted was that his sweeping tariffs would reshape the geopolitics of the world’s largest emerging economies, inadvertently breathing new life into a bloc that had long struggled to define itself: BRICS.

The group—originally Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—has grown to include new members like Egypt, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Ethiopia. Long seen as more symbolic than strategic, BRICS had been plagued by internal divisions, diverging interests, and uneven development paths.

But Trump’s tariff barrage has changed the equation. By imposing some of the steepest penalties on BRICS members—far higher than those levied against traditional U.S. allies—the U.S. president has given the loose coalition something it rarely had before: a common grievance.

Trump’s tariff agenda is sweeping. China, his favorite target, faces the most punishing blow: up to 145% tariffs if no deal is reached. Brazil and India have each been hit with 50% duties, with India’s rate partly linked to its continued imports of discounted Russian oil. South Africa faces a 30% levy, while Egypt and other newer BRICS members are bracing for hikes of their own.

Trump justifies the measures as part of his pledge to punish “anti-American policies.” In stump speeches and tweets, he has branded BRICS as a “dead project” and dismissed its ambitions as little more than “China’s power grab.” Yet the numbers tell a different story.

Ajay Srivastava, a former Indian trade official, sees the tariffs as counterproductive. “These penalties don’t intimidate BRICS,” he told DW. “They create a shared incentive to reduce reliance on the U.S., even if agendas differ. In many ways, Washington is doing BRICS’ job for them.”

The most immediate response to Trump’s tariffs has been financial. BRICS nations, already wary of dollar dependency after years of U.S. sanctions on Russia and Iran, have accelerated moves to trade in local currencies. Central banks from Moscow to Pretoria have stepped up gold purchases, signaling intent to diversify reserves.

Russia and China lead the charge. Over 90% of bilateral trade between the two now takes place in yuan and rubles. Brazil and China are piloting yuan-based settlement systems. Even India—traditionally cautious about de-dollarization—is exploring rupee-based mechanisms with Russia and China.

“Trump says BRICS is dead,” noted Max Boot, a foreign policy analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations, in a recent Washington Post op-ed. “But by pushing allies and rivals alike into the same corner, he is committing strategic malpractice. He is diminishing U.S. power by perversely uniting countries that have little in common besides opposition to Washington’s heavy hand.”

These dynamics will be on display at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, northern China, where leaders from BRICS and beyond are gathering this week. President Xi Jinping will host Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin—the first time the three will meet in this format since 2019.

The Kremlin has lobbied hard for trilateral talks among China, India, and Russia. The aim is not only to bolster BRICS’ credibility but also to bridge long-standing rifts, particularly between New Delhi and Beijing. “We want to strengthen the core of BRICS,” a Russian diplomat told Izvestia. “That means putting aside old disputes and showing unity in the face of U.S. pressure.”

For India, Trump’s tariffs are a game-changer. New Delhi has reopened direct flights with China, eased visa restrictions, and expanded trade discussions. During Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent visit to Delhi, Beijing pledged to boost rare earth supplies—minerals India desperately needs for its green energy transition and defense industry.

This outreach is striking given that India and China nearly went to war in 2020 over their disputed Himalayan border.

Skepticism remains. India distrusts Beijing’s strategic ambitions, not least its deep ties with Pakistan and its massive infrastructure projects across Asia. Shilan Shah, an economist at Capital Economics, argues that India is unlikely to fully embrace China. “Cheap Chinese imports are already undermining India’s efforts to build domestic industry,” Shah noted. “That creates political headaches for Modi, who must balance anti-China sentiment at home with pragmatic cooperation abroad.”

India’s reliance on the U.S. market complicates matters further. In 2024, India exported $77.5 billion to the U.S.—nearly three times its trade with China. Washington is also a crucial technology partner for India’s IT and defense sectors.

Still, Trump’s tariffs make cooperation with BRICS attractive, at least on specific issues like currency settlement, gold purchases, and energy supplies. As Srivastava put it, “BRICS isn’t about perfect unity—it’s about pragmatic deals that chip away at U.S. leverage.”

Brazil, meanwhile, is strengthening ties with China, which already absorbs 26% of Brazilian exports—twice the share of the U.S. In a recent phone call, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Xi Jinping pledged to deepen agricultural trade and cooperate on renewable energy.

For Lula, BRICS offers a platform to assert independence from Washington without fully alienating it. Brazil continues to rely on U.S. financial markets, but Trump’s tariffs have pushed Brasília to hedge its bets.

South Africa, too, shows little inclination to bow to U.S. pressure. Sanusha Naidu, a senior researcher at the Institute for Global Dialogue, says Pretoria views BRICS as central to its long-term strategy. “South Africa isn’t going to reverse its BRICS commitments,” Naidu explained. “It sees value in global governance reform, academic exchanges, and building south-south cooperation. Tariffs won’t change that.”

