Arab News | Riyadh airport attack: When a strategy backfires

The horrific crime committed against travelers at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh requires little investigation or scrutiny. There is no need to collect fingerprints. The perpetrator had already threatened to carry it out. Such an act is hardly out of character, given its rhetoric, methods and history. It is, after all, an arsenal in search of a confrontation to justify its existence and convince its sponsors that it is worth the money spent on it. An arsenal that has brought about repeated wars and airstrikes as though it can survive only in the turbulent waters of conflict. It instinctively understands that peace is its foremost enemy and that stability leaves it no place. It was created to fight both peace and stability.

The crime came after the Houthi militia lost its ability to maintain a presence in the Bab Al-Mandab Strait. Control of the waterway would have greatly enhanced the militia’s value to its sponsors. It had hoped to offer Iran a way to compensate for the serious damage inflicted by the US military on Tehran’s plans to close the Strait of Hormuz. But the Houthis’ push into the wider region proved to be something of a booby-trapped role that exploded in the hands of the one playing it.

Rarely in the history of warfare has a civilian airport crowded with passengers been the target of an attack. Committing a crime of this magnitude most likely reflects the perpetrator’s panic. By seizing Bab Al-Mandab, the militia had hoped to establish itself as a player whose existence or role could no longer be ignored. It may even have hoped to secure some rewards in exchange for assurances to the “Great Satan” that it would not target its ships.

Rarely in the history of warfare has a civilian airport crowded with passengers been the target of an attack

Ghassan Charbel

But events took a different turn. The militia may have panicked when Yemen’s internationally recognized government launched “Operation Dawn of Yemen,” presenting it as a campaign extending well beyond the recapture of the strait and its surroundings. The offensive was given a broader objective: to destabilize and weaken the Houthis’ ministate, paving the way for its eventual downfall.

Another factor may have alarmed the Houthis: the exposure of the militia’s true role before the region and the world. Forces that had previously urged caution in confronting the militia and sought mitigating circumstances for its actions came to recognize beyond doubt that the Houthis had deliberately squandered every opportunity for a settlement. Their very existence is inseparable from the regional mission assigned to them under Iran’s broader agenda for the Middle East.

The Houthis raised thunderous slogans, including “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.” Yet their actions made clear that these slogans were merely a cover for their primary mission: targeting Saudi Arabia.

This is hardly surprising. Over recent decades, Saudi Arabia has stood as a formidable barrier to the objectives of the coup in Yemen and the much larger upheaval engineered by Iran across the region. Saudi Arabia’s political, economic and regional weight prevented the entire region from falling into the grip of that broader Iranian project, which succeeded in making inroads in certain countries but failed to wrest control of the Gulf’s decisions or the region’s destiny.

The nature of Saudi Arabia’s role stands in direct opposition to the foundations of this sweeping campaign to overturn the regional order. The Kingdom is a force for stability, committed to the principles of international legitimacy and the peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiation. It also acts with the highest degree of responsibility toward the stability of the global economy, the flow of energy and the security of supply chains.

Saudi Arabia has never conceded to the architects of this broader upheaval the right to reshape the regional balance of power according to their interests. It opposed their strategy of undermining governments and transferring decision-making authority to militias. It remained committed to supporting legitimate authorities in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine.

The Kingdom responded positively to every effort by successive Iraqi governments to rebuild state institutions and extend their authority across the country. It adopted the same approach toward the Lebanese state’s efforts to reclaim decisions of war and peace and ensure that weapons remain exclusively in the hands of legitimate authorities.

The importance of this Saudi role has grown considerably following the series of shocks that struck several countries in the aftermath of the earthquake unleashed by the attacks of Oct. 7, 2023.

It is no exaggeration to say that the region is heading into some decisive weeks. This is not only because of the elections scheduled in Israel and the US but also because of the uncertainty surrounding the situation in Iran.

Excessive uranium enrichment was a gamble fraught with danger, just like the Houthis’ seizure of Bab Al-Mandab

Ghassan Charbel

Reading the Iranian political landscape was easier under Ayatollah Khomeini, who held all the strings of power. It was also easier under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who skillfully managed Iran’s game of regional “conquests” while maintaining a balance among the country’s institutions.

Under the third era, that of Mojtaba Khamenei, the picture is more difficult to decipher. The current supreme leader has yet to make a public appearance, reinforcing the impression that war could erupt at any moment despite ongoing mediation efforts.

This situation raises an important question about who makes decisions in Iran today. Does the final word rest with the supreme leader and his office? Or does decision-making emerge from an alignment between the supreme leader’s wishes and those of the generals of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps?

Do the generals believe that Iran’s enormous losses from the naval blockade and economic strangulation make it imperative to seek a way out? Or do they regard another round of war as inevitable?

Do they believe that the role of President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is merely to buy time until the next confrontation? And do they believe that Iran’s regional proxies must play their part if another round of fighting breaks out, regardless of the hardships their countries have faced as a result of previous adventures?

The Iranian regime went too far in shaking the foundations of regional stability. It expanded its reach across the region and eventually came to need a nuclear umbrella to prevent its own campaign of upheaval from being overturned. It was at this point that its role backfired, as US aircraft struck Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Excessive uranium enrichment was a gamble fraught with danger, just like the Houthis’ seizure of Bab Al-Mandab and the crime at Riyadh airport. This is what happens when a role explodes in the hands of the one playing it.