Arab News | The policeman of the two straits?

Observers might get the impression that the memorandum of understanding signed by the US and Iran in June was actually closer to a memorandum of misunderstanding. The US wanted more from the war than what the memorandum provides, while Iran wanted something completely different. Donald Trump stresses that the war prevented Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, though he certainly knows that the nuclear issue is not the entire problem. While the war did halt Iran’s nuclear project — at least for the time being — it did not stop Iran’s regional agenda.

It is clear that Iran deliberately kept the issue open, hoping it would impact the results of the US midterm elections. The timing of the Houthi push toward the Bab Al-Mandab Strait reinforces this belief. Tehran concluded that Washington does not want an open war, nor does it want to turn the conflict into a battle to overthrow the Iranian regime and that the Trump administration would settle for a deal it could market as a victory.

To understand what is unfolding in the Middle East, one must look at its two most prominent files: energy security and Israel’s security. Diplomats frequently repeat the premise that energy security underpins the stability and prosperity of the global economy, while Israel’s security tests American leadership and the steadfastness of its commitments to Tel Aviv.

A belief has long prevailed in the region that the US acts as the international policeman, preventing any disruption to both energy security and Israel’s safety. Reliance on this policeman grew even further after the Soviet Union collapsed. Among diplomats, some believed that even as the US signals a pivot away from the Middle East to focus on containing the rise of China, it cannot truly abandon its responsibilities in this region due to the dual imperatives of energy security and Israel’s security.

To understand what is unfolding, one must look at the region’s two most prominent files: energy security and Israel’s security

Ghassan Charbel

Since its inception in 1979, the Iranian revolution has made no secret of its hostility toward the “Great Satan” and, along with it, the “cancerous tumor.” Iranian officials have not hesitated to clarify that the objective is to expel the US from the region and bring about Israel’s demise. Iran considers American influence an obstacle to its regional ambitions and views the strength of the Israeli arsenal in the exact same light.

From the very first moment, Iran recognized the danger of a direct confrontation with the US and Israel. It chose instead to begin draining both parties through proxies. The bombings of the US Marine barracks and the US Embassy in Beirut marked the beginning of a war of attrition against Washington’s authority, standing and image. The kidnapping of American and Western hostages in Lebanon followed the same pattern.

However, the most significant step was the creation of “small armies” hostile to Israel and the US, with Tehran controlling their supply of weapons, funding and command. Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the Iranian agenda expanded and its pace accelerated. Through tunnels, missiles and drones, Iran established positions for its allies that overlooked Israel’s security, while building a network of allies in Iraq and Yemen that overlooked energy security.

It is no exaggeration to say that Iran benefited greatly from the American blunders in managing Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam. While Tehran allowed its allies to occupy seats within the political system formed by the Americans, Qassem Soleimani was building the networks that would plant explosive devices and spill the blood of American soldiers. During that period, Iraqi officials were informed by the Iranians that “geography remains fixed after the transient visitors leave.” And that is exactly what happened.

The launching of drones from Iraqi territory to target a Saudi oil pipeline last week was no minor incident

Ghassan Charbel

American influence gradually waned, making the Iranian gateway indispensable for naming the Iraqi prime minister and forming the government. Washington retained punitive leverage, particularly regarding dollar shipments, but Iranian influence infiltrated the very core of Iraqi institutions.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah did not dismantle the structures of the Lebanese state but it seized its keys, monopolizing decisions of war and peace and making entry into the Baabda presidential palace conditional upon a certificate of good conduct from the office of the party’s secretary-general.

Iran dealt skillfully with the emergence of Daesh in Iraq and Syria and applied the same dexterity when the winds of the so-called Arab Spring reached Yemen. Ali Abdullah Saleh attempted to ride out the storm while waiting for an opportunity to circumvent it, but the agenda set for Yemen hastened his death. The Iranian agenda tolerates no obstacles, from Beirut to Sanaa via Baghdad.

Positioning itself within a number of Arab maps allowed Iran to look out onto other Arab maps from within them. For years, Jordan stood between the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces and the pro-Iranian organizations guarding the Assad regime. At the same time, Tehran accelerated the process of providing the Houthis with an arsenal capable of crossing borders and it is now deploying this arsenal when it comes to energy security.

Positioning itself within more than one Arab map gave Iran leverage. The launching of drones from Iraqi territory to target a Saudi oil pipeline last week was no minor incident. Upon assuming the premiership, Ali Al-Zaidi made his position public: that Iraq will not achieve stability and prosperity unless the Iraqi state reclaims its stripped rights. That is, for the state to be the sole decision-maker and for the factions’ weapons to be confined to legitimate institutions.

In contrast, Iran acted on the basis that the factions’ weapons in Iraq, just like Hezbollah’s in Lebanon, are “weapons of resistance” — and it is not the habit of a resistance to surrender its weapons. Al-Zaidi rushed to take measures following the attack that targeted Saudi Arabia but Iran has no intention of relinquishing the leverage of its ability to mobilize the factions.

What comes after the US midterm elections? Will Iran return to the negotiating table while holding the keys to the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab Al-Mandab Strait? Can the world afford to leave its economy at the mercy of the policeman of the two straits?