Yet beneath the new momentum lie contradictions. BRICS has expanded to 10 members, but the larger it grows, the harder it is to reconcile diverging national interests. Saudi Arabia’s hesitation to formalize membership reflects these tensions.

Critics warn that BRICS is becoming more authoritarian as it expands. The original mission—creating a voice for emerging economies in global governance—now risks being overshadowed by an anti-Western posture driven by Moscow and Beijing.

Even so, trade within BRICS is rising. Research by Boston Consulting Group shows intra-BRICS trade growing faster than BRICS-G7 trade, though hydrocarbons dominate. Ironically, the bloc imposes more barriers on each other than Western countries do among themselves. Still, momentum is shifting.

Signs of deeper cooperation include rollback of anti-dumping duties, proposals for a BRICS-wide free trade agreement, and coordinated calls for reform of the World Trade Organization.

Mihaela Papa of Tufts University predicts greater political backing for intra-BRICS trade campaigns. “We can expect ‘Buy BRICS’ initiatives, new projects like the BRICS grain exchange, and expanded local currency settlement mechanisms,” she said.

A Russian-backed idea of a single BRICS currency remains shelved, but alternative systems are proliferating. As Srivastava puts it: “The dollar will remain dominant, but yuan, rupee, and ruble settlement systems will steadily chip away at its monopoly. Trump’s tariffs accelerate this process.”

The question looming over Tianjin is whether Trump has forged, however inadvertently, a tighter alliance among America’s biggest rivals.

What was once a fractured coalition of states—often more at odds with each other than with Washington—now finds itself united by necessity. The tariffs may not resolve Sino-Indian border disputes or erase ideological rifts, but they have created incentives for cooperation that did not exist before.

That’s why analysts like Boot argue that Trump is undermining U.S. strategy. “The genius of U.S. foreign policy since World War II has been to prevent hostile powers from coalescing,” he wrote. “By punishing countries that were once friendly or neutral, Trump is reversing that logic. He is driving them together.”

Trump promised his second term would be about “America First.” But in targeting BRICS with some of the highest tariffs in modern history, he may be writing a different story: one of America’s rivals finding common cause.

For now, BRICS remains messy, contradictory, and divided. But thanks to Trump’s heavy hand, it is also more energized than at any point in the past decade.

The bloc may not be poised to replace the U.S.-led order, but it no longer looks dead. Instead, it looks like a work in progress—one accelerated not by Beijing, Moscow, or Brasília, but by Washington.

And as leaders gather in Tianjin, the irony is impossible to miss: Donald Trump, self-styled enemy of BRICS, may yet prove to be its unlikely benefactor.

U.S. President Donald Trump on Thursday issued a stark warning to BRICS member states, threatening to impose 100% tariffs on their exports to the United States. The threat came in response to ongoing discussions among BRICS nations about establishing a new reserve currency to challenge the dominance of the U.S. dollar.

Speaking through his Truth Social platform, Trump reiterated his hardline stance on maintaining the U.S. dollar’s supremacy in global trade.

“We are going to require a commitment from these seemingly hostile countries that they will neither create a new BRICS currency, nor back any other currency to replace the mighty U.S. dollar, or they will face 100% tariffs,” Trump posted.

“There is no chance that BRICS will replace the U.S. dollar in international trade, or anywhere else, and any country that tries should say hello to tariffs, and goodbye to America!”

This latest statement marks a continuation of Trump’s aggressive rhetoric on the matter, following similar comments made shortly after his victory in the November 2024 presidential elections. His administration has repeatedly signaled a hardline approach to economic issues, particularly concerning threats to the global financial influence of the United States.

Trump’s threat underscores the administration’s unease with the growing influence of BRICS, an economic bloc consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The group, which recently expanded to include Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Iran, and Indonesia, represents nearly half of the world’s population and a significant portion of the global economy.

BRICS’ Push for a New Reserve Currency

Initially formed in 2009 as a counterweight to Western economic dominance, BRICS has long discussed the possibility of introducing an alternative reserve currency. While these discussions have remained largely theoretical in the past, the imposition of Western sanctions on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine has accelerated the bloc’s interest in reducing dependence on the U.S. dollar.

China and Russia, in particular, have been vocal advocates for creating a BRICS-backed currency to facilitate international trade without relying on the dollar. This ambition has gained traction among other BRICS members as a way to mitigate the risks associated with U.S. economic influence.

Economists have noted that a shift away from the dollar, while challenging and unlikely in the short term, could have long-term implications for U.S. global financial dominance.

