Why Iran is risking so much over the Strait of Hormuz

After 10 days of exchanging strikes with the US over control of the vital Strait of Hormuz waterway, Iran’s leaders may appear to have three choices. None offer a clear route to victory.

The first is to accept much of what Washington wants: guarantee free and safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz by ending attacks on commercial shipping, give up or dilute Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium, and accept intrusive inspections by the global nuclear watchdog.

In return, Tehran would seek an end to the US naval blockade on Iranian ports, sanctions relief, and protection from further attacks.

This is probably the least costly option, but also the costliest politically.

Reopening Hormuz without securing a recognised Iranian role in managing the waterway would mean surrendering what some in Tehran increasingly see as a newly discovered deterrent, one that may now appear more effective than Iran’s missiles, regional proxies, or even its nuclear programme.

For the first time, the Islamic Republic has demonstrated its ability to impose immediate costs on the global economy for an attack on its territory by its enemies.

The nuclear programme, meanwhile, has long been presented as a right that Iran cannot be forced to abandon.

Conceding to demands for tight restrictions on nuclear activities after months of attacks would allow hardliners to argue that American military pressure had worked. It could also open the door to further demands over Iran’s missile programme and its relationships with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iraqi Shia groups and Yemen’s Houthis.

The second option is escalation. Iran could intensify its attacks on American bases in the region, shipping, and vital infrastructure in Gulf Arab states, hoping that higher energy prices and wider disruption would force Washington and its allies to compromise.

This carries the greatest military risk. An attack causing mass casualties or serious damage to Gulf infrastructure could draw Iran’s neighbours more directly into the conflict and leave it facing a broader coalition.

The third option is to preserve the current instability: enough pressure on shipping and energy markets to retain leverage, but not enough to trigger a return to all-out war with the US.

This seems to fit the Islamic Republic’s established thinking. Iran does not need to defeat a stronger enemy if it can survive for longer than that enemy is willing to fight. Survival itself can be presented as victory. But sanctions, war damage and inflation are steadily increasing pressure at home.

And as time goes on, a paradox may emerge: The more Iran uses the Strait of Hormuz as a weapon, the less powerful it could become if countries find new ways to export energy and other goods out of the region.

Parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has acknowledged the contradiction, arguing that the value of Hormuz lies in increasing the volume of shipping through it rather than reducing it. A permanently unsafe waterway encourages the world to find ways around Iran.