Despite BRICS’ intentions, the U.S. dollar remains the world’s primary reserve currency, with most international transactions conducted in dollars. Its role as a trusted store of value, coupled with the vast liquidity of U.S. financial markets, has made it indispensable for global trade and investment.

Trump’s latest threats are seen as a preemptive strike to protect this status.

The prospect of 100% tariffs on BRICS exports has sparked concerns among global trade experts. Such a move could lead to significant disruptions in international trade, escalate tensions between the U.S. and key emerging economies, and contribute to inflationary pressures.

BRICS nations collectively account for a significant share of global exports, particularly in commodities such as oil, agricultural products, and industrial goods. Imposing steep tariffs on these goods could have far-reaching consequences for both the U.S. and global markets.

North American Trade Partners Also Targeted

In a separate but related announcement, Trump revealed that his administration would impose 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico starting Saturday. However, he indicated that he was still deliberating whether to include oil imports from the two countries.

“We may or may not [include oil],” Trump told reporters during a press briefing at the Oval Office on Thursday.

The decision, he explained, hinges on whether oil prices charged by Washington’s two North American trade partners are deemed “fair.” Trump also cited concerns about illegal immigration and the smuggling of chemicals used to manufacture fentanyl as factors influencing the decision.

The fentanyl epidemic has become a central issue for the Trump administration. Synthetic opioids, including fentanyl, have been responsible for tens of thousands of deaths in the U.S. in recent years. Trump has frequently blamed Mexico and, to a lesser extent, Canada for failing to prevent the smuggling of precursor chemicals used to produce the deadly drug.

“We have to stop the poison pouring into our country. These tariffs are about fairness — on trade, and on stopping the flood of death caused by fentanyl,” Trump declared.

Analysts warn that the imposition of tariffs on BRICS nations, Canada, and Mexico could trigger retaliatory measures, leading to a full-scale trade war. This would likely disrupt supply chains, increase costs for American consumers, and strain diplomatic relations.

“If President Trump follows through on these threats, we could see a significant realignment of global trade relationships,” said Dr. Maria Santos, an international trade expert at Georgetown University. “Countries affected by these tariffs may seek to deepen their ties with each other, further accelerating the push away from the dollar.”

So far, BRICS leaders have not issued an official response to Trump’s threats. However, sources within the bloc indicate that discussions about a new reserve currency are likely to continue, regardless of U.S. pressure.

India’s Finance Minister, Priya Mehta, recently stated that the group remains committed to exploring alternatives to the dollar to foster greater economic independence.

“Our goal is not to antagonize anyone, but to strengthen our collective economic resilience,” Mehta said at a recent BRICS summit.

As the geopolitical landscape continues to shift, Trump’s latest threats underscore the high stakes involved in maintaining U.S. economic dominance. The confrontation between the U.S. and BRICS nations over currency and trade policy is poised to become one of the defining issues of Trump’s new term in office.

Whether Trump’s tariff threats will deter BRICS from pursuing an alternative reserve currency remains to be seen. One thing, however, is clear: the global economic order is entering a period of profound uncertainty and transformation.

Turkey has increasingly charted a unique path in international relations, often choosing to march to the beat of its own drum. This was evident during the United Nations vote on December 14, 2022, when the General Assembly passed a resolution supporting a New International Economic Order. While 123 member states, primarily from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, voted in favor and 50 countries opposed it, Turkey abstained—highlighting its foreign policy’s distinct position, straddling various global divides.

Fast forward to September 2024, Turkey surprised many by announcing its application to join BRICS Plus, marking a significant moment in its diplomatic strategy. This move, by a NATO member, to seek membership in a group historically perceived as a challenger to Western dominance underscores a deeper shift in Turkey’s foreign policy objectives and alliances. BRICS, originally composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, is seen as a counterweight to the Western-led global order, making Turkey’s interest in the group a topic of major geopolitical interest.

Turkey’s Unique Position: Between East and West

Turkey’s geographical position has always placed it at a crossroads, both physically and diplomatically. It is a country that straddles two continents—Europe and Asia—giving it a strategic advantage in international politics. However, its foreign policy has often reflected this balancing act, as seen in its membership in NATO and its historical desire to join the European Union (EU). Yet, the September 2024 application to BRICS Plus signals that Ankara might be reconsidering how it wants to pursue its foreign policy goals—potentially moving away from reliance on Western institutions.

Turkey’s application to BRICS Plus is remarkable for several reasons. NATO, long regarded as the cornerstone of the Western military alliance, is fundamentally at odds with the core principles that BRICS embodies. BRICS, formed in 2006, has aimed to represent the interests of emerging economies, challenging the established global governance mechanisms dominated by the West. The organization’s chairmanship by Russia in 2024, a country currently embroiled in a war with Ukraine and under extensive NATO sanctions, further complicates the situation.

Despite these complications, Turkey’s decision to pursue membership in BRICS Plus speaks volumes about its dissatisfaction with the West. As Turkey’s foreign policy becomes more independent, it signals its desire to align with new global powers and rising economies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which offer different economic and diplomatic opportunities.

Turkey’s interest in BRICS is not a sudden development. As early as 2018, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan attended that year’s BRICS summit and expressed openness to the idea of joining the group. While it took several years for Turkey to formalize its interest, the geopolitical context in 2024 made the timing apt.

Turkey’s foreign policy under Erdogan has been characterized by a desire to elevate the country to middle-power status. It has often sought to balance its relationships between the East and West, yet its frustrations with the limitations imposed by Western institutions have grown increasingly apparent. Turkey’s efforts to join the European Union, for instance, have been long and fraught with challenges. Despite numerous trade agreements and military cooperation through NATO, the EU has consistently blocked Turkey’s full membership. In part, this reflects the broader hesitancy within Europe toward accepting a nonwhite, Muslim-majority nation into its ranks, especially in a political climate increasingly defined by far-right populism.

With over 85 million people, Turkey would surpass Germany as the EU’s most populous country if it ever gained membership. This would make Turkey a key player in European governance, granting it significant influence in bodies like the European Commission and the European Parliament. However, amid rising anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe, along with a perceived cultural clash between a largely Muslim country and a traditionally “white and Christian” Europe, Turkey’s prospects for EU membership seem dimmer than ever.

Frustrations with Western Dominance

Beyond its struggles with the EU, Turkey has also clashed with other Western powers, particularly the United States. Relations between Ankara and Washington have been rocky in recent years, particularly in the context of defense procurement. A notable point of contention came in 2019 when Turkey acquired the Russian S-400 missile defense system, a move that angered NATO allies and led the U.S. to block Turkey from obtaining F-35 fighter jets. This dispute underlined Turkey’s frustration with its position in the broader Western-dominated global order.

Turkey has long felt constrained by the political, economic, and military limitations imposed by its relationships with Western countries. The Erdogan government has voiced grievances about being denied a more prominent role in international affairs, often pointing to the structure of the United Nations Security Council, where five veto-wielding members—the United States, United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia—hold disproportionate power. Erdogan has repeatedly called for reforms to this system, arguing that it no longer reflects the geopolitical realities of the 21st century.

Despite these grievances, Turkey continues to maintain its ties with the West. It remains a key member of NATO, and much of its trade continues to flow through European markets, which remain its main export destinations. However, Ankara seems keenly aware that the world is moving in a different direction—one that is increasingly centered on the East, with Asia emerging as the new economic and diplomatic powerhouse.

Turkey’s application to join BRICS Plus aligns with this changing world order. As Erdogan himself noted in September 2024, Turkey’s future lies in fostering relationships with both the East and the West. Joining BRICS would give Turkey a new platform to achieve this, allowing it to strengthen its economic and diplomatic ties with some of the world’s most influential emerging economies.

BRICS has evolved significantly since its founding in 2006. What began as a loose coalition of four countries—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—expanded to include South Africa in 2010, and by 2024, it has become a formidable international grouping. Now known as BRICS Plus, the group welcomed Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates in 2024, while Saudi Arabia continues to deliberate on an invitation it received in 2023. With a membership that represents nearly half of the world’s population and a significant share of global GDP and trade, BRICS has established itself as a serious player on the world stage.

BRICS economies complement Turkey’s in several ways. Russia, for example, is Turkey’s largest supplier of natural gas, providing about half of the country’s total imports. China’s Belt and Road Initiative also positions Turkey as a critical hub for connecting East Asia with Europe, a role that would likely expand should Turkey join BRICS Plus.

Furthermore, BRICS membership would provide Turkey with a larger diplomatic platform to air its grievances with the West and push for reforms to the global governance structure. Ankara, like many other countries in the Global South, feels it has been marginalized by Western powers and sees BRICS as an opportunity to shape a more equitable world order.

The move by Turkey to join BRICS Plus could well be a turning point in global politics. Singaporean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani once argued that the “Asian century” began on March 13, 2015, when the U.K. applied to join the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank—defying U.S. objections. By the same logic, Turkey’s application to BRICS could be seen as a signal of a larger shift toward a multipolar world, where Western dominance is no longer a given.

While Turkey remains committed to NATO and maintains its trade relationships with Europe, its decision to pursue BRICS membership suggests a growing recognition that the future lies in cultivating new alliances across the globe. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected and less centered on the West, Turkey stands to play a pivotal role in shaping the new international order. Whether its BRICS membership will be accepted remains to be seen, but one thing is clear: Turkey is no longer content to remain within the confines of the Western-dominated global system.